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ABSTRACT

This work argues that leading forms of contemporary
moral realism are inadequate, and that the ph~1osoph~ca2 at·
tempt to vindicate the naive moral realism implicit within
popular ethical opinion is misguided.

In their place a form

of moral anti-realism is defended which construes the appro·
priateness or inappropriateness of moral practices and the
correctness or incorrectness of moral judgments as relative
to linguistic conventions, but it is also argued that such
relativism does not undermine the objectivity of moral truth
if one is prepared to adopt Blackburn's (1984) quasi-realist
conception of ontological comnitment.
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INTRODUCTION
Moral claims (or statements) and the moral practices
into which they are woven form an essential part of our
lives.

However, the relationship between moral language and

practice has not typically been appreciated. in that there has
been a tendency (especially on the part of moral realists) to
view moral sentences in isolation and not to realize that a
complete understanding of moral claims requires an understanding of their function within a context among speakers.
A commonplace view, shared by philosophers and non-philosophers alike, is that our actions, our institutions, the
virtues and vices we as persons exhibit--in a word, our moral
practices--are one thing, whereas what we s8yabout these
things, the questions we raise, the conunands we utter--in
general, our moral discourse--is quite another thing.

It is

thought that our moral practices depend for neither their existence nor their correctness or incorrectness upon the existence and nature of moral discourse.

It is thought, for ex-

ample, that the practice of infanticide is (or is not) morally permissible independent of persons' abilities to recognize
and assert as much.

On this view, the truth or falsehood of

moral statements (•Infanticide is wrong."), the appropriateness or inappropriateness of moral commands ( Do not practice
0

infanticide!•), the relevance or irrelevance of a moral question (•Should we commit infanticide?•) is not dependent upon
the capacities of language-users or the conventions of any
linguistic cormnunity.

I call this view D8~ve mor81 re81~s.m.

It is informed by an uncritical but natural attitude toward
1

moral discourse and the moral practices to which it apparently refers.

It is uncritical in the sense that it is typical-

ly not adopted as the result of rational deliberation, but
that is natural: generally speaking children do not learn to

attach a realistic semantic interpretation to moral discourse
by convincing themselves of the truth of PrjJZCj'p.ia Eth.ica.
It is this common sense view which meta-ethicists as diverse
as Moore (1903), Boyd (1988) and Brink (1989) seek to vindicate.

One of the principal theses of this dissertation is

that the vindication of moral discourse and moral practice
(what together with their relation I refer to as mora.l.itYJ is
neither possible nor necessary.

I shall argue, instead, for

what may (after Arrington, 1989) be called the autonomy of
mora.l.i ty.

Arguments against the poss.ib.i.l.ityof vindicating naive
moral realism fall into two categories:

there is a body of

criticism against spec.ifj'c foundational forms of realism, and
there are more general criticisms, stemming from
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which call into question the
very idea of foundationalist epistemology itself.
With respect to the first line of criticism, a number of
specific realisms defended during the Twentieth Century will
be presented and criticized. The foundationalist moral realisms of the Twentieth Century can be classified according
to their epistemological forbears as rationalist, intuitionist and empiricist.

The rationalists--Gewirth (1978), Gert,

(1966) and Donagan (1977) --are to some degree or other de-

2

scendents of the Cartesian tradition. 1

Like Descartes, they

hold that one's beliefs tibout one's beliefs may be incorrigible and that the contents of one's beliefs may exhibit certain features (like Descartes' own criteria of clarity and
distinctness) which guarantee correspondence between mental
contents and facts which make such contents true.

Against

such views it will be argued that if justification requires
internal certifiability, then an infinite regress is generated that precludes the possibility of an adequate foundation.
Just this sort of argument has been offered against correspondence theories of truth by philosophers as diverse as
Kant (1787), Frege (1897), and Moore (1899).

I do not be-

lieve that these arguments undermine the possibility of there
be.ing correspondence (that is, of the possibility of truth as
being a kind of correspondence) so much as they undermine the
possibility of Jcnor1edgs being correspondence that is internally certifiable.
same thing.

Knowledge and true belief are not the

Nevertheless, the argument does cut against the

project of vindicating naive moral realism, if that project
is construed as one of providing morality with a foundation
of this sort.
Intuitionists, like G. E. Moore, tend to be direct,
rather than representational, realists.

According to Moore,

one has direct, unmediated access to objects and their properties and the facts into which they figure. 2

Because con-

'Not all rationalists accept a correspondence theory of
truth. Goldman (1988), for example, accepts a coherence theory of truth. Because his is not an attempt to establish a
form of realism~ it is not dealt with below.
2 This is slightly misleading as, for Moore, objects just
are concatenations of properties.
3

sciousness and judgment effect a direct relation to objects
and their properties and relations, the problem of detennining whether one's mental contents correspond to reality is
avoided.

A11 objects and properties of which one may be

aware possess mind-independent existence.

Natural properties

(i.e., those which occur in time and space) are accessed by
means of perception.

Non-natural properties, such as those

referred to by the words Mt1NO," Mbeautiful" and ugood," are
accessed by means of a special faculty of intuition.
Moore's view thus contains t1NO principal theses:

(i)

that ugood" denotes a property that enjoys an objective onto·
logical status, and (ii) that it denotes a non-natural property.

His arguments for both these claims will be examined

and found wanting.

As suggested above, it does not follow

from the fact that one cannot knowwhether one's mental con·
tents correspond to reality, that no such contents exist and,
therefore, that we have direct access to objects and proper·
ties.

In fact, arguments such as the Argument from Illusion

provide abductive evidence to support the hypothesis that
they do exist.

Thesis (i) is found wanting on other grounds.

If direct realism (in general) and intuitionism (with respect
to mathematics and ethics) makes it possible for there to be
direct knowledge of the objects of consciousness, then it
also seems to preclude the possibility of error.

I will

argue that ethical intuitionism fails to account for how per·
sons may fonn false moral beliefs.
Thesis (ii) derives from Moore's argument that no infor·
mation concerning.that to which ugoodw refers may be garnered
4

from facts about the natural world.

To think otherwise is to

commit what Moore refers to as the NaturaJ~st~c FaJJacy.
Here my principal criticism is, not that one can draw inferences about moral properties from premises solely concerning
natural properties, but that such information is at least a
necessary component in many or most inferences regarding
moral properties.
An interesting alternative to the intuitionism of Moore,

which avoids many of its difficulties, stems from the recent
work of J. J. Katz within semantic theory.

Katz is a s81118n-

t~c intuitionist, but his viewpoint carries important impli-

cations for meta-ethics.

According to semantic intuitionism,

all expressions have a sense.

These senses are abstract pla-

tonic entities, and, as such, they are in no way part of the
natural order.

Senses are not dependent for their existence

either upon the capacities of language-users or the conventions of a linguistic community.

Even if no sapient creature

were to exist in the universe, there would still exist senses, there to be grasped under the appropriate conditions.

In

contrast to Moore, a sense (or meaning) is not to be identified with an expression's referent.

Grasping or intuiting

the same sense, however, makes it possible for persons to
communicate and refer to the very same thing.

Because refer-

ence is mediated by sense, other things being equal, determinancy of sense entails determinancy of reference. 3

This means

The ceter~s par~bus clause here expresses that, for Katz,
reference is accomplished by adhering to pragmatic principles
as well as semantic principles. Thus senses med~ate rather
than fully determine reference. The other things which must
be equal, if conmunication is to occur and reference is to be
mutual, is an understanding of these pragmatic principles.
1

5

that what is correctly called •good" and correctly called
•bad" have nothing to to do with the proclivities of individuals or the customs of societies.
Katz's view is not without its advantages.

Like Moore,

he appeals to platonic entities (even though these entities
are the senses rather than the referents of expressions), and
it is this fact which provides the underpinning of a kind of
moral realism.

Unlike direct realism, this view can accommo-

date false judgments; and because it construes the entities
which mediate reference as mind-independent, it avoids problems connected with ~ntsrna1 certifiability with which rationalist theories are faced.

Nevertheless, I believe that

Katz's argument runs aground precisely at that point at which
he claims best explanation status for his platonic senses.
In contrast, I believe that concrete linguistic tokens belong
among the determinants of reference.

My

argument against

Katz prefigures the view I shall ultimately defend, which is
largely Wittgenstein-ian in that it gives prominence to the
semantic role which linguistic tokens play.
The next group of realists are the epistemological heirs
of Locke and Mill.

Empiricists such as Sturgeon (1988) and

Boyd (1988) assimilate moral reasoning to scientific reasoning.

They consider the methodology of the best science of

the day as providing a paradigm for what counts as justified
belief.

Unlike rationalist foundationalists, they do not

count indubitability (i.e, the impossibility of error) among
the necessary conditions for knowledge.

They maintain, in

contrast, that any claim that proceeds from methods analogous
6

to those found in the empirical sciences may be regarded as
justified.

Each in his own way thinks that the formation and

confirmation and disconfirmation of moral judgments approximates processes evident within the empirical sciences.
Although they disagree over what counts as the best science,
they agree that if moral claims can be made scientifically
respectable, then they should carry ontological commitment.
Of tne two views I shall examine, Boyd's (1988) is the most
sophisticated.

He maintains that moral decision-making exem-

plifies a form of reflective equilibrium found in the empirical sciences.
Against this line of reasoning Quine's (1981b) thesis
that ethics is methodologically infirm is most relevant.

I

do not agree with Quine's conception of ontological commitment in terms of what a theory quantifies over and what is
presupposed by quantification (i.e., the existence of sets),
but I do want to defend his claim that ~fontological commitment is to be cashed out in these terms, then ethics comes up
dry.
Finally, it can be argued that normative ethical reasoning and scientific reasoning are unlike one another in terms
of their goals.

Science seeks explanation; ethics seeks jus-

tification.
Up to this point a number of foundationalist and (more
generally) justificationist moral realist positions and the
specific objections that will be directed against them have
been sketched.

More general criticisms, which hail from

Wittgenstein's later philosophy, may be directed against the
7

whole enterprise of foundationalism, however that enterprise
may be conceived.

Particularly relevant are Wittgenstein's

views concerning the nature of rules and rule-following.
What his arguments show is that the rules we follow--including those which underlie our moral discourse--are not given,
and indeed need not be given, any of the forms of justification thusfar considered.

Each of the justificationist ap-

proaches is, in one manner or another, cognitivist in nature
in that it regards as justificatory some propos.it.ion that is
arrived at by means of some rational, intuitional, or empirical method.

What Wittgenstein shows is that nothing of the

sort is possible, that linguistic practices are in an important sense ungrounded.
Are we therefore entitled to be skeptics with respect to
our ordinary moral judgments?

Earlier I claimed that it was

neither possible nor necessary to vindicate naive moral realism by providing it with an epistemological justification.
Thus, my view is at odds with the traditional current found
in moral epistemology.
Traditionally, realists and their opponents have assumed
that we are entitled to moral skepticism in the absence of
adequate epistemological justification.

It is felt that

without such a justification ordinary prescriptions--for example, the prescription against killing one's neighbor--couJd
turn out to be false.

What is wanted is some kind of guaran-

tee that killing one's neighbor is wrong.

Now, surely, some-

thing has gone awry if someone genuinely utters the question,
•rs there any guarantee that killing one's neighbor is
8

wrong?"

We would be entitled to feel dismay.

We would

think, to use Wittgenstein's phrase, that language had gone
on a ho1~day (1958, #38), and we would ask, •Which word do

you not understand:

'guarantee' or 'killing'?••

The speak-

er's words might invite dismay, they might even precipitate a
certain degree of anguish over our own safety; they would
not, however, invite moral skepticism by enticing us to seriouslessly countenance the moral permissibility of killing our
hapless neighbor.

I contend that the justificatory approach-

es that have animated so much of the history of meta-ethics
is ill conceived.

•The difficulty,# as Wittgenstein puts it,

•is to realize the groundlessness of our believing• (1969, #
170), and to realize that its groundlessness is not a flaw
but a feature of its very nature.

Morality is in this way

autonomous.
Where does this leave naive moral realism?

Should we

accept the conunon sense presumption that moral judgments are
made true or false by the appropriateness or inappropriate-

ness of the practices to which they refer (where the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a practice is not merely a
reflection of the opinion of the subject or the conventions
of the society)?

I believe this is a complex question that

cannot simply be answered either affirmatively or negatively.
4 In a similar vein, mocking Moore's assumption that a belief in .the objectivity of physical objects stands in need of
defense, Wittgenstein says:
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden;
he says again and again •r know that that's a
tree,~ pointing to a tree that is near us.
Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell
him: •This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing
philosophy• (1969, # 467).

9

This is so for three reasons:

(a) ordinary semantic dis-

course consists of a diverse number of forms and even what
appear to be diverse JeveJs of forms (comparable perhaps to
the distinction between practical ethics, normative ethics
and meta-ethics),

(b) it is not clear what truth in ethics

consists in, or whether what counts as truth in ethics falls
under one concept or several, and (c) it is not obvious at
all what standard of ontological conmitment is appropriate
for meta-ethics:

internal certifiabilty, quantification

under a theory, transcendental criteria of invariance, or
pragmatic necessity.

Matters are complicated by the fact

that a great deal of the discourse which constitutes naive
moral realism already embodies much that is Cartesian:

the

distinction between subjectivity and objectivity (which gives
rise to a conception of ontological commitment in terms of
internal certifiability) is very much a part of our culture.
If these Cartesian elements are false, as I maintain, then at
least certain aspects of naive moral realism are false.
More important for us than the justificationist thesis,
which may be inherent in naive moral realism, is the semantic
and metaphysical thesis that statements of moral judgment are
made true by moral objects, properties or facts which possess
objective existence.

Is it possible to defend realism on

other than justificationist (i.e., on other than rationalist,
intuitionist, and empiricist) grounds?

One group of real-

ists, with whom I am partJysympathetic, regards the autonomy
of morality as indicating the mean~ngJessness of utterances
which deny, for example, that murder is wrong.
10

These

philosophers--Platts (1979) and McDowell (1988) --may best be
described as non-justificationist or descri'pt~ve realists.
The latter term is particularly apt in that they accept
Wittgenstein's admonition to •look and see• (1958, # 66) how
moral terms are used and how moral judgments are made.
Denials of the sort just mentioned fall outside of the bounds
of sense and cannot be genuinely uttered by someone who participates in our form of life.

Someone who sincerely be-

lieves murder is not wrong, is not raising serious doubts
about the moral fabric of the world; rather, what is called
into question are the subject's own capacities and dispositions.

Platts would say that the subject lacks certain spon-

tansous conv~ct~onswhich arise within and unify the members
of a community.

McDowell, alternatively, will describe such

persons as lacking in certain moral sens~.b~1~t~es.

Both

views are heirs to Wittgenstein's contention that persons who

are at odds with the community over the use of a term (and
using the word •permissible• in the context of and with reference to a murder would be a case in point) actually are
.b1~nd to the meaning of the term in question. 5

As the term

•meaning-blindness• is meant to suggest, one who fails to understand the meaning of a word is not related to his or her
surroundings in the appropriate sort of way, and what is considered to be the appropriate or r~ght way is determined by
the members of that conmunity.

This opens the way to acer-

Actually Wittgenstein speaks of •aspect-blindness• (1958,
pp. 213-214), but he does so in order to highlight the similarity between an inability to see certain aspects of a drawing (for example, not being able to see Jastow's duck-rabbit
as a duck) an inability to understand the meaning of a word.
11
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tain kind of realism.

The individual whose view is at odds

with the view held by the rest of that society is seen as not
having (yet) d~scoversdwhat the truth of the matter really
is.

Such an individual, for whatever reason, just cannot see

what everyone else sees as the correct response.

On the

other hand, where there is agreement (and of this there may
not be much), there objectivity is to be found.

What moral

facts there are is determined by which moral beliefs are
agreed upon by the members sharing a form of 2~fe.

A form of

life consists in shared practices (linguistic and othe:rwise).
Such practices are seen as necessary or essential to that way
of life.
This view, although it regards its own practices as
groundless, does appear to be compatible with justificationist views in the sense that both types of views point to a
certain necess~tywith regard to what can be said by us.
Such a view, for instance, would not be at odds with a view
that would maintain that if certain moral practices are universal or invariant across cultures, then talk of moral facts
is appropriate.

Rachels (1986), for instance, points out

that, if we find that the practice of caring for one's children is universal, if the linguistic practice of assenting to
the claim that one ought to care for one's children is invariant across cultures, then we are entitled to regard the
obligation to care for one's children as a moral fact.
Rachels holds that many disagreements concerning moral issues
revolve around disagreements over non-moral facts.

For exam-

ple, the current issue over whether abortion is morally per12

missible is fueled at least in part by the divergent worldviews of (at least some of) the proponents of each side of
that debate.

Furthermore, argues Rachels, divergent prac-

tices can often be subsumed under a single moral principle
once economic and other social pressures have been taken into
account.

The practice of infanticide among traditional

Eskimo peoples can, for example, be shown to be a means by
which to preserve the family against destruction under harsh
conditions.

For Rachels certain moral practices must neces-

sarily be observed by any society which is to survive.
It is not my intention to attempt to resolve the question of whether moral practices can be subsumed under sets of
principles that are invariant across cultures.

What is of

interest to me is that as a matter of fact some moral practices are subject to critique, a point not easily accorrmodated by the realism just described.

Some practices seem to be

evaluated in terms of their capacity to be subsumed under
other practices which either are or are not regarded asappropriate.

This fact has long been recognized within norma-

tive ethics where it is customary to draw a distinction between primary and secondary principles (cf. Rachels, 1986 pp.
99-101).

That some practices are more basic and less contro-

versial than others is not something we would expect to find,
if the realist conception just described were true or, at
least, if it were the whole story.

If nothing else, some

kind of distinction should be drawn between moral statements
for which justification is rarely asked and those for which
justification is customarily sought and to which assent is
13

given only as a result of some critical process.
Furthermore, some kind of distinction should be observed be·
tween statements designed. to inculcate basic moral concepts
(to a child, for example) and those that presuppose as much
but which extend the application of a moral concept.

Or,

again, it would appear that moral agents learn what is wrong
in quite a different manner than they learn what is permissi·
ble:

the former a matter of explicit training, the latter

not.

These are not merely epistemological distinctions.

Given the descriptive realist's conception of ontological
conanitment, it is relevant that the non-existence of certain
practices is conceivable.
What I find valuable in descriptive realism is its thesis that (some) moral practices are groundless (obviously the
claim that 411 practices deemed moral are groundless will
have to be revised in light of the counter-examples).

That

at least some moral principles cannot be justified rationally
is consistent with the thesis of the autonomy of morality.
However, descriptive realism's standard for ontological commitment must be viewed as suspect.

It holds that one is en-

titled to regard something as real, provided. the non-exis·
tence of the practices which occur as if it exists is incon·
ceivable.

So there is a moral fact of murder being wrong,

just in case we cannot conceive of the elimination of the
practices of prohibiting murder, pronouncing it wrong, etc.
Or, conversely, there would be no such moral fact, only if we
could conceive of the possibility of there being a society
which makes a habit of engaging in murder, praising it, and
14

so forth.

The Kantian flavor of this approach gives away its

rationalist underpinnings.

Although the concept of objectiv-

ity for these realists is not what it was for those working
within the Cartesian and Lockean tradition, their allegiance
to to principles "1hose oppos~te ~s ~nconce~va.b1e suggests, at
the least, a closet acceptance of justificationism, particularly as it finds a voice in Kant's transcendental conditions
for morality~

I suspect that realists who make much of our

fonn of 1~fe, for all their concern with pract~ces that are

groundless, covertly accept some sort of coherence version of
justificationism.

They believe one cannot say, e.g., that

murder is permissible without contradicting much of what else
is said about what is right, wrong, just or unjust.

One

could perhaps deny that murder is wrong without immediately
contradicting oneself, but saying such would be inconsistent
with everything e1se one says and does.

On this view, cer-

tain moral practices appear to be necessary conditions underlying the very existence of society; and certain moral principles appear elevated to the status of necessary truths.
By way of criticism, I shall argue that descriptive realism, for all its advantages over justificationist approaches to realism, misconstrues the logical and semantic status
of the propositions it holds to be necessarily true and presupposes a false view concerning the nature of ontological
corrmitment.

The two principal theses for which I shall argue

in this dissertation are:

(1) that the ultimate moral prin-

ciples which are referred to by realists are, to use
Wittgenstein's term, grilm118t~ca1 propositions, and (2) that
15

ontological conunitment is, as one might say, a matter of
pri.iX.is rather than thsor.ie.

To say that statements such as "One ought to keep one's
promises" express grammatical propositions is to say that
such statements are the expression of a linguistic convention.

Thus one expresses the convention that language users

c811 keeping one's promises •something one ought to do."

The

statement "It is wrong to treat others disrespectfully" expresses the fact that language users refer to the disrespectful treatment of others as •wrong.•

Such circumstances as

these provide us with cr.iter.ia for saying "That is something
one ought to have done• or "that was wrong," which is not to
say they provide us with ev.idence that an obligation has been
met or that wrongdoing has occurred.

They are, to borrow a

phrase from Dunmett, among the assert4b..i1.ity cond..it.ions for
the sentences containing the words in question.
matical proposition one learns what speakers'

From a gram-

met!!ll1

by, under

what conditions they use, a particular word or phrase.

The

breaking of a promise serves as one of the myriad instances
under which a child learns how "ought," "obligation,• and
"wrong" are used, and it learns to form expectations concerning the behaviors of those who use them.

Typically the ut-

terance of a gramnatical proposition to someone who has al-

ready mastered the uses of such words serves as a rem.indero£
the sort of circumstance under which the use of the word was
mastered:

the original breaking of a promise was no doubt

surrounded by numerous events--perhaps the damaged expectations of a friend; parental disappointment, or some form of
16

punishment--but among those events there was the utterance of
•one ought to keep one's promisesn or something similar.'
Here a sliver of the original context in which one mastered
the linguistic t!ll1d other practices of those who call breaking
a promise uwrong• is re-presented in the hope that the hearer
shall again become disposed to follow the customs of the
tribe.

It might be said that the utterance of a grammatical

proposition provides the occ8s~on for the hearer's behavior
(linguistic and otherwise) to be realigned. 7
The great error of the descriptive realists is to construe grammatical propositions as synthetic 8 pr~or~ statements.

They believe that from the necessity which appears to

attach to statements like •rt is wrong to treat others disrespectfully,• one can milk information concerning the moral
structure of the world, a structure that is independent of
human proclivity and custom.

But to think this is to lose

sight of the essential function of grammatical propositions:
their tokens, uttered within particular contexts and followed
by particular behaviors, estilb2~sh linguistic practices and
concordant behaviors.

It is to this fact that I alluded at

the outset of this Introduction when I said that naive moral
realism and its philosophical offspring misunderstand the re-

lationship between moral discourse and moral practice.

The

mistake is in not recognizing that moral discourse is itself
a pr8ct~ce, and, in particular, it lies in not recognizing
the particular kind of practice that uttering a grammatical
• Wittgenstein: •The work of the philosopher consists in
assembling reminders for a particular purposen (1958, #127).
7 Meaning-blindness is attributed to
the person for whom all
such attempts fail.
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remark consists in.

Among our linguistic practices is that

of say2ngor asserting something to be true.

In contrast,

the utterance of a grammatical proposition sho,m what can be
called •true.•

Such utterances are, in a sense to be ex-

plained more fully in the final chapter, antecedent to truth.
In an important respect they say nothing, not because they
express mere conventions and are thus incapable of being either true or false of mind-independent facts, but because
their occurrence determines what can be said to be true or
false.

They set the stage for, provide the linguistic scaf-

folding for, the practice of calling statements of a certain
form "true.•

As I remarked earlier, they re-present a sliver

of the context in which various practices are mastered.

We

lose sight of the non-cognitive nature of these expressions,
because it is customary to say they are true (even necessarily true) or that their truth is presupposed by the truth of
more particular claims {such as "You should keep your promises") or that they constitute a kind of definition (they might
indeed be regarded as operat~ona2 definitions); even
Wittgenstein's use of the term ,,proposition• suggests a content.

I view these customs as remnants of a rationalist as-

sumption inherent in our cul~ure that all meaningful utterances must have cognitive value, a propositional core.
It is appropriate to label the view just sketched as a
form of moral ant2-rea2~·sm.

The term •moral anti-realism"

may be applied to any account of moral practices which construes the appropriateness of such practices as the mere reflection of human tendencies or customs.
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If these tendencies

or customs change, so does morality itself.

Changes in moral

practice are not symptomatic of greater or lesser accord with
moral facts which exist independently of the minds of those
who perform moral judgments or the societies these minds inhabit.

In the version sketched above the appropriateness of

a particular practice is dependent upon the linguistic conventions of the persons who deem such practices appropriate.
What is wrong, for example, depends on what is counted as
wrong, what is sa~d to be wrong, upon what moral statements
we ca11 true, and these depend upon what grammatical propositions one is trained to live in accordance with.
One thing that is distinctive about this form of antirealism is that it construes the claims and queries of the
moral realist, not as false, but as nonsens~ca1.

This much

was already suggested with regard to the foundationalist's
question nWhat guarantee do we have that breaking a promise
is wrong?"

There is something peculiar in thinking that we

must be ent~t1ed to regard breaking promises as really wrong.
(Should we we1come our children to the comnunity of human response?)

If anything, the first part of the statement nit

reii1..ly ~s a fact that breaking promises is wrong" makes more
emphatic the utterance of the gramnatical proposition which
follows.

Just as grade school teachers clap their hands to

gain their students' attention, it readies its audience to
take a serious stance toward what follows.

In their ordinary

context such utterances have a use; it is when they are interpreted as expressing deep metaphysical truths that the
danger arises.

Stripped of their normal context their tokens
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become bits of nonsense.
Shall we then say that there is no truth or objectivity
in ethics?

Are we to resign ourselves to thinking of our

moral pronouncements as essentially false or arbitrary?
think not.

I

One of the purposes of this dissertation is not

only to demonstrate the nonsensica1 nature of such realist
pronouncements and questions as mentioned above, but to expose the nonsensical nature of utterances which occupy, as it
were, the opposite end of the spectrum:

"There is no truth

in ethics,• -What's right for you is right for you, what's
right for me is right for me,• and others of their ilk.
There is a tendency to think that because the realists'
questions cannot be answered affirmatively (or simply cannot
be anSMrJred, as I would have it), statements of the latter
sort are justified.

But underlying statements which occupy

either extreme is a false conception of ontological commitment.

What is common to both the justificationist and de-

scriptive forms of realism is the view that ontological commitment is a kind of accomp1ishment, in particular that it is
a cognitive accomplishment.

They see the matter as a ratio-

nal process that terminates in a decision concerning flHJat
there ~s.

I do not think that we ontologically commit our-

selves, but that we become committed through our activities
and practices.

To put the point in a somewhat Heideggerian

manner, we are throM:J .into a world which is in part comprised
of customs and practices.

Following Blackburn (1984), I con-

tend that ontological commitment consists in a stance we take
towards certain salient features of our environment (includ20

ing our social environment).

We allow ourselves to be struck

by such features as present themselves, for example, by the
wrongfulness of breaking a promise.

It does not matter that

the manner in which we ascribe wrongfulness to actions stems
from convention (i.e., that wrongfulness is, what Blackburn
calls, a •projected" or •spread" property), for wrongfulness
is a feature of our world.
Moral realists will perhaps be put off by this phenomenalizing of our ontological commitments.

This view, they

will argue, places morality as well as everything else within
the sphere of subjectivity.
placed.

But I think this concern is mis-

The Wittgensteinian conception of language defended

in the course of this dissertation does not treat the use of
language as the mere expression of what is subjective.

If

anything, the traditional subject/object dichotomy is called
into question.

Language is essent~a11ya set of social (and

always potentially public) practices.

This is the lesson of

Wittgenstein's private language argument.

Moral discourse

is, as it were, out there among its 'objects.'

Once we view

morality as consisting of mutually affective practices (some
of which are linguistic practices), the bogey of moral skepticism begins to fade.

Once light has been cast upon what

was once regarded as darkly subjective, there remains no
place for the skeptic to dwell.

Thus, the phenomena1.iz.ing of

the objects of moral judgment is offset by the object~v.iz.ing
of language itself.
Moral anti-realism should not occasion moral skepticism
or even a laissez-faire, come-what-may attitude regarding
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one's actions and the actions of others.

Such attitudes are

engendered by the belief or the desire for there to be h4rd
moral facts beyond the phenomena.

But, even though.this can-

not be the case, morality exists!

Its life is our own.

lives in our actions and is no less real than they.

It

In the

end, moral anti-realism enjoins us to take responsibility for
the morality which is our creation.
I think the value of this dissertation lies in the fact
that it points to the importance of engag~ng in normative
ethics, of engaging in the issues of our day and in being an
activist.

Moral rules are not like rails laid in the moral

heavens, they are not dictates of divine command nor of semidivine Reason; virtues do not bear the stamp of Platonic
Forms; rights do not stem from Natural Law.
the posturings of bad faith.

These are but

What is important is to see

that morality answers to us, in an important sense ~s us.
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empiricists.

One might, for example, justify one's perceptu-

al belief that P by appealing to the fact that one perceives
that Pis the case.

Since one can be mistaken about whether

one's faculty of perception is functioning properly, to claim
as much is to offer non-inductive evidence.

But because he

is a direct realist, if the faculty in question is functioning properly, then the belief is incorrigible. 10

Properly

functioning faculties--including a properly functioning faculty of moral intuition--provide more than non-deductive evidence:

they provide direct access to the truths of proposi-

tions."
Although the philosophers examined in this chapter disagree as to what constitutes justification, they share a desire to provide some sort of justification for the type of
meta-ethical claim discussed earlier.

Each wants to demon-

strate that a belief in the obJect~v~tyof true nonnative
claims is warranted, i.e., that such claims are made true by
moral facts, properties, or objects.

They obviously disagree

with respect to the ontology required to make such claims
true (or false).

Also, they differ with respect to how ex-

plicit this goal appears within their overall project.

One

will not find in Gewirth the statement, •r intend to prove
there are moral properties and facts."

One w~11 find in both

"It occurs to me that Moore's early epistemology is a precursor to contemporary reliabilist theories of knowledge
(e.g., Armstrong, 1973): if one's faculties are functioning
properly, then one would not believe P, unless Pis true.
The difference would primarily lie in Moore's rejection of a
purely physicalist ontology.
11 For the Moore of 1899 propositions and facts are one and
the same (as are concepts and properties); so to be aware of
the truth of a proposition is none other than to be aware
that a certain fact obtains.
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Reason and Horal.ity (1978, p. 175) and his "Replies to My

Critics" (1984, p. 220) the claim that his normative
Principle of Generic Consistency is made true by correspondence to the nonnat.ive structure of action. 12

Moore and Boyd

appeal quite explicitly to the sort of meta-ethical claim
with which we are concerned in order to support their particular versions of utilitarianism, and they attempt to offer
justification for these meta-ethical claims.

And Katz, whose

work in semantic theory bears upon the meta-ethical issues,
does not discuss these issues at all.
2.

MORAL RATIONALISM

Moral rationalists, like Gewirth (1978), Gert,

(1966)

and Donagan (1977), are the philosophical descendants of
Descartes.

It is their goal to provide epistemological foun-

dations for moral judgments in ways analogous to those adopted by Descartes to prove the existence of the external world
whereby the physical sciences were provided with a firm foundation.

For these philosophers a normative ethical theory

must consist of a set of propositions which are (in some
sense) self-evident or derivable from those which are selfevident.

Only if one's moral judgments hail from foundations

such as these can one be said to have moral knowledge.

In

the following section, after briefly describing the Cartesian
An uncritical reading of Gewirth would lead one to think
that what makes the Principle of Generic Consistency true
just is the sort of evidence evinced in the course of the dialectically necessary method for it; but that is to confuse
the grounds which Gewirth offers for accept.ing the principle
(an epistemological matter) with what makes the principle
true (a metaphysical one).
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CHAPTER I
JUSTIFICATORY FORMS OF MORAL REALISM
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The realists of this chapter may be distinguished from
those of the next in terms of the way in which they construe
the question of whether there are moral facts, properties or
objects.

Those considered in this chapter view naive moral

realism as in need of v1nd1cat1on; consequently, they attempt
to provide ,iust1f1cat1on for such claims as, for example,
that there is something about murder that is wrong.

Those of

the next chapter reject the assumption that naive realism
stands in need of justification.

Their concern is not with

justifying these kinds of judgments but with describing and
explaining ho~persons form such judgments, and, consequently, how they go about count1ng (or under what conditions they

regard) something like the wrongness of an action as real.
Obviously, when the time comes, some amount of discussion
will have to be devoted to the issue of whether that sort of
descriptive account deserves to be interpreted ontologically
as a real1sm.

Those discussed in this chapter clearly would

not agree that descriptive and explanatory accounts of the
manner in which persons form ordinary meta-ethical judgments
should in any way be regarded as offering insight into flHlat

there 1s in the moral realm.

If our universe really does in-

clude moral facts, properties or objects, then these philosophers hold that beliefs and statements to that effect stand
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in need of justification.

Unless such justification is in

the offing, unless one can lay claim to meta-ethical know2edge, they maintain that skepticism concerning the objectivi-

ty of morals is appropriate.
The three forms of justificatory realism share in common
a view of knowledge such that S knows P, if and only if (1) S
believes P, (2) Pis true, and (3) Sis justified in believing P. 1

The first condition identifies knowledge with a par-

ticular propositional attitude, namely, the attitude of holding P to be true.

Thus knowledge cannot consist mere2yin

desiring P to be true, fearing P to be true, imagining P to
be true, etc.

Obviously, the mere possession of belief can-

not suffice for having knowledge; otherwise one who entertains a false belief would be in possession of knowledge
every bit as much as one who entertains a true belief.

In

that case the distinction between knowledge and ignorance or
error would collapse, and the very idea of knowledge would
become vacuous.

The third condition has generally been ac-

knowledged by philosophers engaged in epistemology at least
since the time of Plato.

It seems that mere true belief does

not suffice for knowledge, for if it did, one would have to
ascribe knowledge even to those who accept out of ignorance-or simply on the basis of emotion--that a particular proposition is true.

Shall we say that a trial jury that is swayed

by pity to regard a defendant as not guilty knOIJ'S the defendant is not guilty just in case their belief turns out to be
• Let it be noted that the philosophers to be examined do
not explicitly state their commitment to this conception of
knowledge, but that it is implicit in the projects in which
they are engaged.
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true?

It seems we would not ascribe knowledge under these

conditions.

What is required is that the person to whom

knowledge is ascribed be able to offer justification for the
propositions they hold true.

Justification cannot consist

merely in providing an exp2anat~on for why one believes what
one does.

For example, one might explain that one's belief

was produced by pity, or that it was drilled into one by
one's parents, or that one accepted it upon reading a fortune
cookie.

At most these explanations provide insight into the

occasion under which a belief was formed or accepted, but in
no case is justification offered, because in no case is ev~dence evinced in support of the proposition.

The philoso-

phers to be examined below would agree to all this; what distinguishes them is what they require in the way of evidence
or justification.
The sharpest distinction holds between the rationalists
and empiricists, examined below in Sections Two and Four respectively.

Rationalists, like Gewirth, accept Descartes'

foundationalist epistemology.

This requires that justifica-

tion consist in deductive evidence and that the premises offered as evidence be self-evident (in the sense that their
denial entails a contradiction).

The empiricists, like

Sturgeon and Boyd, are amenable to the methodology of science
and, so, to inductive and abductive evidence.

Moore's epis-

temology, which will be examined in Section Three below, is
an interesting hybrid.'

In an important way he is like the

• Please note. that I am only concerned here with Moore's
ve.zy ear2yepistemology, specifically the epistemology of his

1899 article #The Nature of Judgment" which informs Pr~nc~'p~a
Eth~ca (1903) and Eth~cs (1911).
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model of knowledge employed by the rationalists, I shall
focus upon Gewirth's attempt to establish the obJect~v~tyof
his Principle of Generic Consistency (or PGC).

For our pur-

poses it is not problematic to leave Gert's and Donagan's
views unexamined; what is important about these theories is
not so much their content but their method or logical form,
and Gewirth's method is typical.

After examining Gewirth's

argument, the shortcomings of this kind of approach will be
discussed.

In particular I want to argue that such arguments

fall shy of their mark, due to a regress which is generated
in attempting to justify their 1~nk~ngprem.ises, i.e., the
premises which supposedly sanction inferences from claims
about one's own beliefs and desires to conclusions about objective moral facts.
Let us begin by examining the Cartesian model employed
by the rationalists.

This model will involve arguments of

the following form:
(1) Subjective Premise S
(2) Linking Premise L
(3) Objective Conclusion O
Subjective premises are premises concerning the acts or contents of one's own mind.

They carry no import whatsoever

concerning objects or events which may occur external to, or
independent of, the mind itself.

Such propositions as that

one is thinking, doubting, willing, judging, imagining, perceiving (if this is understood not to involve the bodily sensation but the cognition of what appears to be given to bodi28

ly sensation), etc. are to be included, as well as such
propositions as that one is aware (de d~cto) that a given
proposition is the case (e.g., that I am thinking), or am
aware of a mental image (e.g.,that of a unicorn), or of a
perception (e.g., of what appears to be a red object), etc.
For Descartes, such claims are foundational.

One's be-

liefs concerning one's own mental acts are incorrigible.
They are not to be doubted.

The proposition that I am think-

ing passes the method of doubt test.

One cannot doubt that

one is thinking, because to doubt just is to engage in a kind
of thinking; so to doubt that one is thinking appears to entail a kind of contradiction:

the proposition that one could

doubt but not think is as self-contradictory as the proposition that one could be a bachelor but not be unmarried.
Since to be a bachelor Just ~s to be (among other things) unmarried, to assert otherwise would be to assert that it is
possible for someone to both be unmarried and not be unmarried.

But that is impossible without self-contradiction, so

no such doubt can be entertained.

Similarly, it is not pos-

sible to assert that one can doubt but not think, since that
would entail that it is possible that one is both thinking
and not thinking at the very same time.
We are not concerned here with whether Descartes' argument is sound; clearly it is not sound due to its circularity.13

What is important is that the concept of doubt.ing 'con-

11 A contradiction is entailed only if one assumes that it
is a fact that one is doubting. If this is assumed, then it
would not be possible that one ~snot doubting. Thus the
possibility that one is not doubting (thinking) would be removed. Whether this assumption is true is precisely what is
at issue, so the argument is question-begging.

29

tains' the concept of ch~nk~ng (as its genus), so that as
long as Descartes finds himself engaged in doubting, he cannot doubt without contradiction that he is thinking or that
he exists as one who thinks:

u1et him deceive me as much as

he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I
think I am something .... ! am, I exist, is necessarily true
each time I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it"
(1641, p. 150) .

Typically the thesis of the incorrigibility of the mental is taken to extend to other propositions about one's mental life.

So, while one may doubt whether one actually sees

a red object on the horizon, one cannot doubt that one seems
to see such an object.

Although one may doubt whether one

remembers an actual event like the sun rising, one cannot
doubt that one seems to remember such an event.

Presumably

one cannot doubt what one desires, since to seem to desire
something is (supposedly) indistinguishable from actually desiring it.
Descartes' goal was to pass from subjective premises to
an objective conclusion: from, for example, I seem to see objects extended in space before me to chere are objects extended in space before me.
premises.

For this he needed linking

These premises contain criteria for saying that

the contents of one's mental states correspond to external
reality.

For Descartes, these criteria consist of a mental

content's clarity and distinctness.

We need not rehearse

Descartes' argument for why clarity and distinctness are the
mark of correspondence.

Suffice it to say that the formation
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of clear and distinct ideas is essential to the function of
the intellect, and, as also noted in the Hed~tat~ons, that
such functioning could be in error only if God is a deceiver,
a possibility to be discounted on the grounds that a perfect
being could not be deceptive.
tinctness are is unclear.

Exactly what clarity and dis-

One reasonable interpretation is

that a clear idea is tantamount to a definition, whereas a
distinct idea is what is acquired when one discovers the entailments of the definition.

The model here is the axiomatic

method of Euclidean geometry in which theorems are derived
from particular axioms.

So, for example, one would have a

clear conception of a triangle if one knows a triangle is a
three-sided polygon, and one's concept of a triangle would be
distinct if one knows (among other things) that a triangle
cannot be a circle.
Essentially, then, Descartes' proof of the existence of
the material world runs like this:
(1) I seem to perceive that there is a material
world.
(2) My idea that there a material world is clear
and distinct, and clear and distinct ideas
must be true.
(3) My idea that there is a material world is
true.
Premise (1) is the subjective premise which merely reports
the occurrence of a particular kind of idea.

Premise (2),

the linking premise, asserts that the idea of a material
world is a clear and distinct one.

To c1ear1yconceive of

matter is to conceive of something which (if it exists) is
extended in space (extension in space is its essence).
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To

have a distinct idea of matter, one must have deduced that
matter must be distinguished from mind (whose essence is intellect) as well as from God (whose essence is infinite perfection).

If matter is not essentially mind or God, then it

must be a distinct substance that exists apart from the others.

What follows is the objective conclusion:

matter must

exist independent of the mind.

It is not my purpose to offer a critique of Descartes'
argument.

Its flaws (the positing of a self which thinks,

its inconsistent definition of substance, the invalidity of
its ontological argument, and the unsoundness of its cosmological argument) are well known.

On the other hand, the fa-

mous Cartesian Circle will become important below.

Roughly,

the problem is that Descartes must show that clear and distinct ideas are true, if he is to first maintain that it
would be contradictory to deny that he is a thinking thing
and to later contend that it would be contradictory to regard
God as a deceiver.

Since one clearly and distinctly con-

ceives of oneself as a thinking thing, one must be one; since
God is clearly and distinctly conceived as infinitely perfect, God must have existence (as non-existence is a kind of
imperfection) and must be no deceiver (since that would be an
imperfection too).

But the reason why Descartes must prove

God exists and is no deceiver is that he must secure the accuracy of clear and distinct ideas, that is, he must show
that a properly functioning intellect does not produce error
and falsehood.

The problem of providing justification for

linking premises is a major difficulty for correspondence
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theories of knowledge.

It is, indeed, one of the main rea-

sons philosophers have sought alternatives to correspondence
theories.

To what extent it is problematic for Gewirth, we

shall see below.
Gewirth's model is precisely that attributed to
Descartes.

He refers to his starting point as #dialectical"

as opposed to #assertoric," and refers to his method as a
whole as #dialectically necessary" (1978, P. 44).

Simply

stated, the dialectical method considers the nature or meaning of concepts as they are entertained by the mind, quite
apart from any sort of consideration of the actual objects
that are asserted to fall under the concept.

In this way

Gewirth's starting point consists in one or more subjective
premises; the dialectical method, he says:

#proceeds within

the standpoint of the agent, since it begins from statements
or assumptions he makes• (1978, p. 44).

This form of concep-

tual analysis is intended to yield necessary truths:
[A]lthough the dialectically necessary method
proceeds from within the standpoint of the agent,
it also undertakes to ascertain what is necessarily
involved in this standpoint. The statements the
method attributes to the agent are set forth as
necessary ones in that they reflect what is concep
tually necessary ... {1978, p. 44).
These necessary truths are analytic in nature.

Once what is

conceptually necessary has been elucidated, the dialectically
necessary method goes forward by calling attention to further
propositions which are entailed by or presupposed in those
which are analytic.

The subject who possesses the concepts

in question must assent to these latter claims (if only implicitly) on pain of contradiction {1978, p. 48).
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Specifically, Gewirth attempts to deduce from analytic
truths concerning the concept of action his First Principle
of normative ethics, the Principle of Generic Consistency,
which prescribes to M[a]ct in accord with the generic rights
of your recipients [i.e., those who can be affected by your
actions] and yourself" (1978, p. 135).

As we shall see, the

PGC is what is traditionally referred to as a synthetic a
priori truth.

It is not .mere2ya conceptual truth.

It is a

claim .ITlelde true by what he refers to as the #normative structure of action" (1978, p. 175).

This normative structure

provides the Mcorrespondence-correlate for moral judgments•
(1978, p. 175).

Whether Gewirth can legitimately infer the

existence of such objective moral facts from subjective
premises which reflect conceptual truths will be scrutinized
below.

I shall argue that his linking premise is not up to

the task.
Gewirth's analysis begins with the concept of act~on.
It is not surprising that the concept of action would play
center stage where, for Descartes, the concept of doubt had
loomed large.

Gewirth, after all, is interested in morality,

which essentially concerns actions (which to prescribe, prohibit, etc.).

Ultimately the analysis of the concept of ac-

tion is designed to reveal what is essential to being an
agent of an action.

The PGC, in turn, is revealed as a con-

dition which must be satisfied (observed) for one to be an
agent at all.
An

examination of the concept of action reveals two im-

portant features which all actions share in common.
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These he

refers to as the gener.ic features of actions.
It is goal-directed behavior.

is purposive.

some end to which the agent is pursuant.

First, action
There must be

This end need not

be something consc.iousJy set before herself to attain.
Rather, purposive behavior can be both dispositional and occurrent (the latter Gewirth refers to as "purposeful" behavior; 1978, p. 38}.

Thus if one is in the hab.it of satisfying

one's hunger .in a nutr.it.ionaJJy sound way, one may self-consciously pursue the goal of satisfying one's hunger, while at
the same time pursuing the latter goal with little or no
thought whatsoever.

Perhaps one must be trained to want nu-

tritionally sound food, but in the course of time this desire
becomes latent.

Its satisfaction becomes part of the "proce-

dure" _by means of which the conscious desire to overcome
hunger is obtained (1978, p. 38).
It should be recognized, too, that the goal of an action
need not be identified with any particular material consequence (overcoming hunger, receiving nutrition, attaining
happiness, etc.} which may result from performing the action.
One's goal may just consist in implementing a procedure or
following a rule for its own sake.

If one thinks one ought

to obey the rule to always tell the truth, then one's goal
may be to teJ2 the truth regardless of the consequences of
Thus the goals of some actions can be the actions

doing so.
themselves.

Such actions are:

not aimless but rather goal-directed, at least
in the sense that they envisage more or less clearly a certain content to be effected or achieved,
content consists
even if at one level this
only in a certain mode of acting or in observance
of certain rules or formal requirements (Gewirth,
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1978, p. 37).
One can see from the fact that goals are extended to include
more than simply the consequences of an action that Gewirth's
concept of purposiveness is an extremely generic one.

It is

one which he believes both deontologists as well as teleologists would find acceptable.

To the kind of Millian objec-

tion which states that one could not have as a goal the fulfillment of a given rule, unless the fulfillment of the rule
were recognized as having utility, Gewirth would respond that

it is not his purpose to exp2a1n the relation between different kind of goals.it

His purpose is to catalog the sorts of

things which agents may count among their goals.

Because his

is purely a task of conceptual analysis, it remains wholly
irrelevant what kind of explanatory account is to be given
for the acquisition of goals.
The second generic feature of action is vo2untar~ness.
Actions are to be distinguished from other purposive or goaloriented events, like photosynthesis or oogenesis, by the
fact that they must be conceived of as possessing goals that
are the goals of some agent who engages in the action 1n
order to bring about the goal.

•voluntariness," Gewirth

tells us, uinvolves a procedural aspect of actions in that it
concerns the way actions are controlled as ongoing events"
(1978, p. 41).
1•

The voluntariness of an action •comprises the

Mill argues that one can make a goal out of the following

types of procedures and rules only because one recognizes
them as means by which happiness is produced.. They are only

conceived of as goals in their own right because, by virtue
of their assoc~at~on with the happiness they produce, they
come to be conceived of as a part of happiness (1863, pp.
415-417).
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agent's causation of his action, whereas the purposiveness
comprises the object or goal of the action .... " (1978, p,
41).

Behavior that is coerced (that is, forced upon one by

way of threat) or is automat~c (such as those which occur
within one's autonomic nervous system or which result from
diseases) does not count as voluntary behavior.

Behavior

that is the ~nev~tab1e result of a particular kind of chemical dependency, for example, would not count as an act~on at
all. 11

In contrast, genuine action involves choice:

one

chooses th~s alternative over that:
In its most complete sense, 'choice' connotes
antecedent, informed deliberation between alternatives and a reasoned decision based on that deliberation, with consideration
being given to relevant aspects of the organized system of dispositions that constitutes the person and with knowledge of relevant circumstances (1978, p. 31).
To conceive of oneself as acting, it is important that one be
able to conceive of oneself as acting otherwise.

What dis-

tinguishes the activity of a person preparing a meal from the
process of photosynthesis in a plant (besides their goal) is
that the former weighs options (for example, whether to use
this as opposed to that amount of basil) which are informed,
not only by the goal, but by facts about the environment
(e.g., how much basil is available) and facts about the agent
Clearly there are some gray areas here. If one chooses
to rob a bank rather than a convenience store in order to pay
for one's drug habit, then surely one's behavior is not totally determined by one's drug addiction in the manner that
one's 'sweats' and 'shakes' are so determined. Yet, that
some such course of action would be taken seems determined.
Or consider the case of someone who chooses to take up smoking cigarettes in full knowledge of the addictive nature of
nicotine. Are the future 'actions' of the smoker not to be
considered actions at all?
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herself (e.g., how much basil she can tolerate).

In the case

of the plant, facts about its environment and facts about itself causally determine the course its life shall take.
Needless to say, this or that could occur to the plant, but

the point is that whatever occurs to i t , occurs to it.

In

contrast, an action is not the sort of thing that simply occurs to or happens in an agent; it arises from within the
agent as something over which she exercises control.
Because actions are purposive and voluntary, it would be
inevitable for agents to express or describe their state when
they do act with a sentence of the form "I do X for purpose
E."

Here both the voluntary or procedural element as well as

the purposive element are made explicit.

Often enough, how-

ever, one's description of one's action highlights one or the
other feature (1978, p. 42).

Nevertheless, all agents would

have to recognize such a description as appropriate.
Importantly, the statement expresses the conat~ve nature of
action, that is to say, it expresses a positive or pro-attitude on the part of the agent toward the goal in question
(1978, p. 40).

u[P]urposive action is conative and dynamic,"

Gewirth tells us, "in that the agent tries by his action to
bring about certain results ... that he wants at least intentionally, even if not inclinationally, to attain" (1978, pp.
48-49)

The distinction here between the inclination and the

intention to do X for purpose Eis one between that of taking
pleasure in or liking E

and that of pursuing E ~n sp~tB of

the fact that one takes no pleasure in E or even finds Edisdainful (1978, p. 39).

For that reason E may be said to have
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value for the agent.

Because an agent can intend E but not

be inclined towards E, the favorable attitude towards E need
not be VBZJ' favorable at all.

Accordingly, the value as-

signed to E may be extraordinarily minimal.

To say E has

value here means only that the agent recognizes it as a goal
worth one's attention and effort.

Indeed no one but the par-

ticular agent in question need have E for a goal and recognize it as having a value.

Because E has value for the

agent, if she is committed to uI do X for purpose E" being a
description of her action, then she is further committed to
•Eis good" as a description of the goal she seeks to attain.
This, it must be remembered, is not a claim to be taken assertorically.

Rather, it expresses that to which the agent

is corcmitted in virtue of the concepts she exercises.

It is

what she must say or th~nk, if she says or thinks ur do X for
purpose E."
Since the goals towards which agents seek to attain must
be regarded as goods (at least by the agent), anything found
to be a necessary condition for the possibility of attaining
these goods must be regarded good as well, according to
Gewirth.

Since an action's generic features are necessary

for the achieving of goals, an agent is committed to regarding voluntariness and purposiveness as goods.

These are to

be counted as •generic goods" (1978, p. 52).
Voluntariness or freedom emerges as a good, not only because the exercise of freedom in a particular instance is a
met!UJs

for attaining a specific goal, but because the very

8b~1~ty to exercise freedom at all is a necessary condition
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for the possibility of action.

Thus it is the capac~cyfor

freedom and not just a specific exercise of freedom that is
good.

This point will become important later on as the basis

upon which agents may claim a general right to non-interference from others.
Purposiveness itself may be a good in the following way.
Let us say an agent recognizes a series of goals, E1, E2,
E3, ... , En·

The agent may be assigned, not only a desire to

achieve a specific goal, but a desire to achieve her goals ~n
general.

Not only is the achieving of E1 good, but so is the

general achieving of goals.

E1 is good in itself, but it is

also good to the extent that it constitutes Man increase in
[the agent's] level of purpose-fulfillment" (1978, p. 53). An
agent's level of purpose-fulfillment is what Gewirth refers
to as the agent's well-be~ng.

Well-being consists of three

kinds of things, and each kind of thing must be regarded as a
good.

First, the agent must regard as good Mthose basic as-

pects of his well-being that are the proximate necessary preconditions of his performance of any and all his actions"
(1978, p. 53).

I understand Gewirth to be pointing to the

fact that some goods, those associated with one's well-being,
supply the means by which other goods are attained.

Thus in

order to pursue goals at all, one must be in possession of a
certain level of well-being, which, we are told, includes
Mlife and physical integrity (including such of their means
as food, clothing, and shelter) ... [as well as] mental equilibrium and a feeling of confidence as to the general possibility of attaining one's goals" (1978, p. 54).
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In addition

to these bas~c goods which contribute to one's well being,
Gewirth acknowledges nonsubtract1·ve goods and add1· t~ve goods;
simply put, that one's level of purpose-fulfillment is not
diminished and that it is increased are regarded as goods as
well.

Notice that two things have been identified as
which goals in general are to be attained:

mt!Jt!l.Ds

by

the freedom to

control one's actions and the well-being that stems from the
attainment or acquisition of goods that are necessary for the
attainment of other goods.

Gewirth wants to maintain that if

freedom and well-being are goods for the agent (to the extent
that they are necessary conditions for agency), then the
agent has a r1·ght to them:
Since the agent regards as necessary goods the
freedom and well-being that constitute the the
generic features of his successful action, he logically must also hold that he has rights to these
generic features, and he implicitly makes a corresponding right-claim (1978, p. 63).
This is most perplexing.

It is not at all clear how the move

from •Freedom and well-being are necessary goods# to •r have
the r~ght to freedom and well-beingff is to be made.
Presumably the key is that since these goods are necessary
goods and agents cannot conceive of themselves as agents unless these goods are acquired, agents are entitled (indeed,
required) to think that they ought to have these goods.
Thus, their very conception of themselves as agents requires
that they conceive of others as not being allowed to interfere with their actions and as acknowledging and acting in
accordance with their need for well-being {i.e., by acknowl-
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edging their need for the goods which constitute their wellbeing).

According to Gewirth, the agent who accepts that •My

freedom and well-being are necessary goods" but denies that
•I have rights to freedom and well-being" is embroiled in a
contradiction.

If one were to deny that

ur

have rights to

freedom and well-being," then one would be committed to denying that

0

All other persons ought at least to refrain from

interfering with my freedom and well-being."

This, in turn,

would require the agent to accept, uit is not the case that
all other persons ought at least to refrain from interfering
with my freedom and well-being."

But it is quite impossible

to accept this and at the same time accept "My freedom and
well-being are necessary goods."

To hold this latter claim

Just ~s to hold that one's •freedom and well-being [should]

be kept inviolate, so that they are not interfered with by
other persons" (1978, p. 80).

Another way to put the point

is to say that if the agent thinks it is permissible for others to interfere with her necessary goods, then that is tantamount to regarding such goods as not necessary at all
(1978, pp. 80-81).
sary?

How can what is necessary not be neces-

Since one cannot conceive of oneself as an agent with-

out having these conditions met, one cannot conceive of oneself as an agent without conceiving of others as having an
obligation not to interfere.

Generic goods are thus the

basis for gener~c r~ghts.
The last step in the argument involves universalizing
this obligation.

If others can be conceived of as agents,

then they must be conceived of

BS
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agents for whom freedom and

well-being are goods (1978, p. 105).

By virtue of the fact

that they are agents, they are entitled to the same rights
one would claim for oneself as an agent.
would, again, be self-contradictory.

To think otherwise

If the very concept of

an agent demands that to be an agent these conditions must be
met, then to regard others as agents but not entitled to
these goods would be inconsistent.

Thus the agent must re-

gard herself under an obligation not to interfere with the
freedom or well-being of others.

It is at this point that

the dialectically necessary method terminates in the PGC:
0

Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as

well as yourself."
According to Gewirth, the PGC is more than just a necessary belief that all rational agents must accept.
claim Dlilde true by the nature of action itself.

It is a
The claim

that one ought to act in accord with one's own and others'
generic rights is made true by the fact that .if one .is to do
X for puzpose E,

then one ought: t:o regard E t!lnd t!l.1..1. .it:s nec-

eSSt!IIY cond.it:.ions (.inc.l.utb.'ng freedom and we.1..1.-be.ing) as good.

The

0

ought" in this instance is a prudential one.

The an-

tecedent here denotes a certain goal, namely, action itself
(doing X for purpose E).

The consequent states certain con-

ditions which must be met if action is to occur.
refers to these prudential dictates as the
ture of actionn (1978, p. 175).
the

0

0

Gewirth

normative struc-

It is this that constitutes

correspondence-correlate• of the PGC.

Since actions and

agency ex.ist, so must these constraints upon action and agency, constraints that must be observed by all rational agents.
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I find Gewirth's view extremely problematic.

How is it

possible to move from what purport to be purely conceptual
truths (and their entailments) to truths about obligations
and actions?

Earlier it was mentioned that Gewirth's argu·

ment is similar in form to Descartes' argument for the exis·
tence of the external world.

Gewirth describes himself as a

foundationalist by stating the following:
from a logical point of view one may hold that
this system (of morality) can be organized in a
unilinear logical sequence in which some of its
components can be logically derived from others,
but not conversely ... The sequence is nfoundation·
ist" in that it begins from [the statement that 'I
do X for purpose E'] that every agent must accept,
and ... I argue in a noncircular way from this
premise to the conclusion that every agent logical·
ly must accept for himself a certain supreme moral
principle (1984, p. 193).
The premises which constitute the foundation are subjective,
insofar as they arise within the dialectically necessary
method and are not to be interpreted assertorically.
statements from

ur

All the

do X for purpose E" and •Eis good" to MI

have a right to freedom and well-being" are to be understood
in this manner.

In each case the sentence is an expression

of how the agent must conceive of herself qua agent.

Just as

Descartes could not conceive of himself as doubting (engage
in the act of doubting) apart from conceiving of himself as a
thinking thing, so too agents cannot think of themselves as
acting unless conceive of themselves in accordance with the
contents of these sentences.
The conclusion, as we have seen, is alleged to be a sub·
stantive moral principle that is no more open to doubt than
the premises upon which it rests.
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But it is a principle

which is true also because it corresponds to something.

But

now what sanctions the move from nthis is the necessary way
of conce.iv.ing of actions" (an epistemological or semantic
claim) to •this is the way actions really are (a metaphysical
claim)?

Let us grant that the mean.ingof the sentence •Act

in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well
as yourself• decomposes into the meanings of those sentences
(•Eis good" and so forth) which entail it.

Why should we

regard the elements of its meaning as corresponding to generic features of actions?

What we need to discover and exam-

ine, in order to answer this question, is the claim (or
claims) which functions as Gewirth's linking premise.

What

does Gewirth have that is analogous to Descartes' claim that
clear and distinct ideas are true?
In what is perhaps his most explicit statement on the
issue Gewirth says:
The whole of my argument for the PGC, however,
has undertaken to establish that the generic features of action provide objective, ineluctable contents for testing the truth or correctness of moral
judgments, parallel to the objectivity and ineluctability of the contents that observable facts
provide for testing empirical and scientific hypotheses. The gener.ic features of act.ion serve
th.is funct.ion not by d.irect.ly be.ing correspondence-corre.lates for mora.1 ,iudments but rather by
sett.ing, through the normat.ivs structure of act.ion, certa.in rsqu.irements for mora.1 ,Judgments,
wh.ich must confo.rm to thess featurss on pa~·n of
contrad.ict.ion (1978, p. 176, emphasis added).
I see no way out of the circle.
problem is not Descartes'.
be regarded. as true

Obviously Gewirth's

We can grant that a claim should

if it does not entail a contradiction.

But it does not follow from the fact that the set of beliefs
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spun from a consideration of the concept of action is cons~stsnt, that they (or, rather, the PGC) corresponds to something.

At best consistency is a necessary, but not a suffi-

cient, condition for correspondence.

What Gewirth must show

is that the denying that the normative structure of action
ex.ists entails a contradiction.

This cannot be attained by

withdrawing the generic features of actions into the mind (as
it were) to serve as tests of a moral principle's correspondence.

That is a bit of a red herring.

The issue just is

whether these generic features inhere in the actions themselves, such that actions can possess the normative structure
which Gewirth claims.

The relativism which marks the dialec-

tically necessary method {ME is good for mt.I') makes this an
issue of central importance.

That relativism suggests that

value is imposed upon goals, actions, and their necessary
conditions by the subject.

Their value is contingent in that

(subjective) way (a point Gewirth does not deny).
ob.Ject~v~tyof IOOral values?

Whence the

Apparently objectivity emerges

at precisely the point at which rights-claims are universalized.

But is there some sort of contradiction in thinking

that other agents might conceive of action and agency in
terms other than my

own?

(To answer this question affirma-

tively is certainly to utter something other than a conceptual truth.)

The point is, though, that all Gewirth is enti-

tled to say here is that ~fwe are to understand what another
means by •action• and •agency,• then he or she must apply the
same concepts to those terms as we do.

That, again, is an

epistemological point, not a metaphysical one.
46

The test that

something exists--in this case the nonnative structure of action which finds its voice in various prudential dictates-cannot consist in confonnity to our concepts.
The passage cited above indicates that Gewirth recogniz.es the need for a linking premise.

What he has in mind as

a test of a moral principle's truth is its confonnity to or
consistency with the statements that emerge from the analysis
of the concept of action.

So, if •one ought not murder inno-

cent personsw is true, then it must conform to such statements as "Murder is a fonn of interference# and uAny form of
interference with the freedom of another (except in self-defense) is bad, etc.

One looks to the features of murder to

determine its permissibility or impermissibility.

That is

the sort of test to which such principles are susceptible.
What I have tried to show is that at most such a test entitles one to say this is permissible or impermissible (a point
consistent with Hare's prescriptivism), but it does not entitle one to regard these principles as corresponding to an objective moral fact such as the nonnative structure of action
is alleged to be.

As I shall argue in the next section,

Gewirth's troubles are symptomatic of larger problems inherent in correspondence theories.

3•

MORAL INTUITIONISM

Moore's Tntuitioniem_
G. E. Moore is one of many philosophers at the beginning
of the Twentieth Century who abandoned correspondence theo·
ries of knowledge and truth.

His argument against correspon·
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dence and for a fonn of direct realism forms the cornerstone
of his epistemology, and to appreciate the manner in which
the subject matter of ethics is objective such arguments will
have to be looked at.

The objectivity of ethics--of what

words like •good,• •right," and •just• refer to--is the logical consequence of his thesis that all concepts or properties
(terms he uses synonymously) have objective mind-independent
existence.

This fact is often not appreciated by meta-ethi-

cists who think Moore's accusation that a fallacy is involved
in equating moral properties with natural properties embodies
his argument for the objectivity of moral_s.
sues must be distinguished:

Rather, two is-

(1) whether moral properties are

objective, and (2) whether moral properties are identical to
natural properties.

The first part of the section below ex-

amines the ontological status of properties in general and
the epistemological status of moral judgments.

In saying

that Moore is a realist concerning concepts or properties, we
assign to him the view that all properties (including, for
example, the property of being a unicorn) are real and are
not the mere products of any act of consciousness or judgment.

Moore's ontology, we shall see, requires a distinction

between what is simply real and what is real and has existence.

Properties that fall into the latter category are ca-

pable of entering into spatio-temporal relations; they are
what Moore eventually calls natural properties.

The second

part examines the application of Moore's direct realism (with
respect to properties) to moral properties in particular.
When applied to moral properties, we get what is referred to
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as nethical intuitionism,w which views goodness, etc. as nonnatural whose special mode of cognition is an act of intuition.
Moore directed various arguments against correspondence
theories of truth and knowledge from 1899 on throughout his
career.

Here we are primarily concerned with the argument in

his 1899 article nThe Nature of Judgment# which appears to
exercise an influence upon his 1903 Prjnc~'pja Ethjca.

It

maintains that correspondence theories generate an infinite
regress.

The argument is a reductjo:

since we do form judg-

ments, any theory that requires positing an infinite nwnber
of further judgments, as correspondence theories do, to explain how a given judgment can be made must regarded as be
false.
Moore's adversary is F. H. Bradley (1883).

Bradley had

opposed the empiricist idea that content or subject matter of
judgments consists merely in abstractjons from perceptions of
particulars which may well not possess the property or properties ascribed to them by the judgment.

For example, if it

is judged that a given object is yellow, then the empiricist
would maintain that the propsrtyof being yellow does not inhere in the object itself but is rather a secondary quality
attrjbuted to the object on the basis of an abstraction from

whatever impressions were received by the subject.

Theim-

plication of this view is that the ideas we form of objects
are quite unlike the objects themselves; in that case falsehood would not be an occasional occurrence, it would be the
very lot of humankind.

Bradley and Moore find this prospect
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deplorable.

Both share the view that the properties typical-

ly attributed to objects are real.

Rather than being mere

abstractions from impressions of particulars, properties like
yellowness are to be construed as universals (1883, p. 4).
Particulars (whatever they may be) exemplify or instantiate
or (as Plato would say) participate in the universal.

They

do not possess the universal by virtue of their relation to a
subject.
What distinguishes Moore from Bradley is the fact that
the latter but not the former holds that the mind forms mental representations of universals and the objects which instantiate them.

Both philosophers are interested in vindi-

cating ordinary beliefs concerning the natures of objects.
Moore, however, does not think that this can be done if it
necessary to posit mental representations to mediate the act
of judgment and its object; in that case the possibility of
widespread falsehood could not be eliminated, because it is,
he holds, impossible to 'get outside' of the relation that
holds between content and object to ascertain whether the
content is true to the facts.
In opposition to the empiricist tradition which (at
least as conceived by Bradley and Moore) regards the subject
as the passive recipient of impressions, Bradley maintains
that any act of judgment requires the subject to neut off" or
ufix" a specifiable content (1883, p. 4).

This mental con-

tent represents the properties in question and is sometimes
said by Bradley to be uuniversal in character" (1883, p. 5)
like that which it represents.
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Moore's criticism of correspondence theories falls under
the category of attacks which maintain such theories involve
a kind of vicious regress.

Arguments against Descartes which

appeal to the Cartesian Circle are one such case.

Arguments

against Descartes are typically framed this way:

to know if

upn is true, we must know if "'P' is clear and distinct" is

true, which in turn requires that we know if u•p• is clear
and distinct~ is clear and distinct, and on

ill1

~nf~n~tum.

Frege (1897) had argued that illlyconception of truth, and a
fort~or~ any conception of truth as correspondence, would
have to be formed using other semantic or epistemological

terms.

The ineliminability of semantic terms would thus gen·

erate an infinite regress.

Moore's own argument points to a

regress even more bas~c than that brought directly against
Descartes' linking premise.
Moore is to be credited with showing that the problem
with correspondence theories consists, not merely in grounding the linking premise, but in determining the content of
the objective premise to which the linking premise refers.

A

linking premise L asserts that a certain criterion has been
met by subjective premises Sin such a way as to justify objective conclusion

o.

tent of Sand that of

It establishes a link between the con-

o.

Now Sis a proposition which as·

serts that some subject (perhaps oneself) has a certain
propositional attitude towards O:
true.
S.

e.g., s judges Oto be

So the content of O is conta~nedwithin the content of

The occurrence of O within Sis not truth-functional; em·

bedded within a verb phrase containing the psychological verb
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"judges," it is rendered intensional:

it simply does not

follow straightaway from the fact thats judges O is true
that O ~s true (not in the way that one can infer from up
Q' that 'P' is true).

premise.

&

This is what necessitates a linking

Linking premises warrant the de-intensionalizing of

the proposition that is embedded.
Moore's point is that correspondence theories make it
impossible to even ~dsnt~fy (know, determine, etc.) the content of 0, and so, for that matter, the content of S.

For

Moore the problem is not that the linking premise itself requires justification, but that its content cannot be determined.

Obviously, if a content cannot even be determined,

the claim of which it is the content cannot be justified.
One cannot justify a claim whose content one does not know.
If S contains O, thens must be able to 'fix' or 'cut
off' O from ths wor2d in order to represent it.

That is to

say, s must be able to isolate certain features of the world
that are to be represented- -t!lnd thsn rsprsssnt thsm.
is this to be accomplished?

But how

To fix the content of a true be-

lief, one must be able to determine wh.ich features of the
world are to be "cut off• and ufixed."

If one can do this,

it becomes superfluous to posit mental representations to accomplish this very goal.

If one cannot do this, then it

seems impossible that representations of the relevant features of the world could occur.

If one cannot be aware of

what makes O true, then how is one to determine the content
of Osuch that one could judge it true (so that, therefore, S
is true)?

This is what Moore is getting at when he says:
[t]he theory would ... seem to demand the comple
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tion of an infinite nwnber of psychological judgments before any judgment can be made at all. But
such a completion is impossible; and therefore all
judgment is likewise impossible. It follows,
therefore, if we are to avoid this absurdity, that
the 'idea used in judgment' must be something other
than a part of the content of any idea of mine
(1899, p. 178) ."
One would have to know what O is true of before it is possible to for:m the judgment that O is true.

But one could not

do that, until one determines the content of O, which is accomplished by the for:mation of the content of S's judging
that O is true.

But that content cannot be formed unless S

knows what O is true of; hence, the infinite regress.
As the passage above indicates, if judgment (including
true judgment) is possible, then entertaining a true belief

cannot be mediated by mental representations.

If true belief

is possible, then one must have direct access to the objects
of awareness.
Consequently, if a subject forms an awareness of some
kind of thing, of some property like yellowness, then the object of awareness cannot be a mere representation of something else of which the subject is indirectly aware.

To be

aware of yellowness is to be aware of yellowness ~tself.
So, for Moore, all properties or concepts have objectivity: the property of being yellow, being the current
President of the U.S., being a unicorn, being good, etc, are
all real.

What distinguishes properties that are merely con-

ceivable from those that are perce~vable is that the latter,
but not the former, also possess the property of existence.
I want to thank Gary Levvis for calling this passage to
my attention; his (1993b, pp. 6-7) discussion of this issue
has provided valuable information on this topic to me.
11
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That, in effect, means that they possess spatio-temporal
qualities.

The property of being a yellow object at a par-

ticular location at a particular time can ex~st, but the
property being yellow (like the property of being a unicorn)
considered in itself is merely real.

All properties, howev-

er, including that which is denoted by •good" possess mindindependent existence. That being the case, what remains to
be determined is whether •good" denotes a natural property
(i.e., something which must be existent) or whether it can
denote that which is merely real.
Moore's Pr~nci'p~a Eth~ca begins by asserting that the
study of ethics must commence with an investigation into the
nature of goodness prior to any discussion of what would constitute good behavior, which was the typical starting place
for most ethical theorists.

Moore's emphasis on this point

was due to his view that good is a property corrrnon to many
things, not just behavior.

And since good does denote such a

property, it was necessary to explicate its meaning if one
was to come to some understanding of the structure of morality.

Moore likens the property of being good to the property

of being yellow.

The reasoning behind this analogy had to do

with the fact that ye11owdenotes a simple property, i.e., it
is something that is readily perceivable and immediately
knowable.

One cannot exp2a~n to another what yellow ~s:

just have to look and see in order to understand it.

you

Moore

points out that such a term cannot be defined; definitions
are reserved only for complex
erty of being a horse.

properties, such as the prop-

This type of property can be broken
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down into simpler parts.

Ye11ow, however, cannot be reduced

to any simpler parts: it just is what it is.
One might ask, though, what would be wrong with defining
ye11owas a certain set of light vibrations that stimulate

the eye?

The obvious problem with such a physicalistic re-

duction is that, as Arthur Danto (1989, p. 10) points out,
the requirement of identity is not met in this situation:
although the spectral distributions severally cause my perceiving the color yellow, it is not the case that this color
is identical with any one of them.

Moore would agree with

Danto; he said that the vibrations are •what correspond in
space to the yellow which we actually perceive• (1903, p.
10).

And, as is pointed out by others, one could close one's

eyes and experience something yellow.

The point here is that

ye11owis a simple, indefinable property.

The same holds true for the property of goodness.
According to Moore, it too is indefinable since it is a simple property.

One doesn't have to reason to determine

whether some action or state of affairs is good; one inmediately perceives it to be good if it in fact is good.

Moore

claimed that our perception of goodness was due to our ability to detect this property by means of a special innate faculty of intuition.

Now, given that good is a simple and in-

definable property, it follows that no semantic reduction of
this property to a natural property can be made.

That is to

say, the meaning of good cannot be given in terms of what is
pleasant, what is conducive to the greatest amount of happiness, what is desirable, etc.

Simple concepts are autonomous
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in this respect.

But the ethical naturalists, in particular

the classical utilitarians, did define goodness in physicalistic terms (like the property of being pleasurable) and so
conmitted, according to Moore, the Naturalistic Fallacy,
i.e., they identified a moral property with a natural one:

[E]thics aims at discovering what are those
other properties belonging to all things which are
good. But far too many philosophers have thought
that when they named those other properties they
were actually defining good; that these properties,
in fact, were simply not 'other,' but absolutely
and entirely the same with goodness. This view I
propose to call the 'naturalistic fallacy' (1903,
p. 10) •

To say that good denotes a natural property is to say that it
denotes an existent.

Recall the distinction made earlier be-

tween an existent property and a simply real property:

the

latter has no temporal or spatial qualities and is not a
unique combination or cluster of properties.

As Moore points

out, such a property
... -[i]s simply something which you think of or
perceive, and to any one who cannot think of or
perceive it, you can never, by any definition, make
its nature known (1903, p. 7).

Goodness is an example of such a real, but non-existent,

property.

It is a universal as opposed to a particular prop-

erty, and as such can be predicated of many (existent)
things.

On the other hand, an individual object (or exis-

tent) is defined by Moore as a c2usterof properties, properties that exist independent of our awareness of them.
Goodness, for Moore, is one of those properties.

It is to be

viewed as an object, even though it has no components.

It is

substantive and as such does not depend on other properties.
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Since goodness is considered by Moore to be a real, but nonexistent object, he refers to it as a non-nacura2 property.
One objection that can be raised against Moore's view
concerns a difficulty which arises when two persons' moral
intuitions differ.

How are such differences to be resolved,

what counts as a cssc for having a correct or true intuition,
and how shall the occurrence of false intuitions be explained?

Suppose, for example, that two persons differ over

the moral permissibility of abortion.
share a number of moral beliefs:

Let us assume both

that both mother and fetus

are persons, that both have rights, etc.

Neither has a 'the-

ory' of rights that might be used to rationally assign
greater weight to one or the other's rights.

Furthermore,

neither is inclined to equate the good with any natural phenomenon, such as an action's pleasurable consequences.

So we

have two individuals who are alike in all respects, except
that one's intuitions tell her abortion is good (permissible), and the other's intuitions tell hsrthat abortion is
bad (impermissible) , 17

How is this difference to be recon-

Let it be noted that Moore would be more inclined to
speak, not of actions, but of the 2ovs of one's friends' exceptional mental and physical qualities as good. This does
not diminish the relevance of the example used above. That
example was selected for its simplicity. The discussion
above could be adapted to what Moore would be more likely to
regard as good by considering a case in which, for example, I
regard my love for someone's character (i.e., the character
of a person who has perhaps chosen to have an abortion) as
good, but someone else regards my love for that person's
character as bad. Here, as above, there would be differing
intuitions. If it is objected that value judgments may pertain only to one's own love of character, the example could
be further modified so that one and the same person regards
his or her love of another's character as good and bad at
different times.
17
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ciled?

How do we determine whose intuition is correct?

Consider how such conflicts are resolved when perceptual beliefs are involved.
Typically if two persons hold contrary perceptua2 beliefs, which of the two views is correct can be determined by
further observations made under normal-to-ideal conditions by
'ordinary perceivers' whose faculties are functioning properly.

Ordinarily, a false perceptual belief may be explained

by appealing either to (1) a breakdown in the faculty of perception,

(2) a breakdown in a faculty with which perception

is causally interactive or in the causal connection between
the two, or (3) inadequate environmental factors that degrade
perceptual input.

The point is that when false perceptual

beliefs arise, there is a story to be told as to how they
could arise.

That we can explain false beliefs in these

terms is important, for if they were not so explainable it
would be difficult to understand how rational persons could
have false beliefs.

Since it is entirely possible for ratio-

nal persons to form false beliefs, but in such a way that
false beliefs are the exception rather than the rule, one
desideratum for an adequate theory of judgment is that it
provide some sort of account of how false belief is possible.
It seems to me that, ~f one accepts a just~f~cat~on~st ep~stemo2ogy, then an adequate theory of judgment must do more

than simply provide a test for whether a claim is true; it
must provide reasons for why the test is legitimate.

In the

case of perceptual beliefs, that means providing an account
of what makes the.observations of 'ordinary perceivers' reli58

able.

Such an account would need to include a description of

the factors which distinguish accurate from inaccurate perception.

So, an adequate theory of judgment should not only

be compatible with the poss~b~J~tyof there being an explanation of false belief, it must provide an actual explanatory
account of how such beliefs arise.

Otherwise the test for

truth would appear ad hoc and in need of justification.
But how shall the occurrence of contrary moral (i.e.,
normative ethical) beliefs be explained on Moore's view?
Although the question of false perceptual beliefs would continue to exercise Moore during the first few decades of the
Twentieth Century, the question of false moral beliefs would
receive little or no attention.

Hardly a word is devoted to

the subject in Pr~nc~p~a Eth~ca or Eth~cs.
Nothing comparable to the case of perception appears to
be in the offing when it comes to divergent intuitions.
Presumably one would have to resolve the conflict by appealing to the beliefs of 'ordinary intuitors.' But who are they?
Are they the members of society whose views are prevalent? 11
Suppose a society is divided in its intuitions; what then?
And why should the number of persons who hold a belief be in
any way relevant to whether the belief is true?

Unless some

expJanat~on can be given as to why some persons' intuitions
should count for more than others, any such test would appear
merely ad hoc.
One might, following w. D. Ross (1930), identify right
intuitions with those of persons raised in the right sort of
culture. But surely this is question begging, since a value
judgment is involved in deciding which culture has the right
values.
11

59

Yet there is nothing comparable to (1) - (3) in the case
Is it possible to

of the mysterious faculty of intuition.

ascertain a breakdown in the faculty itself?

Clearly one

cannot examine the faculty of intuition to discover something
analogous to, say, a damaged retina.

But this, it might be

argued, is an attack upon a straw man, since it assumes the
faculty of intuition must be analogous to a phys~c41 faculty
of perception.

The view that all mental acts (of imagining,

conceiving, intuiting, etc.) are physical events or involve
physical events in the manner in which perception does certainly cannot be attributed to Moore.

It would be a mistake,

accordingly, to fault Moore's idea of intuition on the
grounds that one cannot inspect its 'parts' to see if they
are in working order.

However, .my-point is that the lack of

an analogy here is precisely what counts out the use of
strategy (1).

One who responds to the manner described here

is burdened with providing an kind of account of how one
would

go

about diagnosing problems with a faulty intuition.

The second strategy would involve explaining the difference
in intuitions by appealing to differences in either the faculties with which intuition interacts or in the abilities of
those faculties to interact with intuition.

Confronted with

someone whose intuitions differ from his own, Moore might attempt to locate and prove false some belief the other has
concerning the morally relevant facts.

Once the falsehood is

removed, their intuitions could coincide.

But in the example

above we are assuming that the persons are alike in terms of
their non-moral beliefs.

Moore would have to respond by
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saying that it is impossible for two persons alike in every
respect to differ with respect to their intuitions; that is,
he would have to rule out the example as somehow illegitimate.

But the example does not describe a logically impossi-

ble situation, so it is difficult to see how it could be regarded as illicit in some respect.

Explaining how it might

be is precisely the burden Moore faces.
Perhaps strategy (2) 'WOuld be more effective if applied
to the re1at1on between intuition and other faculties.
hard to make sense out of this proposal, however.

It is

Since

Moore is in no way a materialist, the relation cannot be a
causal one.

Indeed, the very idea of intuition 1nteract1ng

with other faculties is problematic, since for Moore, acts of
intuition are autonomous:

one can form an awareness of the

concept or universal to which "good" refers quite apart from
any perception of particular good objects.

He describes in-

tuition as a mental act that involves an ~mmed1ate relation
to a proposition or fact (1903, p. 148).

One perceives a

given fact and 1ntu1ts among its constituents the simple,
non-natural property to which "good" refers. 19
acts operate in tandem, as it were.

These mental

That a particular action

or fact is good cannot, on pain of committing the naturalistic fallacy, be 1nferred from the physical (or natural) properties of the fact.

This precludes the possibility of apply-

ing strategy (2) in the second manner.
Similar considerations can be brought to bear upon the

"It is helpful here to remember that for Moore (at the
time of Pr1nc1p1a Eth1ca) objects and facts are nothing more
than clusters of properties or universal.
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third kind of strategy.

In the case of differing perceptual

beliefs it is possible to appeal to environmental factors.
Inadequate lighting can make vision difficult.
is too soft is hard to hear.

A

voice that

But nothing comparable to ~his

is possible in the case of intuition.

This sort of explana-

tion is possible for differences of perceptual belief only
because perception is a physical event in which interaction
occurs with physical features of the environment.

An act of

intuition, on the other hand, is not a physical event, and
that which is its object is not a physical feature of the environment.

Now perhaps one might want to defend Moore by

saying that the property of goodness might somehow be diminished in its appearance.

But it is difficult to reconcile

this claim with Moore's contention that ngood" refers to a

s1mp1e property.

The reason we can speak, for example, of

different shades or luminosities of blueness in the visual
field is because a color's hue is distinguishable from its
shade and brilliance.
erties.

Colors are comp1ex, not simple, prop-

It is because of this complexity that we may speak

of the diminishment, and not the absence, of blueness in the
visual field under certain conditions.

If goodness can ap-

pear to a greater or lesser degree before intuition, then
goodness would have to be complex.

Consequently, strategy

(3) must be ruled out.
So, it appears there is no way for Moore to explain differences in moral intuitions.

The upshot of this is that he

can provide no way to distinguish true from false moral intuitions, should such differences occur.
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Moore's argument against naturalism can be criticized as
Has he adequately demonstrated that "good" refers to a

well.

non-natural property?

It does not appear that he has.

My

main concern here is that his analysis does not deal with how
we can legitimately compare objects with each other.
Although he does point out in Pr1nc~"p1a Ech1ca that he is
only interested in understanding the nature of goodness (p.
12) and so seems content upon staying at the meta-level, one
wonders how we are to say that some object is beccer than another.

In order to say that xis better than y, one would

have to be able to understand how the predicate nis good" relates to x, i.e., how it is better, in what respect it is
better.

But in doing so, one would have to know something
Applying

about the natural characteristics of that object.

the predicate #is good" to x would involve, then, a contingent relationship between the subject and the predicate, and
in that event, one could not hold that goodness was a nonnatural property.
Given that Moore's intuitionist account of the objectivity of moral properties fails to distinguish true from false
intuitions as well as fails to show how moral properties as
non-natural properties do relate to natural objects, one can
conclude that such an account falls short of proving that
moral realism is a viable theory.

Meta-ethical Implications

.o.f

Platonistic semantics.

Before proceeding to the accounts offered by the empiricists I would like to examine the meta-ethical implications
of J. J. Katz's recent work in semantic theory.
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Although his

recent work The HBtaphys.ics of Hean.ing (1990) does not explicitly pursue meta-ethical issues, it does carry relevant
implications which are hard to dub as either purely
Platonistic or naturalistic.

His semantic theory entails a

form of realism which doBs appeal to Platonic entities to explain the nature of moral discourse: however, it is a form of
realism which does not .ident.ifythe referents of such discourse w.ith Platonic entities.

I do think Katz's view can be

subjected to criticisms which cut to the heart of his semantic theory and which, interestingly, form the basis for the
sort of view which will later be attributed to Arrington.
Katz is what is known as a semantic realist or
Platonist.

He holds that the sensBs of expressions, moral

expressions not withstanding, are abstract entities which in
no way depend for their existence upon the practices of language-users or upon the customs of linguistic communities.
Even if there were no language-users at all, meaning or sense
would exist.

More importantly, for our purposes, even if

there could be a group of language-users who do not engage in
moral discourse (or in some arBa of moral discourse--for example, the area of moral discourse which concerns justice),
the meanings of such terms would continue to exist.

Those

meanings would be there to be grasped in the event that the
group undergoes an evolution in its (moral) linguistic capacities or practices.

What is interesting about Katz's view is

that he alleges it to be the best of the competing sc.iBDt.if.ic
theories concerning the nature of linguistic sense and of the
relations (synonymy, antonymy, etc.) which hold among senses.
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He maintains that the very sorts of considerations which led
Chomsky to posit deep syntactic structures to explain certain
facets of linguistic behavior lead h~m to posit deep semantic
structures which are Platonic in nature.
Katz's semantic Platonism competes against three other
theories of meaning with which it is incompatible; these respectively identify the meaning or sense of an expression
with (i) the expression's referent or truth-condition, (ii)
the use to which tokens of the expression are put, or

(iii)

some psychological entity which plays a causal role in the
production of tokens of the linguistic expression.

According

to Katz, none of these competing theories can adequately explain speakers' knowledge of such semantic facts as are described in (1)- (6) below (1990, pp. 28-29).
(1) Although •soluble" and "insoluble" are
antonyms, •flamnable• and •inflammable" are synonyms.
(2) "Valuable" and •invaluable" are neither
antonyms nor synonyms.
(3) uPocket watch" is similar in meaning to npocket comb," but the similarity does not extend to
upocket battleship."
(4) The expressions "free gift" and ntrue fact"
are redundant.
(5) •sank" and udust" are ambiguous, but only the
latter is an antilogy, i.e., a word with antonymous
senses.
(6) The sentences •A sister is a sibling" and •A
square is a rectangle" are analytic, i.e.,have
pleonastic predicates.•
The knowledge which speakers have of such facts, which is
21 This is only a portion of the list actually offered by
Katz.
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manifested more in their linguistic behavior than in their
willingness to assent to claims like (1)- (6), cannot be accounted for by the competing theories.

Linguistic behavior

can be explained only if we attribute to speakers a capacity
to grasp (or intuit) abstract semantic properties (like amb~gu.ity, and relations (like synon..YJTI.Y} • 21

Against referential accounts of meaning, Katz urges the
traditional Fregean objection.

Linguistic expressions can be

co-referential yet vary in their sense.

For example, uthe

Morning Star• and uthe Evening Star" both refer to Venus, but
they are not synonymous with one another.

This fact counts

against truth-conditional analyses of sense, because sentences into which these expressions figure--for example, uThe
Morning Star will rise at 8:00 p.m tonight• and "The Evening
Star will rise at 8:00 p.m. tonight•--have identical truthconditions but vary in terms of their sense.

Typically this

is put by saying that the two sentences express different
contents or propositions.
Katz directs t-wo arguments against the thesis that meaning is to be equated with use (a view associated with
Wittgenstein).

The first argument is that expressions which

have the same sense can have different uses (1990, pp. 4041).

Consider the difference in connotation -psychiatrist,"

and ushrink."

Such terms, according to Katz, have the same

meaning but vary in terms of their connotation and, therefore, their use.

Clearly Katz is correct in that these terms

What follows is necessarily condensed. A fuller presentation and critique of Katz's arguments may be found in
Levvis (1993).
21
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would be used in different contexts.

ushrink," for example,

would more likely be used in the context of an individual who
does not hold psychiatrists in high regard.

But should we

regard these terms as alike in their meaning?

Why should we

not treat the connotations of··the images and emotions evoked
by--these terms as a component of their meaning?

Katz antic-

ipates this objection and responds that meaning or sense is
the sort of thing which supports valid inferences, whereas
connotation does not.

For example, it follows from the mean-

ing of the word ubachelor" that if uJohn is a bachelor" is
true, then "John is unmarried" is true.

Similarly it follows

from the meaning of the word "shrink" that if "She went to
see a shrink" is true, then "She went to see a mental health
expert" is true.

What "She went to see a shrink" does not

entail, however, is that the person speaking is in effect
dissatisfied with or against psychiatric treatment.

It is

conceptual content, rather than connotation, which contributes to the meaning of an expression.

The three terms

above share the same content (a menta1 hsa1th worker of a
certa1n sort ... ), even if they cannot be used in the same
way.
Katz's second argument against equating meaning with use
is that some expressions can have a meaning but no use whatsoever (1990, pp. 42-43).

Some grammatical strings are sim-

ply too long to be comprehensible to human beings; they will,
for that reason, fail to have a use.

Or, again, legitimate

syntactic operations may be performed upon a sentence (embed·
ding operations, for example) which produce sentences of mod67

erate length which are incomprehensible and useless:

uThe

man who the boy the students recognized pointed out is a
friend of mine" happens to be the product of syntactic operations performed upon •The man is a friend of mine and the boy
pointed out the man and the students recognized the boy."
Since there can be meaningful linguistic expressions which
have no use, meaning cannot be equated with use.

To identify

meaning and use would leave one unable to explain how speakers who are led through the syntactic transformations one
step at a time are able to recognize the product as hav~nga
meaning.
Finally, Katz attacks the view that meaning may be identified with some psychological entity that is causally efficacious in the production of utterances and other linguistic
tokens.

Such theories are often referred to as conceptua1~st

semantic theories (which is something of a misnomer, since
Katz's own theory adverts to conceptua1 content).
Conceptualist semantic theories come in a variety of forms.
One form taken seriously today is that which is grounded in
Chomsky's generative grammar and which has among its advocates Jerry Fodor and others who think that language comprehension should be modeled along linear computational processes.n

This means that linguistic competence and performance

consist in fo.DTM11 operations performed upon syntactic units
of a language.

The syntactic units upon which operations are

performed are not identical to the (surface) syntactical

Such models are questioned even from within the camp of
computational linguistics, for example, by proponents of neural network models.
22
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units of natural language.

Rather they are deep syntactic

structures of which the language-user may have no direct
awareness.

That deep syntactic structure exists and plays a

causal role in the production of linguistic tokens is evident, for example, from the fact that NSave yourself!• is
grammatical but #Save herself!" is not.

To understand why

the first is grammatical and meaningful but the latter is
not, it is necessary to attribute to connnands a suppressed
second-person subject,even if there is no corresponding pronoun within its surface structure.

All commands must have a

second-person subject which agrees in person with the reflexive pronoun contained in the sentence; that is why •save herself!" is ungrammatical and meaningless.
Katz agrees with Chomsky and his followers that there
must be deep syntactic structures.

He disagrees, though,

with their contention that the underlying syntactic units
thus posited may be counted as themean~ngs of the tokens
which they serve to produce.

The semantic properties of a

language, he maintains, are simply not isomorphic with its
syntactic properties, not even if we count in such underlying
syntactic structures.

A word like

0

bachelor" is syntactical-

ly simple,and presumably it deep structure counter-part would
be simple too.
plex.

Yet it is a term which is semantically com-

The meaning of •bachelor" decomposes into uI2/118rr~sd

adu.lt hU111t!U1 JM.le ,,,ho .is e.1.ig~b.le for marr~age.

In order to

explain speakers' readiness to count #bachelor" and

0

unmar-

ried adult human male who is eligible for marriage" as synonymous expressions, one must attribute to speakers more than
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simply a tacit knowledge of syntax.

Knowledge of sense or

meaning must be more than a knowledge of syntax.
Deep syntactic structures there may be, but they must be
understood. for what they are:
meaning.
t~on.

linguistic tokens which have a

Like any linguistic token they require ~nterpreta-

This process of interpretation cannot amount simply to

mapping one syntactic unit onto others, for they too would
simply be tokens which have a meaning.

A linguistic token

(whether an utterance, an inscription, or a sentence in the
head) can serve as a locus for meaning; but it cannot be a
meaning.
According to Katz there is little left for senses to be
other than abstract Platonic entities.

If the sense of an

expression cannot be identified with the expression's referential or truth-conditions, with its usage, or with some feature within the mind of the language-user, there is nothing
left in the natura1 world for senses to be.

Senses are ab-

stract entities.
This view has major implications for meta-ethics.
Because Katz does not accept referential accounts of meaning,
his view is incompatible with Moore's.

For Moore, ugoodnessu

refers to a simple unanalyzable property; that is its meaning.

For Katz, the meaning of •goodness• as well as other

moral terms must be an abstract entity.

It must consist in a

conceptual content capable of being grasped by languageusers.

If there is disagreement among language-users as to

how to define •goodness,• •justice," and so on, that only attests to a certain ~ncapac~tyon the parts of the language70

users in question.

It demonstrates merely that humans' lin-

guistic capacities have not evolved sufficiently enough yet
for humans to grasp the meanings of these terms.

What ugood-

ness" means is something abstract and unchanging.

Likewise,

the semantic relation of antonyrny which holds between ngoodness" and ubadness" is unchanging and eternal.
The move from semantic realism to moral realism comes in
the following way.

Although Katz's theory does not identify

the referents of moral terms with abstract entities, it follows that whether some object, action or event may be referred to as

0

good" or ubadw is determined wholly by its re-

lation to the concepts which are expressed by those terms,
and those concepts are not in any way human constructions.
So, whether burning a cat is bad will depend upon, and on1y
upon, whether that kind of action fa11s under the concept expressed by "bad."

Since the senses of expressions are not

human constructions, this qualifies as a form of moral realism.

An action's being good or not is a determinate matter.

One and the same kind of action cannot be good for one linguistic community but not for another.

Disagreements over

what to call ugood," stem from an underdeveloped (or unexploited) linguistic faculty.

Human psychological faculties

do not determine the sense--or, therefore, the reference--of
moral terms.
This theory is interesting in that it circumvents at
least one main criticism of Moore's intuitionism by not
equating the referents of moral terms with abstract entities.
Because it does not equate the meaning of ugood" with some-
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thing unanalyzab1s, it is able to avoid traditional objections which are sensitive to the multiplicity of syntactic
contexts into which Ngood" may figure (particularly various
adjectival forms).
Another problem, that will become of greater importance
below in our consideration of enq;,irical justificatory approaches, is that sc~BJJt~f~c approaches to meta-ethics (and
Katz claims his is a piece of empirical linguistics) are
guilty of leaving their subject matter behind.

A scientific

investigation into the nature of moral judgments and discourse will not appeal at the theoretical level to what is
essential to such judgments and discourse, namely, their norRMlt~vs content.

Rather the product of such an investigation

will be a piece of psychology or linguistics.

An explanation

of moral discourse along those lines will appeal to the possession of certain beliefs and to the fact that those beliefs
are hs1d (asslll11Bd, des.ired) to be true, but they will not appeal to the truth of those claims:

a normative claim cannot

serve an explanatory role.
Katz's view avoids this problem entirely.

It is scien-

tific in its methodology, yet it, in the end, appeals to entities (senses) which play a normative role.

The senses of

expressions prescribe what counts as meaningful discourse.
The sentence •John is a married bachelor• (if not uttered as
a joke) is nonsensical precisely because the senses of its
expression are not compatible; thus the ru1s ••married' may
not be used to modify 'bachelor'" reflects a certain relation
among the senses of those expressions.
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Now it's true that

Katz's theory does not appeal to the normative in the ethical
(as opposed to the normative in the semantical or syntactical); nevertheless, it is a theory in which the normativity
of the semantical does determine the reference of moral
terms.

So while the referents of those terms (goodness or

badness itself, let us say) play no explanatory role, what

they are ~s determined by something which plays an explanatory role.
Katz's view seems to be immune to the kind of criticism
that may be leveled against other empirical approaches.

I

would, however, like to criticize Katz on grounds that are
not unrelated to my advocacy of the positions which are held
by Arrington and Blackburn (to be described below).

Their

views, particularly Arrington's, are heavily influenced by

Wittgenstein and my own criticism is Wittgensteinian in nature.

Basically my criticism is that our judgments concern-

ing what counts as the correct application of a term include
an arbitrary and conventional element.

This is a criticism

directed against foundationalist accounts of knowledge, including foundationalist accounts of our knowledge of the
meanings of linguistic expressions (among which I count
Katz's theory).

Foundationalism within the theory of knowl-

edge maintains that knowledge consists of propositions which
are self-evidently true (perhaps because their denials entail
a contradiction, as Descartes thought) or which are entailed
by propositions which are self-evidently true.

The problem

with foundationalism is that it must employ a method by means
of which propositions of one kind or another may be declared
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either as or as not foundational, and that methodology (or
the propositions which describe that methodology) cannot it·
self be foundational.

This is the problem which gives rise

to the famous Cartesian Circle:

Descartes counted the cog1to

as foundational on the grounds that it is clear and distinct;
clarity and distinctness (particularly the latter) are to be
understood in terms of a proposition's inability to entail a
contradiction; yet it is precisely that inability which is
supposedly to be secured by a proposition's being clear and
distinct.

The only way out of the circle is to st1pu2ats

that propositions which meet a certain criterion will be
counted ilJTIOng those which constitute knowledge.
however, undermines foundationalism.

This fact,

Methodologies may, of

course, be justified on pragmatic or other grounds, but at
some point (to echo Wittgenstein, 1958, sec. 485) Just1f1cat1on camss to an end.

It is at that point at which one

reaches bedrock and is inclined to say #'This is simply what
I do' " (19 5 8 , sec . 21 7 ) .
It is clear that Katz's descriptions of semantic facts,
(1)- (6) above, are intended to play a foundational role.

Put

in their material mode counter-parts they express what are
traditionally regarded as analytic truths.

To deny the mate-

rial mode equivalent of #The term 'bachelor' is synonymous
with that of 'unmarried adult human male who is eligible for
marriage'# would be to utter that which cannot possibly be
true (Descartes' criterion).

Similarly, to deny that HA sis-

ter is a sibling" is analytic--entails that it is possible
for there to be a sister who is not a sibling, but (given the
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meaning of usisterw) this is not possible.

It is this which

accounts for the normativity of Katzian senses.

Relations

among senses are necessary; they are true by virtue of their
meanings.

Such relations prescr~bs how you can speak.

If

the sense of •bachelor• just is •an umarried. adult human male
who is eligible for marriage•, then one cannot go around saying that Susie is a bachelor.
But how does one know that one knows the sense of a particular linguistic expression?

According to Katz, knowledge

of the semantic features of a language requires a special
kind of linguistic intuition.

We need not concern ourselves

with Katz's account of linguistic intuition (let it suffice
to say that it involves psychological representations of
senses and their relations); even if there is such a faculty,

those who employ this faculty must have some criterion for
when this faculty has been correctly utilized.

How is one to

verify whether one's linguistic intuitions are accurate?
Let's suppose that Joe is an unmarried adult human male and
that we describe him as such, what sort of procedure are we
to employ to judge the appropriateness of labeling Joe a
•bachelor•?

Our intuitions tell us this is permissible, but

how do we know?
itions?

How many times should we consult our intu-

The point is that what counts for us as the correct

way of going on (i.e., what we consider justifiable) is not
itself justifiable (•If it did not it would not be justification,w Wittgenstein, 1958, sec 485).
Katz would like to deny that meaning or sense is somehow
a human construct, but he cannot avoid the criticism that
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judgments as to whether we have exercised our linguistic.intuitions in the proper way involve a conventional element.
This is a point which seems to me to count in favor of antirealist semantic theories and ultimately anti-realist metaethical theories, a matter which will await further examination below.

4.

ETHICAL EMPIRICISM

Many moral realists must be categorized as empiricists
rather that rationalists or intuitionists.

For them, the

methods of the sciences provide the requisite justification
for claims.

Realists such as Sturgeon (1988) and Boyd

(1-988), for example, do not fall within the Cartesian tradi-

tion of doubting sense experience but rather in the Lockean
tradition which looks to sense experience as the source of
knowledge.

However, calling these justificatory moral real-

ists uethical empiricistsn is problematic, as there are also
moral realists who are not justificationists but who do appeal to natural facts about how subjects do form moral judgments.

The two camps of naturalist realists are most immedi-

ately the philosophical heirs of Quine and Wittgenstein respectively.
All the philosophers examined in this section of this
chapter may be described as Quinean Naturalists, because they
share a certain way of construing the issues that stems from
Quine.

Each accepts the premise that 1f no.rmat1ve ethical

theories are amenable to realistic interpretation, then such
theories must be analogous in certain relevant ways to scien76

tific theories.

In calling them {)u.:inean Naturalists I do not

mean to suggest that they accept Quine's own conclusion concerning the status of ethical theories; indeed, they do not.
Quine (1981, pp. 55-66) actually denies that ethical theories
can be interpreted realistically, on the grounds that they
are methodolog.ica.1.ly .inf.:irm.

What makes it possible for

philosophers to accept Quine's premise without accepting his
conclusion are the varying views as to what are the relevant
features of science which ethics must share.

This particular

section examines these competing realisms and the arguments
which can be leveled against them.
Without going into Quine in any great detail let me say
that Quine is the ultimate empiricist:

For Quine, all state-

ments--even those commonly regarded as analytic and apr.:ior.:i-are subject to revision with respect to their presumed truth
or falsity.

This is the crux of his dissolution of the ana-

lytic/synthetic distinction.

That distinction, according to

Quine, assumes that certain individual sentences of a theory
can be meaningful apart from the other sentences in that theory or can be true come what may.

Quine rejects such an as-

sumption and opts instead for a holistic view, a view that
regards a scientific theory as a network of sentences.

The

truths of statements from logic and mathematics which have
traditionally been regarded as analytic are now to be construed simply as more intransigent than those which are more
obviously contingently true.

Ultimately, wlJat there :is is to

be determined by what is in accordance with the methods and
theories of the best science of the day.
77

It is with this in

mind that Quine argues in "On the Nature of Moral Values"
that ethical theories lack the potential to carry ontological
commitment on the grounds that they are methodologically infirm.

Quine's view rests on the apparent fact that there is

nothing in ethics which is comparable to theory confinnation
and disconfirmation which is the earmark of the physical sciences.

Science, unlike ethics, permits the forming and test-

ing of hypotheses.

Characteristic of this process is the

forming of predictions which are followed by observations
which either confirm the hypothesis to some degree or disconfirm it.

Ethical judgments, however, do not employ predic-

tion and observation. 23

In what follows we are concerned with

the views of philosophers who, like Quine, are basically unwilling to quantify over anything (sets being an exception
for Quine) that is not instrumental to empirical investigation.
Contemporary moral realists such as Sturgeon and Boyd
maintain that ethics shares a sense of continuity with science in that both involve the testing of hypotheses.

If a

hypothesis passes the relevant tests, it can be said to be
ev.idence for

the overall theory of which it is a part.

What

these moral realists intend to show is that certain moral hypotheses can be shown to be true and, as such, are to be as
explanatorily relevant to our observations and evaluations of
behavior.

In what follows, I first examine Sturgeon's view

W.V.O. Quine, "On the Nature of Moral Values," in
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1981, pp. 55-66. For a detailed discussion of Quine's view,
see R. Gibson's En1.ightened J'bnp.ir.ic.ism: An Exam.inat.lon of
fJT. V. (}u.ine 's Theory of KnoAT1edge, University of South Florida
Press, Tampa, pp. 155-176.
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and then move on to Boyd's realist position.

My PUrPOSe in

doing it in this way has to do with the fact that (i)
Sturgeon's view is an attack on Gilbert Harman's view that
moral observations add nothing relevant to our explanations
and (ii) that his view is a weaker version of moral realism
than that which is presented by Boyd.

Boyd's generally

stronger view is, I feel, more supportive of the ethics-science analogy.
As pointed out above, Sturgeon (1988) responds to
Harman's charge that moral observations are explanatorily irrelevant to why we make the moral judgments we do.

Harman

(1977) speaks of uthe problem with ethics• in the opening
chapter of The Nature of Nora1~tyand his investigation centers around the question of how one is to test and confirm
moral principles and whether such principles can help in the
explanation of our observations.

Ultimately, the problem

with ethics has to do with its inability to explain why we
observe what we observe, that it cannot confirm moral principles in the way that science would be able to do so.

Toil-

lustrate his point, Harman begins his analysis by showing the
relation between perception and observation in both science
and ethics.

uperception,• according to Harman, uinvolves

forming a belief as a fairly direct result of observing something; you can form a belief only if you understand the relevant concepts and a concept is what it is by virtue of its
role in some theory• (1977, p. 5).

The relation between per-

ception and observation is an intimate one, and points to the
fact that observation is theory-1aden (1977, p. 4).
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What is

perceived will depend to a certain extent on what principles
and theories you hold.

Harman presents us with the following

example to illustrate the role of perception and observation
in science and their link to the confirmation of a theory:
Consider a physicist making an observation to
test a scientific theory. Seeing a vapor trail in
a cloud chamber, he thinks, uThere goes a proton.•
He can count his making the observation as confirming evidence for his theory only to the extent that
it is reasonable to explain his making the observation by assuming that, not only is he in a certain
psychological •set", given the theory he accepts an
his beliefs about the experimental apparatus, but
furthermore, there really was a proton going
through the cloud chamber, causing the vapor trail,
which he saw as a proton (1977, p.6).
What this example shows is that the scientist must assume
certain physical facts (at the very least, that there rsa22y
is a proton) in order to sxp2a~n his observation of a vapor
trail in a cloud chamber.

Now, according to Harman, a theory

should include only those facts that would be considered necessary for the explanation of an observation.

If, as Harman

maintains, the physicists's observation of the vapor trail
which led to his conclusion that a proton existed in the
cloud chamber could have been more economically accounted for
by reference to his psychological set alone, then everything
else presented should be considered ~rre2svant to the making
of that observation.

But, of course, reference to the other

factors, including the existence of a proton, is necessary
and reasonable in this and other types of similar situations,
since the physicist's observation does serve as evidence for
the theory itself.

And, for Harman, scientific observations

are best explained by assuming that the events they report
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cause them.
Can, however, this analysis be applied to the moral situation?

A

moral theory, like a scientific one, should con-

tain only those principles that are relevant to the making of
some moral observation.

Consider what is being observed in

the following scenario, to use one of Harman's examples.
see teenagers pouring gasoline on a cat.
them setting the cat on fire.

You

You then observe

Are there any specifically au-

tonomous mora2 facts that must be assumed in order to arrive
at your conclusion that this type of behavior is wrong?

Does

one have to infer the existence of moral facts in order to
explain our moral observation?

Hannan argues that the intro-

duction of mora2 facts adds noth.ing to our explanation of why
we act as we do, why we observe what we do observe.

In

ethics, one doesn't have to assume that there really exists
some moral property of wrongness, say, in order to explain
his observation that what the teenagers are doing is wrong.
As Hannan points out,
If you round a corner and see a group of
young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, you do not need to conc2ude that what
they are doing is wrong; you do not need to
figure anything out; you can see that it is
wrong (1977, p. 4).
Whether the act in question is rea22ywrong, then, does not
matter to the explanation of your observation.

Unlike scien-

tific observations, moral observations never have to assume
that the moral events (or facts) reported cause them.
Explanations of moral observations need only involve reference to theories regarding the observer's moral psychology or
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sensibility (1977, p. 4).

Moral judgments, as it were, could

be described as the result of the observer peering through a
nonnative lens, her judgment being the coloring (i.e., the
evaluating) of some particular state of affairs as morally
right or wrong.

In contrast, the scientist's thinking that

MThere goes a proton." serves as evidence for his observation
of a vapor trail in the cloud chamber.

The scientist will

have to make· assumptions about certain physical facts (that
there really is a proton) in order to explain his observation
of a vapor trail in a cloud chamber.

So, according to

Hannan, once we realize that we need only appeal to our particular normative or psychological theories, i.e., once we
realize that M[a]ll we need to assume is that we have certain
more or less articulated moral principles that are reflected
in the judgments we make, based on our moral sensibilities"
(1977, p. 7) for explanations of our moral observations, talk
of moral facts is explanatorily impotent.
What Harman is claiming is that our assumptions about
moral facts do not explain our moral observations.

What he

means by 'explanatorily irrelevant' is that reference to
moral properties adds nothing to the explanation that will
help us to understand why we made the moral judgment that we
did.

According to him, it is not that there exist moral

properties out thsrs to refer to that will Just~fyour saying
that 'xis good,' for instance, but, rather, it is the case
that, because of effective socialization, we have come to
view certain things this way rather than in other ways (he
does not dispute that we make moral judgments) and so have a
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certain amount of agreement with those who share our interests on these issues.

But appealing to •the wrongness• of

some situation tells us nothing and, according to Harman,
adds nothing to our observation that •xis wrong• once we
have described the situation. What we see when we observe
teenagers setting a cat on fire is not fllrongness per se; what
we see is what is before us: some particular cat being set on
fire by some particular teenagers in some particular way at
this time and place.

What we want to say is that this par-

ticular action ~s fllrong, yet saying so would not add to our
explanation of our evaluation about that particular case and
so, as a result, the introduction of moral facts would not
Just~fyour saying that what the teenagers are doing is
wrong.

At most, what is shown is a reference to the fact

that we have been socialized to give this type of judgment;
it has not been shown that there rea11yare moral facts.
Hannan has so far pointed out that moral properties and
facts are explanatorily impotent since our moral judgments
and behavior can be partially explained by reference to natural and social scientific facts about ourselves, specifically
reference to our psychological make-up, and, as such, bringing in or positing moral facts and properties is unnecessary.
But that does not quite limit ethics to being reduc~b1e to
the natural facts.

If anything, Harman claims, ethics will

only turn out to be part~a11yreducible to the natural and
social scientific facts.

By showing what is wrong with a re-

ductive ethical naturalist view, Harman will conclude that a
scientific approach to meta-ethics will not adequately ac83

count for the nature of moral decision-making.
A reductive ethical naturalist will claim that a moral
fact is reducible to some natural or social scientific fact.
By reducing moral facts to natural ones, we could use assump-

tions about those facts to help explain our observations of
behavior.

Harman (1977, p. 14-15) discusses whether moral

facts might be reducible to natural ones.

One possible way

in which this reduction could take place is if such moral
facts were to be recognized as facts about functions, roles
and relevant interests in particular situations (1977, p.
15).

We can at least talk about non-moral evaluative facts

in this way in that things are judged good or bad depending
on whether or not they fulfill their intended functions, answer to their expected roles, or are able to respond to the
relevant interests of certain situations.

For example, to

say that this particular knife is a good knife is to say that
it cuts well, among other things.

And when one says that

some knife is a good knife, we take it as a matter of fact
that it cuts well.

We would even go a step further and and

say that we expect it to fulfill that specific function, that
it ought to cut well if it is a good knife.

To say that Mary

is a good teacher could be to say, for example, that she is
able to present her lectures to her students in a clear manner, among other things.

There are other objects, though,

that cannot be called •good# with respect to some fun~tJon or
ro1e (e.g., a rock) and so must be related to some particular
Jnterest in a certain context (a good rock is one that will

break that window).

The question is, though: will this type
84

of analysis work for ethical judgments as it does for nonmoral evaluative judgments?

The goodness of one's watch is

determined by such facts as its ability to keep time, its
simple upkeep, the length of its life, etc.

The (moral)

goodness of an action, however, cannot just be said to be
solely determined by its physical characteristics or in terms
of some relevant interests in that such physical facts do not
quite define or exp1a~n the moral sense of goodness.

Yet

whether some action is good also cannot be explained by merely appealing to some moral property of goodness, not just because such a property's existence is doubtful, but because
such a concept by itself explains nothing.
Harman constructs the following uthought experiment# to
illustrate that this type of analysis is not adequate for
showing how moral facts might be reducible to or constructed
out of observable facts:
You have five patients in the hospital who are
dying, each in need of a separate organ. One
needs a kidney, another a lung, a third a heart,
and so forth. You can save all five if you take
a single healthy person and remove his heart,
lungs, kidney, and so forth, to distribute to
these five patients. Just such a healthy person
is in room 306. He is in the hospital for routine
tests. Having seen his test results, you know that
he is perfectly healthy and of the right tissue
compatibility. If you do nothing, he will survive
without incident; the other patients will die,
however. The other five patients can be saved only
if the person in Room 306 is cut up and his organs
distributed. In that case, there would be one dead
but five saved (1977, pp. 3-4).
The question that Harman poses at this point is whether some
moral fact can be defined in terms of some relevant interests
in this particular situation.

The purpose behind isolating
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the relevant interests in this situation is to help us decide
what to do.

In this particular situation

most of us, I

would guess, would go with our initial intuitions and say
that we should not cut up a healthy person to save the lives
of other people and that would be the end of the discussion.
But remember that we are interested in finding out whether or
not we can refer to this judgment as a factual judgment.

If

we call it a factual judgment, we are committing ourselves to
the view that we can justify and explain our observation that
Mkilling a healthy person to save others is wrong" by appealIs this moral fact a

ing to some moral fact of wrongness.
fact about some relevant interest?

More than just a vague

indication would be needed if a precise reduction is to be
possible.

Keep in mind that such an identity is the goal of

the reductive ethical naturalist.

And the interests, roles

and functions must be of a kind that is able to exp1a~n our
observations in the situation at hand.

Does specifying the

relevant interests in this particular context adequate1y explain our observation of such an action being wrong?
Harman argues that such a reduction is not possible,
given that we do not have to appeal to moral facts (since,
for Hannan, there are no moral facts)

moral observations.

in order to explain our

According to Harman, the introductio.n of

moral facts adds noth~ng to our explanation of why we act as
we do, why we observe what we do observe.

An explanation of

why we would not want to sacrifice the life of the patient in
room 306 does not have to appeal to any moral facts; it can
be given in terms of what moral views we hold along with an
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assessment of our moral sensibilities which are relevant to
that situation.

And such moral views are the result of ef-

fective socialization, according to Hannan.

They have no

status independent of our particular upbringings.
Hannan claims that all that needs to be appealed to is the
psychological make-up of the agents which would include some
reference to their particular moral views.

Whether the act

in question is rea11ywrong does not matter to the explanation of their observation that cutting up the healthy patient
would be wrong and, hence, undesirable.
But does it follow from this discussion that an account
of our moral decision-making can adequately be justified by
psychological and sociological facts about ourselves?

No.

According to Harman, these latter facts only serve to exp1a~n
what we are doing when we make a moral observation; they do
not, however, serve as the ,iust~f~cat~on for our observation
(that what we are saying ~s true).

Consider a situation in

which an ethics teacher asks one of her students why he says
that abortion is wrong and the student responds by saying
that "That is the way I was raised to see it.".

The student

has offered an explanation, but clearly the goal of the
teacher here is to have the student justify his explanation,
i.e., say why it is true.

Merely describing the psychologi-

cal and sociological facts, then, is not sufficient for the
justification of our moral beliefs.

And such a justification

is what the nonnative ethicist is after.
Hannan, then, cannot be considered to be an extreme
moral nihilist since he does accept the existence of moral
87

judgments and does believe that normative ethical theory has
a role to play, namely in the justification of our moral beliefs.

He states,
... [i]t is worth pointing out that extreme moral
nihilism is not an automatic consequence of the
point that moral facts apparently cannot help explain moral observations. Although this is grounds
for nihilism, there are more moderate versions of
nihilism. Not all versions imply that morality is
a delusion and that moral judgments are to be abandoned the way an atheist abandons religious judgments. Thus, a more moderate nihilism holds that
the purpose of moral judgments is not to describe
the world but to express our moral feelings or to
serve as imperatives we address to ourselves and
to others. In this view, morality is not undermined by its apparent failure to explain observations, because to expect moral judgments to be of
help in explaining observations is to be confused
about the function of morality (1977, p.12).

And so, if ethical reductivist naturalists continue to hold
their view, believing that such a reduction is possible,
Harman concludes that moral nihilism will be victorious over
reductive ethical naturalism.

If one can show that moral

facts and properties cannot explain why we observe what we
observe, and in that sense can be shown to be irrelevant,
doubt is cast on their very existence.

And, if there are no

moral facts or properties to speak of, there cannot be moral
knowledge.
basis.

Moral realism is then left without an ontological

As such, then, Harman finds that comparing ethics to

science does not do justice to the nature of ethics.

A sci-

entific approach to meta-ethics only serves to offer a description of what is going on when we make moral judgments;
it does not pre~cribe what we ought to do.
Ha:anan's view is that moral realists have misconstrued
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the function of morality.

Harman concludes that ethics can-

not be compared to science since science is primarily concerned with description.

Ethics cannot be adequately de-

scribed merely by reducing it to the natural and social scientific facts, given its primary normative nature.

The non-

reduct~ve ethical naturalist view of Sturgeon, however, raises questions as to the legitimacy of Harman's view that any
talk of moral facts is pointless as well as to whether his
supposed disanalogy between science and ethics is as great as
he makes it out to be.

Sturgeon claims to be able to demon-

strate that moral facts do enter into our explanations of our
moral observations, and thus is critical of Harman's overall
analysis.

If such a demonstration is possible, Sturgeon be-

lieves that moral realism is a possibility.
So, the question is:
against Harman's charge?

can Sturgeon defend himself
He responds in the following way.

He takes up Harman's challenge by showing (i) that moral
principles are not inmune from observational testing and (ii)
that moral facts are relevant to the explanation of the moral
judgments we make.

In making a case for (i), Sturgeon gives

the following example:
From the surprising moral thesis that Adolf
Hitler was a morally admirable person, together
with a modest piece of moral theory to the effect
that no morally see the degradation and death of
millions of persons, one can derive the testable
consequence that Hitler did not do this. But if he
did, so we must give up one of our premises; and
the choice of which to abandon is neither difficult
nor controversial (1988, p. 232).
Sturgeon also poi~ts out that the testing of any principles,
scientific or moral, is not done in isolation.
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He is very

much a Quinean here, accepting the latter's naturalized epis·
temological approach.

The confinnation of a scientific prin-

ciple depends on its coherence with the overall theory, and
the truth of the theory itself depends on how it answers to
experience or corresponds to the world.

Sturgeon believes

that the confirmation of a moral principle or theory likewise
depends on whether it f~ts w~th or answers to experience, as
the Hitler example shows above.
Making a case for (ii), however, is what Sturgeon believes will significantly affect Hannan's overall argument
for moral skepticism.

Sturgeon sets out to argue that

"[m]oral facts do fit into our explanatory view of the world,
and in particular into explanations of many moral observations and beliefs• (1988, p.236).

Sturgeon gives the follow-

ing example (1988, p.244) to illustrate his point that a
moral fact cannot only explain our evaluation of some person
or action, but can account for the best or most reasonable
explanation for that judgment:
Bernard Devoto, in The Year of J)ec.is.ion: 18~5,
describes the efforts of American emigrants already
in California
to rescue another party of emigrants, the Donner
Party, trapped by snows in the High Sierrras, once
their plight became known ... Relief efforts were put
under the direction of a recent arrival, Passed
Midshipman Selim Woodworth ... But Woodworth not only
failed to lead rescue parties into the mountains
himself, where other rescuers were counting on
him (leaving children to be picked up by him, for
example), but had to be •shamed, threatened, and
bullied• even into organizing the efforts of others
willing to take the risk; he spent time arranging
comforts for himself in camp, preening himself on
the importance of his position; and as a pre·
dictable result of his cowardice and his exercises
in vain-glory, many died who might have been
saved ... DeVoto concludes: "Passed Midshipman
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Woodworth was just no damned good" (1942, p. 422).
Sturgeon's point is that if the evidence that Devoto cites is
correct, then part of the best explanation that we have of
his belief that Woodworth was no dammned good was that he was
no damned good (1988, p. 244).

Other examples involving

moral facts as part of explanations of our moral beliefs and
observations can also given.

Sturgeon gives the example of a

judge who, because of her compassion, gives a lighter sentence to a convicted criminal (1988, p. 244) as well as the
example of the abolition of American slavery due to the fact
that human bondage was seen to be evil (1988, p. 245).

What

Sturgeon wants to get across here is that all of the explantions given in the above cases involve an appeal to some
moral fact.

Yet, as I will point out later on in this dis-

cussion, Sturgeon's explanation of a belief in this sense
only accounts for the existence of the

belief; the explana-

tion does not serve to Jusc~fy that belief.
What Sturgeon wants to understand at this point is how
Harman can actually say that such facts are not explanatorily
relevant.

Sturgeon pursues the matter in the following way:

could it be the case that the observation would have been
made even if it turned out that that explanation was false

(1988, p. 245)?

Would Devoto have believed that Woodworth

was no damned good if Woodworth did not have the characteristics he did?

Prejudices aside, and provided that Devoto can

give evidence (such as evidence of cowardice and vani.ty) for
his belief, then Woodworth's cowardice and vanity are relevant to DeVoto's conclusion.

The same point applies to the
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cat-burning incident

We say that what the hoodlums did

(burning the cat) was wrong.
such an action is wrong?

But how it is determined that

Being an ethical naturalist,

Sturgeon claims that certain moral facts supervene upon a
certain set of natural and social scientific facts.

If there

had been other kinds of facts, we would not have made the
same moral observation.

If we're going to say that their be-

havior is not wrong, we will have to look for some change in
the physical facts.

Perhaps we missed something.

Perhaps it

is not really gasoline they are pouring over the cat.
Perhaps what we see is not a fire being set; maybe it is a
reflection of one in a mirror.

In that case, we would not

say that what they are doing is wrong.

But perhaps it is re-

ally what we thought we saw originally and our original assessment of the case is a correct one.

In any event, the

truth of our explanation that it is wrong behavior would
depend on the kinds of physical facts before us.
Suppose, though, that there exists disagreement over
whether the hoodlums' action of cat-burning is wrong, that
while I say that what they did was wrong, another individual,
John Smith, says that it was not.

What would account for

this disagreement given that we have the same situation before us?

The first thing to question here is whether we are

in fact seeing the same thing.

We both see that some cat is

set on fire by some teenagers.

The difference, then, must

lie in what we take to be the morally relevant features of
the situation.

My reason for thinking this behavior wrong

might be a utiltarian one, one that says that unjustifiably
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causing any sentient being pain (and death) is wrong.

John

Smith, though, adheres more to a Kantian outlook and believes
that only rational beings should be spared pain.

What this

seems to indicate, though, is that we are each focusing on
different aspects of the action that has just taken place.
So, in one sense, then, we are not seeing the action of catburning in the same way.

However, if we shared the same

moral theory or outlook and, hence, agreed on what facts were
to be the morally relevant ones, then, according to Sturgeon,
we could at least claim that there was a moral fact of the
matter here, that what the teenagers were doing was wrong.
Another example given by Sturgeon (1988, p. 247) may
also help to clarify his point.

Imagine a situation in which

we have an individual (call her Jane Doe) who sees the
teenagers setting the cat on fire, but her reason for calling
their behavior wrong is not because she holds a particular
moral theory per se, but rather because she believes that
teenagers are always doing something wrong and mischievous.
So it does not necessarily matter what they are doing, since
whatever they will do in her eyes will be wrong.

Her aware-

ness of the situation is colored by her prejudice against
teenagers in general.

But, in her case, her moral outlook

will remain the same despite the fact that her judgment is
based on a false belief.

She is not being reflective in her

decision-making unlike the utilitarian and the Kantian.

If,

though, she removed such biases from her perception, chances
are that she would see the situation in a different light,
possibly agreeing with the utilitarian or Kantian outlooks.
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It seems that Sturgeon's point here is that what we perceive as the relevant moral facts will make a difference in
the explanations of our beliefs about some situation.

And,

so, as Sturgeon himself realizes, his realist analysis of the
situation depends on having a background moral theory to- relate to.

Harman's position does not rely on any background

moral theory.

So, it is in that regard that Harman can say

that the observation would have been made regard1ess of the
truth of the situation.
The important question, though, with regard to
Sturgeon's analysis of moral judgments is this: has he answered Harman's charge?

Is Sturgeon's scientific approach to

meta-ethics guilty of leaving its subject matter behind?

A

scientific investigation into the nature of moral judgments
and discourse will not appeal at the theoretical level to
what is essential to such judgments and discourse, namely
their normat2ve content.

Rather, the product of such an in-

vestigation will be a piece of psychology or linguistics.

An

explanation of moral discourse along those lines will appeal
to the possession of certain beliefs and to the fact that
those beliefs are he1d (assl.Ull6d, des2red') to be true, but
they will not appeal to the truth of those claims: a norma-

tive claim cannot serve an explanatory role.

To put it in

another way, the goal of science is explanation, but the goal
of normative ethics is justification of our moral judgments.
Returning to our analysis of Sturgeon's account of moral
judgments, it only speaks to the explanatory side.
not offer justification of such moral judgments.
94

It does
What his

analysis shows is that moral consensus is due to our sharing
a background moral theory.

And given that he accepts that

there exists moral disagreement, as in the case of the
Kantian and utilitarian who disagree over whether cat-burning
is immoral, his case for moral realism is a weak and unconvincing one.

Cases of moral disagreement are, of course, not

rare but even in the cases where we are in agreement (by
virtue of accepting the same moral standard), we still need
to say something about why we are justified in continuing to
hold such standards or offer the explanations we do.

In

other words, we have to be able to say why our theory or
principle{s) is true.

A realist position in ethics has to be

able to do this.
Richard Boyd, another non-reductive ethical naturalist,
however does claim to offer justification.
be able to do so by

But he claims to

pointing out that there is a parallel

left to draw between ethics and science.

According to him,

an analogy between the two disciplines can still be maintained.

He defends a realist semantics for moral discourse

according to which conflicts arising in ethics are to be resolved in much the same way as disputes arising in science
have been.

Boyd takes his approach to be representative of

Quine's naturalist bent in that his goal is to show how moral
properties such as goodness are natural properties and not
the simple unanalyzable non-natural properties envisioned by
Moore and others.

The centerpiece of Boyd's realist seman-

tics for moral discourse is a notion of reflective equilibrium {borrowed from a theory of decision procedures in science)
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which when applied within the moral domain appears to presuppose a particular version of consequentialism.
called homeostatic consequentialism.

His theory is

It tries to model moral

decision-making after a scientific model which involves testing hypotheses (if we can consider a proposition like uMary
is unkind- as a hypothesis) against (i) observations and (ii)
pre-existing theories by means of (iii) reliable procedures
and techniques.

Just as science must strike a balance be-

tween observation, theory and method by not letting any one
ride rough shod over the others, so must ethics.

Like sci-

ence, ethics requires observation and theory, and the two are
in fact intertwined from a child's earliest moral development
to that point at which it encounters moral beliefs contrary
to its own and must seek to either confirm or revise its beliefs.
We may

go

as far as to say that human beings are by

their very (physical) nature reliable indicators of what is
valuable or not.

We learn from our parents what sorts of

things are to count as valuable.

Humans are, as it were,

hard-wired with a concern for their own well-being.

We have

an aversion to pain as well as a definite preference for what
is pleasurable.

In our on-going attempts at avoiding the

former and enhancing the latter, we form and test hypotheses
concerning the values of things by identifying and observing
potential sources of pleasure and pain.

Humans naturally

promote the k~nds of things which contribute to the pursuit
of pleasure and the avoidance of pain; and, so, they encourage attitudes (like mutual respect) and develop social pro96

grams and institutions which will lead to that end.

These

various goods and the methods for attaining them form a homeostasis, an equilibrium.

These goods are tested through

their implementation, for example, in social programs.

A

program that is implemented but fails to produce the goods
expected (that is, when what was hypothesized as good turns
out not to be so), is rejected in much the same way that a
scientific theory would be rejected.

When the theory fails

the test, measure is taken of the theory (i.e., the hypothesis), the observation and the methods used (in this case the
way the program was implemented).

New theories and methods

are drawn up and new observations are made.

If homeostasis

could be achieved (and it's an open question whether it
could), it would no longer be necessary to revise our beliefs.

As long as the revision of beliefs is necessary, how-

ever, it will be guided by a concern for striking a new balance among those goods which continue to be accepted, the
methods of their implementation (and determination) and future goods which are hypothesized and the~rmethod of implementation.
Boyd's account of ethical judgments and belief revision
requires this teleological notion of a homeostatic state

which optimizes the happiness of the members of society.
Thus his meta-ethics, that is, his account of moral judgments
and moral discourse, require building into subjects an ingrained utilitarian psychology.

Subjects' utilitarianism

(indeed, their ru1e utilitarianism) forms the backdrop
against which particular moral judgments are deemed true or
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false.

Moral subjects are

guided teleologically to the truth. 24
Quine (1981) does not think, however, that this type of
view establishes realism in ethics.

Quine would hold that

moral realists, even Boyd, have not met the challenge of
demonstrating that the theory or principles they hold are in
fact true, i.e., true in virtue of correspondence to the
world.

According to Quine, moral statements can only be

judged true in relation to the moral standards themselves,
i.e., according to how they cohere with other sentences of
the theory.

His main reason for claiming that this is the

case has to do with his view that there are no moral observation sentences to speak of (1986, p.664).

According to

Quine, an observation sentence is defined as a sentence that
any qualified witness to the observation could agree to,

without benefit of acollateral information# that is not publicly shared.

Such an agreement is agreement with regard to

the truth-value of the sentence.

The sentence "It is rain-

ing# , for example, qualifies as an observation sentence.
There, however, does not appear to be any analogous type of
sentence in the moral domain.

The closest we could come to a

moral observation sentence 'A'Ould be a sentence like "That's
horrible#, a response that some of us would agree with when
observing the hoodlums igniting the cat.

Quine, however,

N Boyd's case is not atypical.
David Brink has a similar
theory. Cf. Chapter 8 in Brink's .HoraJ ReaJ.iSITI and the
Foundat~ons of Eth~cs, (Cambridge University Press, 1989)
where he discusses his consequentialist position, objective
utiltarianism.The fundamental features of David Brink's version is similar to Boyd's view and both views are non-reductive naturalist views.
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points out that such a consensus is possible only because we
(those of us who find the response #That's horribleff asap·
propriate to the hoodlums' behavior) already accept a partic·
ular moral theory, a theory not in general shared by all ob·
servers of the event.

Such a theory is collateral informa·

tion that not all witnesses could or would accept.
Now it might be objected at this point that science it·
self cannot offer conclusive proof that its currently accept·
ed theories are undeniably true, and so ethicists should not
have to worry that they cannot meet Quine's challenge.

Yet

they do need to worry since science is unlike ethics in that
most scientific theories combine theoretical statements with
observation statements.
checkpoints.

Ethics, however, lacks empirical

As Quine points out,

... one regrets the methodological infirmity of
ethics as compared to science. The empirical
foothold of scientific theory is in the predicted
observable event; that of a moral code is in the
observable moral act. But whereas we can test a
prediction against the independent course of ob·
servable nature, we can judge the morality of an
act only by our moral standards themselves.
Science, thanks to its links with observation, re·
tains some title to a correspondence theory of
truth; but a coherence theory is evidently
the lot of ethics (1981, p. 63).
From this it follows that while Quine is a realist with re·
spect to science, he is an anti-realist with respect to
ethics.

Whether something is to be judged moral or inmoral

will depend upon the particular moral theory you hold.
think Quine is correct here.

And I

In many cases, it would seem

that at the base of our decision to find something morally
wrong (or right) is a certain subjective element, namely that
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we have accepted to view certain types of actions as wrong
(or right) and that that acceptance depends on what moral
theory we adhere to.

What Sturgeon's theory does show us is

that we need not be total skeptics about the relevance of
certain moral qualities to the explanations of our observations and beliefs.

Yet that by itself does not support a

full-fledged moral realism.

On the contrary, experience

seems to indicate that for the most part what we have is a
multiplicity of moral outlooks with their own •facts of the
matter."
In addition to Quine's criticisms of moral realism, all
of the aforementioned non-reductive ethical naturalists are
subject to criticism based on the fact that they rely upon a
certain (questionable) assumption for justifying their moral
realist positions.

Quinean Naturalism assumes that there is

some single set of standards for rational acceptability which
all good sciences either have adhered to or do adhere to, and
that these standards can be discovered once and for all by us
and then used as a basis for comparison with ethics.

If Kuhn

(1962) is correct, then there is no reason to suppose that
the 'growth' of science occurs in any sort of continuous and
unequivocally rational way.

For Kuhn, scientific revolutions

usher in new paradigms: not only new theories, but new
methodologies and research goals.

New methodologies intro-

duce new standards for rational acceptability.

For example,

the emergence of artificial intelligence during the late
1950's made unacceptiflb1e any theory concerning the nature of
psychological processes that was incapable of being instanti100

ated in a computer program.

Indeed, even if we attribute a

greater continuity to science than does Kuhn, who can deny
the advent of new methodologies and new standards?

Certainly

the advent of computers has introduced standards for statistical inferences unimaginable to good science one hundred
years ago; sample sizes, analyses of variables, etc. once
considered adequate no longer are.

Were the experiments con-

ducted by Mendel, therefore, not good science?

Contemporary

science also admits of a plurality of goals and methodologies.

Does the fact that paleontology is strictly explanato-

ry but not predictive make it a deficient science?

If the

mentalistic jargon in which psychology is conducted turns out
to be fictive as opposed to factual, will the fact that psychology is only predicative (of human behavior) and not explanatory be regarded as a flaw?

How should we view other

sciences which make 'reference' to fictitious entities (frictionless planes, absolute zero and the like) to formulate
predictions? And even if there were consensus among contemporary scientists and watchdog philosophers of science concerning what counts as good science, would that ensure that the
standards might not change?

For this reason I think the

whole enterprise surrounding the hope that in the workings of
science can be d~scovered standards for rational acceptability and ontological conmitment is mistaken.

Wittgensteinian

Naturalism, which will be discussed in the next section, does
not rest upon this assumption.
What has been shown so far is that the project of comparing ethics to science is a mistaken one.
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If moral facts

could be totally reducible to natural facts, then non-reductive ethical naturalists would have a case of the method
(meta-ethics) and the subject matter (the normative content)
passing each other by.

Explaining our moral observations via

a description of our upbringing and psychological make-up
only serves to give a descr~pt~oD of our moral beliefs; such
explanations by themselves do not serve to justify our moral
theories, i.e., tell us why they are true.

A meta-ethical

theory is not just concerned with explanation or description;
its concern is largely over what we ought to do and why we
are justified in believing that some of our moral prescriptions are true.
world.

Truth in science is correspondence to the

Yet, since these ethical naturalists are unable to

show that our moral judgments correspond to the world in the
way that scientific judgments do, they are unable to offer a
defense of moral realism.
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CHAPTER II
DESCRIPTIVIST FORMS OF MORAL REALISM
1.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The authors to be examined in this chapter, in one way or
another, reject the assumption that sense can be made out of
realism only if moral judgments can be proven to cor~espond
to facts of some sort.

That assumption has traditionally

been associated with cognitivism, but it is implicit in noncognitivist rejections of realism as well.

That assumption

is certainly operative in theories examined in the previous
section.

Each of the philosophers to be considered here of-

fers an alternative to ethical rationalism and cognitivism,
yet each lays claim to being a moral realist.

As we shall

see, a different conception of objectivity emerges from their
debate.
I begin by examining the view of Mark Platts
much influenced by the later Wittgenstein's work.

who is not
However,

Platts' view is similar enough to the views of McDowell and
the other Wittgensteinians that it warrants examination.

In

a certain respect it serves as a foil, since many of its difficulties are overcome by adopting particular claims advocated by McDowell.

In an important respect Platts occupies a

position midway between those of the naturalists of the previous se.ction and the Wittgensteinian naturalists considered
here, since he does seem to require that moral statements
satisfy conditions of correspondence while yet relinquishing
the ideal that moral judgments must be rationally justifi103

able.

It is the latter thesis he shares in common with the

Wittgensteinians.

What Platts fails to realize is that that

position is not compatible with the first.

2.

In Nays of

Hei!U1~ng

PLATTS

(1979) Platts argues that some of the

moral judgments we make are factually cognitive, i.e., that
moral beliefs are no different from other factual beli~ts in
that they can be assessed as true or false.

And their truth

or falsity depends on the independently existing world·and
not on what individuals believe to be the case.

As he

states, Nif a moral judgment is true, it is true in virtue of
the (independently existing) real world, and is true in
virtue of that alone" (p. 246).

He claims, as Wittgenstein

and McDowell do, that our linguistic practices are social
practices.

Such practices are governed normatively by human

concepts and standards and as such cannot be judged as irrational outside of our form of life.

The concepts and stan-

dards employed are formed, as it were, by our interests and
concerns; this much we realize when we study our language.
The realists who hold this view are following the position
held by Wittgenstein that we will only understand the meaning
of our discourse by looking and seeing how it is used.

Here

is where the use of ethical ~ntu.i t.ions comes into play.
Platts refers to himself as an ethical intuitionist but he is
concerned not with the f8cu1tythat Moore focused upon, but
rather with the intuitions themselves.
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Ethical intuitions

for him are basic ethical beliefs, or what Williams calls
spontt1neous conv.1.'ct.ions:

[I]ntuition in ethics, as a faculty, is no more.
But .intu.it.ions--the beliefs which, when there was
supposed to be a faculty, were supposedly given by
it are very much part of the subject. These are
spontaneous convictions, moderately reflective but
not yet theorized, about the answer to some ethical
question, usually hypothetical and couched in general terms. They are often questions about what to
do {1985, pp. 94-95).
Such ethical beliefs are, in fact, that--ethical be1iefs.
But Platts, unlike Williams, does not want to associate this
type of belief with desires.

He cites Elizabeth Anscombe's

distinction between factual belief and desire, which are for
her two separate categories of mental states.

The distinc-

tion is made in terms of the d.1.'rect.1.'on of f.1.'t these two types
of mental states have with the world: true beliefs f i t the
way the world is whereas the goal of desires is to be realized., that is, there is a hope that at some point the world
will accomodate them.

Platts insists that moral beliefs and

judgments belong to the category of beliefs whereas non-cognitivists hold that such judgments belong to the category of
desires.

As Platts points out, we do not always desire to do

what is right; •we perform many intentional actions in the
moral life that we apparently do not desire to perform# (p.
293).

It may, for example, be terribly inconvenient for me

to stop and help a distressed motorist, but I nevertheless
should do so.

Why?

Because that person needs my help, and I

should help those who cannot help themselves, if it is within
my power to do so.

do?

Not always.

But is this something I enjoy or want to
So, how is it that we get realism out of
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this view?

Couldn't my obligations in this and other like

instances be construed as the result of effective socializa·
tion as Harman would like us to think?
We are trained to use these concepts in certain ways as
opposed to others.

This process involves educating us as to

the proper use of the terms we apply.

And just as we learn

to use the term 'red' to apply to fire engines rather than to
rabbits, the· same type of process occurs when we learn to
apply the term 'kind' to those persons who exhibit gentle and
thoughtful behavior to others, rather than to those who set
cats on fire.

What is objective about this whole process is

the fact that we cannot just apply these terms in any
arbitrary manner.

There are certain standards in operation

that must be adhered to if we are to be able to use the same
concepts over and over.

For instance, it would not be in

line with the public standards governing the use of the term
'kind' if we applied the term to those cases that did not de·
pict kind-behavior.

It would be wrong, for example, to say

that Hitler was a kind person in light of the fact that he
ordered the mass killings of German Jews during World War II.
With regard to this particular case, there is a great amount
of social consensus confirming his malicious actions.

The

moral judgments of society, then, regulate and guide our
moral judgments and actions.
It should be noted at this point that many contemporary
realists have left behind the goal of trying to analyze con·
cepts like goodness and rightness, the main reason being that
we learn more about our moral discourse by focusing on con·
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cepts like courage and kindness than we do on the former.

Goodness and rLghtness are general as well as ambiguous concepts whereas concepts such as courage and kindness can be
more specifically demonstrated.

The latter are referred to

as thLckmoral concepts, a label given to them by Williams.
Williams points out (1985, p. 129) that such concepts do not
recognize the fact/value distinction per se:
The way these notions are applied is determined
by what the world is like (for instance, by how
someone has behaved) and yet, at the same time,
their application usually involves a certain valua
tion of the situation, of persons or actions. 21
Let's now turn to Platts' argument for why the union between
the two elements is a necessary connection.
Platts is not an ethical reductivist, but he does claim
that the non-moral or natural facts fLx the moral ones.

The

mystery to uncover here is how the moral facts are fixed by
or supervene upon the non-moral facts in light of the fact
that Platts also claims that such moral facts cannot be inferred from or entailed by the non-moral or natural features
of the world.

This problem of how to account for superve-

nience is not just a problem for Platts; it's also a problem
for any contemporary naturalist realist.

Platts presents us

with what he believes to be an appropriate analogy for dispensing with this problem.

He asks to imagine a grid ar-

rangement of black dots on a white card.
face.

We then see Lt as a

As Platts points out, we wouldn't be able to picture

It's important to mention that Williams himself does not
accept this view ~nd points out that an account that weds together factual and evaluative elements is a mistaken account.
For more on Williams' own view with regard to this matter,
see his EtbLcs and the ~1111.its of PhLlosophy, 1985, Chapter 8.
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it as a face if the dot arrangement wasn't the way it was.
In

this case, the dots f2x the face that is seen by us.

Now, compare this type of judgment with one of our moral
judgments, say, that the teenagers behaved badly when they
lit fire to the cat.
this instance?

What would be the non-moral facts in

The main non-moral features would be that

setting cats (or any sentient creatures) on fire is painful
and fatal, we dislike pain and death in most instances, and
we see the teenagers performing this action.

Given a certain

type of moral education, we see this situation as morally
bad.

But not all people will see it as bad, some might sug-

gest, even in the case of these teenagers.

What Platts wants

to emphasize here is that we could perceive all of these nonmoral features and still not render a moral verdict in the
situation.

This is what he means when he says that we do not

2nfer the moral facts from the non-moral ones.

This would be

obvious in the case where we travel to an alien culture and
are able to observe only their behavior.

We would have no

clue as to what their value system is or how to apply it to
the behavior at hand.

But this fact by itself does not mean

that there is no moral judgment to be made.

The non-moral

features are there; they do fix the situation in such a way
that a person who has a certain amount of moral perception in
that society could make some moral judgment about the behavior observed.

Keep in mind that, according to Platts and

other realists like McDowell and Boyd, such moral facts are
determined. by the interests and concerns of a society.

As

children, we learn what these interests and concerns are and,
108

accordingly, learn the rules for protecting these interests
and concerns.

Our moral training, then, is concerned with

developing our sensitivity to such interests as well as our
ability to detect the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of some situation.

But, it follows, if we don't have the right kind of

perception or sensitivity or training, no true or appropriate
judgment can be rendered in such situations.

It seems to be

the case here that one has to be in a certain frame of mind,
as it were.

It is possible that you could spend all day long

staring at the dot arrangement and nseew only dots.
the same in the moral situation.

It is

It is possible that you

could attend only to the non-moral or natural and social-scientific facts and Mseew only that.

What is missing in both

cases is a certain type of perception or education that is
relevant to the situations at hand.
Now Platts does recognize that the judgment that a face
is seen and a moral judgment that the teenagers are behaving
wrongly are not totally analogous simply because, in the
first case, there is not a face literally there to be seen
whereas, in the second case, what we judge to be the case ~s
or cou2d be the case.

As Platts states,

[U]nlike the picture case, when we make moral
judgments about the situation, what we say can be
literally true or false and, again unlike the picture case, there is no question of that truth or
falsity being the result of conventions. It is the
result of the (independent) world (pp. 283-284).
The moral realist in this case claims to be able to show that
our being morally educated in the way that we are allows us
to be able to observe certain traits in others and ourselves
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and be perceptive and attentive in particular ways to these
others.

And this process has nothing to do with whether we

individually desire it or whether morality is to be viewed as
a practical institution.

The moral judgments we make, like

other perceptual judgments made, are objective; you and I as
individuals do not decide to abandon our particular moral
discourse and evaluation; it is part of our sharBd form of

l~fB, to use Wittgenstein's phrase.
abandon ourselves.

To abandon it is to

And the use of thick moral concepts al-

lows us to see this point more readily than staying with very
general concepts such as goodness or rightness.

To illus-

trate my point, consider the situation in which we call someone courageous.

In order to sBs someone as courageous, we

have to observe or know something about the other (non-moral)
features in that situation.

Arrington (1989) as well as oth-

ers uses the example of George Washington crossing the
Delaware.

To say that George Washington was courageous at

that time has to do with the military and social factors involved along with his own view of things at that time.

This

would, of course, include his own psychological make-up.

If

he was a lunatic while crossing the Delaware, we would not
want to call him courageous.

Nor would we want to if that

time period was not a time of war or of great hardships.

The

concept of courage embodies our standards as to what const~tutss courage.

Not just any description will do.

Clearly

our desires are not directly involved in this assessment.
To regard the non-moral features of the above situation
as constituting courage is in line with what Harman refers to
110

as a moral property being a funct1on of the non-moral or natural properties.

{Recall that Harman raised this point as

part of his overall criticism of the moral realist position.
Harman's point is that the only sense in which one could ever
talk about moral facts or properties was if such properties
could be reduced to the non-moral facts.

Yet reducing them

to the non-moral facts or features of some situation is tantamount to not having them at all.)

But, of course, as we

saw, Harman's position emphasized that the positing of moral
facts and properties added nothing that was relevant to the
explanation of the so-called moral observation.

No realist

would want to co:rmrlt herself to that, and Platts is no exception here.

When the realist says, for instance, that courage

just 1s these other features, two things need to be clarified.

First, given Platts' description of moral facts as not

being inferred from the non-moral facts, he was left to deal
with the problem of what else is required for explaining
moral observations.

His response was that there needed to be

in addition to these features some particular moral training
that would allow us to detect the moral property.

If one had

this type of upbringing, then one would be able to pe~ceive
the existence of the questioned moral fact or property.
Kindness, for instance, is instantiated in kind actions;
those of us who have learnt what kindness means can immediately see it when we come across it, much the way we can immediately see the color red when we come across objects which
instantiate it.

Those who do not perceive kindness or any

other of our moral properties are lacking in our moral in111

sight and experience.
gory.

The amoralist may fall into this cate-

Platts, however, wants to emphasize that there will be

times when we make mistakes about what is moral in some situation, mistakes that are not to be accommodated simply by
reference to a lack of inforrnation concerning non-moral
facts.

He attributes our moral fallibility along with the

making of different moral judgments about the same case to
our thick moral concepts having semancic depch.

As Platts

maintains,
Moral concepts exhibit the characteristic of
semanc.ic depch. Starting from our grasp upon them
through our knowledge of the austere truth-conditions of sentences containing them, we have to
struggle to improve our sensitivity to particular
instantiations of them. This process proceeds
without limit; at no point, for the realist, can we
rest content with our present sensitivity in the
application of these concepts. So at no point can
we rest secure in all our present judgments involving these concepts (p. 287).
There exists, then, no true certainty that what we have decided to do in some particular instance is the morally right
thing to do.

What we have at best is an approximation to the

truth of the matter.

We cannot say unequivocally that all of

our moral beliefs are true and justified.

When we find or

discover that we have erred in our judgments, we must revise

our beliefs.

Revision will be necessary, according to Platts

and others, because of the infinite complexity of our world
and our finite relation to it.

As he states:

[c]ertainty plays no role in this form of intuitionism. This is a consequence of taking realism
seriously. By the process of careful attention to
the world, we can improve our moral beliefs about
the world, make them more approximately true ... But
this process of attention to improve beliefs and
understanding will go on without end; there is no
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reason to believe that we shall ever be justified
in being certain that most of our moral beliefs are
true ... Our moral language, like all the realistic
parts of that language, transcends our present
practical comprehensions in trying to grapple with
an independent, indefinitely complex reality; only
ignorance of that realism could prompt the hope for
certainty (pp. 285-286).
All of what has been said thus far, Platts maintains, points
to the autonomy of moral facts and to their relevancy with
regard to explanations of moral behavior in that once the
moral features of some situation are detected, behavior can
be judged as correct or incorrect with respect to how it relates to those features.

Yet something further needs to be

said with regard to both of these claims.

When he says that

courage just ~s the union of these other features in the
world, he is not using the 'is' of identity.

Rather, his

'is' is to be interpreted as the 'is' of const~tut~on.
Courage is constituted by these particular features, but is
not identical to them.

Platts emphasized this earlier when

he stated that one could understand all the non-moral features of a situation and be totally ignorant of the moral
facts.

So, even though such moral facts are not inferred

from the non-moral ones, they are constituted by them.

This

fact about moral concepts, then, is the first important characteristic that needs to be emphasized by the realist if she
is to be able to give some adequate explanation of their independence and their role in the evaluation of our behavior.
Clearly, Platts' version of ethical intuitionism is more
plausible than the intuitionism of Moore.

Yet it is still

not clear how this gets us moral realism.

One could still
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question, as Harman does, why we should not attribute the
moral beliefs that Platts holds to a process of effective so·
cialization.

It seems that we could still give an account of

the nature of moral decision-making by this process just as
well as by Platte's intutionism.

My main criticism, to which

I will return later, is that Platts has not made a distinc·
tion between objectivity and inter-subjectivity.

What he

calls objective seems really to be inter-subjective, and as
such it is difficult to see how inter-subjectivity automati·
cally gets one realism as opposed to anti-realism.
What makes the views of Wittgensteinian naturalists in·
teresting is the way in which this problem is circumvented by
a modification of what is to count as objective or real.
Wittgensteinians, in effect, reject the assumption which goes
back at least to Descartes that the way to metaphysics is
through epistemology.

Descartes had maintained that in order

to know what there 1s one had first to ascertain those fea·
tures of propositions or judgments which guarantee their
truth.

Hence, for Descartes, the clarity and distinctness

characteristic of certain ideas (such as the cog1to) guarantee their correspondence to certain facts.
The Quinean naturalists carry on the justificationist
tradition by virtue of the emphasis they lay upon the correct
methodology of the physical sciences.

This is not to say

that Boyd and the others accept (in any way!) Descartes' con·
caption of science as being deductive and of (some) scientif·
ic claims as being known with certainty; on the contrary, all
the authors examined earlier would regard the matter of theo114

ry confirmation as one of degrees of probability.

What is

important, though, is that each regards science as paradigmatic of a body of know1edge.

By examining the standards ac-

tually employed by successful scientific practice we may determine criteria for saying what there is.
of Platts reveals a dual tendency:

Our examination

on the one hand, the use

to which he puts intuitions (conceived of as spontaneous convictions) distances him from that tradition running back to
Descartes, since Platts does not seek criteria for the rational justification of moral beliefs; but, on the other hand,
his concern to exhibit the semantic depth of our moral concepts lands him squarely back within this tradition.
According to Wittgensteinians, there is something both
right and wrong with the naturalistic approaches described
thus far.

The philosophers taking these approaches are quite

correct to appeal to actual pract~ces in their attempts to
ascertain what there is, but they are mistaken in thinking
that sc~ent~f~c practices alone carry ontological corranitment.
Wittgensteinians believe that what counts as real is determined by sets of social practices which constitute our form
of life.

According to them, forms of life are described as

shared sets of dispositions.

Stanley Cavell, a

Wittgensteinian, describes forms of life as consisting of
shared:
... routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of
fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness,
of when an utterance is an assertion, when an
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appeal, when an explanation .... 2'
Lear, another Wittgensteinian, describes forms of life as
shared "perceptions of salience, routes of interest and feel·
ings of naturalness in following rules. " 27

And following

Lear, Lynn Rudder-Baker states that a form of life is to be
counted among the social conditions which make meaning possi·
ble. 21
According to these Wittgensteinians, there can be no
meaningful discourse whatsoever outside of our form of life.
The matter is put pointedly by Lear who is intent upon draw·
ing a contrast between Wittgenstein's view (so interpreted)
and forms of semantic Platonism (such as found in Katz):
... If the platonist tries to step outside the form
of life in order to tell those within how things
really are, then he must come to grief. For out·
side the form of life there is nothing: no rules,
no universals, no sameness, no reality (1983, p.
80) .
Those who share a form of life are viewed as .l.ike·m.inded by
Lear (1982, p. 385).

He believes that a form of life sets

the bounds of sense and that it would be impossible to say
anything whatsoever about what it would be like to be other·
minded:
... [b]eing minded as we are is not one possibility
we can explore among others. We explore what it is
Stanley Cavell (1966) , "The Availability of
Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," in G. Pitcher, ed.
lv.i ttgenste.in · · The .Later Ph.ilosophy.
Anchor Doubleday, Garden
City, N. J., pp. 160-161. Also quoted in Emmett (1990), p.
213.
27 Jonathon Lear
(1982) "Leaving the World Alone," Journa.l
of Ph.i.losophy 79, p. 385.
The same passage appears unaltered
in Lear (1983) "Ethics, Mathematics and Relativism," in
Sayre-McCord (1988), pp. 76-93.
21 Rudder-Baker
(1984) "On the Very Idea of a Form of Life,"
Inquiry 21, p. 288; quoted in Emmett (1990). p. 214.
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to be minded as we are by moving around self-consciously and determining what makes more or less
sense. There is no getting a glimpse of what it
might be like to be other-minded, for as we move
toward the outer bounds of our mindedness we verge
on incoherence and nonsense (1982, p. 386).
Rudder-Baker, expanding on this point, believes that no sense
can be made out of the idea of COR/ParLng forms of life and it
is no mistake that her title parodies that of Davidson's •on
the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.n

According·to her, if

what are presumed to be two forms of life can be compared,
e.g., the way of life of the Aleuts versus the way of life of
the American Teenager, then there must be some common element
which forms the basis of the comparison.

For example, some-

one from a technologically advanced society might find the
practice of infanticide abominable; yet its practice in some
societies, rather than being symptomatic of a radically different way of valuing children, may reflect a need to take
drastic measures to insure the preservation of the family. 29
(Often infanticide occurs when food and other resources are
scarce.)

In order to compare what the members of the two so-

cieties are doLngwhen the one conmits infanticide and the
other takes every measure possible to assist a sickly infant,
those persons' goals must be taken into account.

In this

case, the common goal of preserving one's family provides the
answer, and it provides the basis of comparison.

Thus what

initially looks like diverse forms of life turns out to be
different ways in which the same value may be manifested.
One should be aware that it is not possible in thi~ dissertation to discuss Wittgenstein's argwnent for why human
29

This example comes from Rachels (1986), pp. 20-21.
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activities are to be considered the essential determinants of
meaning, as that would require a lengthy digression.

Yet,

suffice it to say that there are two arguments against semantic platonism within Wittgenstein's philosophy.

One argument

points out that sentences like •All bachelors are male" do
not express necessary truths but reflect linguistic conventions (i.e., are actually disguised assertions about language).

Wittgenstein, like Quine, abandons the analytic/syn-

thetic distinction.

The other argument has it that even if

there were abstract entities such as senses, they--like the
expressions for which they are senses--would require interpretation (a 'grasping').

The positing of senses neither

helps explain nor offers any guarantee that persons mean the
same thing by the words they use.

Ultimately, the final

court of appeal as to whether two persons mean the same thing
by the linguistic expressions they use is the use to which
those expressions are put.

Wittgenstein is to be considered

a naturalistic philosopher, because he holds that meaning is
to be understood as a soc~a1 phenomenon.
That being the case, one will still have to show how
Wittgenstein's work could support moral realism.

The point,

I think, is that if sharing a form of life involves, among
other things, the sharing of certain values, then there is
nothing which we could conceive of as fa1s~fy~ng our shared
moral judgments.

It thus becomes unnecessary to engage in

traditional epistemological worries over criteria for distinguishing truth from falsehood.
judgments are not possible:

This is not to say that false

an individual can make mistakes
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when doing things.

What counts as making a mistake and what

counts as correcting a mistake, though, are determined by the
social standards with which one's conduct is compared.

The

grounding of meaning in social practices makes a refutation
of skepticism unnecessary.
The upshot is that a kind of realism may be said to follow.

Since there is nothing at all outside our form of life,

there could not be anything which would falsify our shared
beliefs.

One could view this matter through Davidsonian

eyes, as transcendentalists like Rudd.er-Baker are wont to do.
Davidson {1983) attacks the scheme/content distinction, maintaining no sense can be made out of the conception of a language as a kind of conceptual scheme which stands over and
either fits or is fitted by the facts.

Language is rather to

be thought of as an expression of our embeddedness in the
world which is by and large true.
Lear does agree with this view and goes one step further
by pointing out that there are certain practices within our
form of life that we engage in for which there are no alternatives.

Examples of such practices are addition and modus

ponens:
[C]onsider, for example, the alternative answers
to the following questions:
What does 7 + 5 equal?
(a)

12.

(b) Anything at all, just as long as everyone is so
minded.
What fallows from P and If P, then
{a)

(7l

Q.

(b) Anything at all, just as long as everyone is so
minded.·
To each of these questions,
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(a) gives the correct

answer ... anyone who tries to offer a different integer as an answer is in error ... anyone who, say,
claimed to derive not-Owould be in error. (1982,
p. 385)
Consider, for example, the case where we come across someone
who engages in the practice of adding by tNO but does so by
continuing the series u2, 4, 6, ... " with u9, 12, 15, ... ".
Assume we assign the same reference to the numerals (so, for
example, we both agree there are 12 marbles on the table),
but that we would not continue the series in the same way.
Should we not say that this is a case where one of us is
right about what uadding by two" means?

The Wittgensteinian

responds that this sort of scenario does not suggest that
there might be two different ways of adding by two or that
what makes our way of adding by true r.ight is what makes the
other's way of adding by two fc'Tong.

Rather the answer is

that what we call •adding by two• is a different practice
than what the other calls "adding by two.•

There is no al-

ternative way for us to add by two; if we acted as the other
acts, we would be engaging in something we would not call
•adding by two" (Enmlett, 1990, pp. 224-225).

Were we to now

continue the series as the other does, we would not be
switching from a practice which yields what is true to one
which yields what is false; at least it would be misleading
to put matters that way, and to leave it at that.
pends upon the standards of the society we occupy.

Much deIf in our

society such a practice does not conform to standards of
counting by two, then we can say one who engages in that
practice is adding uwrongly• or that their answer to acertain problem is "false•--but what that means is that what
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they are doing falls away from our own societal norms.
Suppose the other belongs to a different society in which it
is a corranon practice to continue the series in the way described.

(Imagine this way of counting playing a role in

certain forms of commerce.)

Within that context were we to

switch to that way of adding by two, we would not be abandoning a practice which yields the truth for one that yields
falsehood:

we would simply be changing what""" do and what

we call •counting by two."

What would count as a correct an-

swer would be something different then, something determined
by that society's norms.
The same seems to hold true for examples from ethics (although Lear himself is not willing to coimlit to this view,
given that uwe can recognize the existence of other groups
who have alternative moral outlooks" (1983, p. 83) and,as
such, arriving at universalizability or objectivity in ethics
appears to be an impossibility, according to him).

There are

certain things which we do which we call utreating others
kindly."

Were we to come upon a tribe whose members make a

habit of violently abusing their loved ones, and upon asking
for an explanation of their behavior were we told "We do
this, because we were taught to treat others kindly," we
would not infer "Well that's a novel way to treat another
kindly."

Nor would we raise the issue of what happens to be

the r~ght way to treat others kindly.

Rather we would say

that what they call "treating others kindly" is a very different sort of practice than what goes by that name for us.
The dispute that follows, then, is over linguistic (and ad121

joining) practices, and we condemn their behavior in our own
te:rms.

To say that our disagreement is over 1.ingu.ist.ic prac-

tices is slightly misleading, though.

That makes it sound as

if we merely disagree over what the right words to use are.
In fact, our linguistic practices are woven more intimately
into the fabric of our lives.

To condemn what they call

Mtreating others kindlyw is to condemn what they are doing
and their standards for appropriate and inappropriate behavior.

We are saying we would not want to do that sort of

thing, i.e., engage in that sort of practice.

And that is

just Wittgenstein's point.
I want to examine John McDowell's position here, as his
is an elaboration of the Wittgensteinian approach to these
issues.

Earlier I criticized Platts on the ground that his

realism is perhaps little more than a kind of inter-subjectivism.

It is here that McDowell takes up the fight, showing

that what was criticized as inter-subjective is actually universal among moral agents.

And he also describes a person's

inability to conceive of practices different from his or her
own as a kind of b1.indnsss to alternative practices (what

Wittgenstein refers to as mean.ing bl.indnsss).
3.

MCDOWELL

In most of his work on moral realism John McDowell's efforts are aimed at undermining Hume's projectivism as well as
non-cognitivism in general.

His basic criticism of these po-

sitions concerns their acceptance of a strict prescriptive/descriptive distinction.

McDowell claims that these com122

components are inseparable from each other, and, in this regard, science is no different from ethics.

If this claim can

be substantiated, then, perhaps, the moral realm could gain a
certain amount of objective status.

Before going on to

McDowell's arguments against the non-cognitivists, then, it
seems that a small discussion of the perspective of this latter group of philosophers, especially Hume, is in order.
In An Enqu.iry Concern.ing the Pr.inc.ip1es of Hora1s, Hume
makes a distinction between the role of reason and the role
of taste and sentiment in the making of moral evaluations. He
points out that reason is concerned with the apprehension or
inference of matters of fact or relations among ideas or impressions of sensations in the world (1751, p. 308) whereas
taste gives rise to sentiment which is defined by him as uan
immediate feeling and finer internal sensen (1751, p. 274)
and which is connected with our motivation to action.

As

Hume states,
The distinct boundaries and offices of reason
and taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity,
vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they
really stand in nature, without addition and
diminution: the other has a productive faculty,
and gilding or staining all natural objects with
the colors, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation (1751, p. 311).
Hume argues that the passions or sentiments and not reason
are the source of our motivation.

Since reason discovers

only ob.Jeets as they rea11y stand .in nature, i.e., only facts
that obtain independently of our subjective states, it cannot
be used as the sole basis for our moral judgments.
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Reason

would have to be capable of motivating us to act, a characteristic that Hume does not find in our ability to reason.
It is our feelings or sentiments that motivate us to respond
in certain ways and such feelings are grounded in considerations of utility, i.e., they are based on a universal capacity for sympathy and not self-love.

Hume believes that all of

us have the ability to feel what others feel and from this
capacity comes a sense of what is generally beneficial for
us.

Our moral judgments express sentiments or feelings of

approbation and blame toward those actions and persons who
either contribute to our welfare or do not, toward those actions and persons that give rise to virtue or vice.

And, as

he points out in A Trsat~ss of HuRliln Nature,
... the distinction of vice and virtue is not found
ed merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason (1739, p. 424).
It must be remembered that our judgments are not to be
based on self-interested motives if they are to be considered
moral.

Our sentiments must not arise from a personal per-

spective; they must arise from the perspective of a rational,
impartial evaluator, one who views the actions in question in
abstraction from her own personal interests.

In doing so,

the impartial evaluator must appreciate all the non-moral
facts that are relevant to a moral judgment before making
that moral judgment.

Yet Hume does not want to imply any

form of reductionism or supervenience claims by this belief
since he firmly belives that no Mought" can be derived from

For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some
new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that
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it should be observed and explained; and at the
same time that a reason should be given, for what
seems altogether inconceivable, how this relation
can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it 1739, p. 423).
The others referred to are, of course, those objective facts
and properties in the world, or what ~s.

Hume likens vices

and virtues to such phenomena as colors and sounds which according to him are not properties of objects in the world:
... [w]hen you pronounce any action or character to
be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the
constitution of your nature you have a feeling or
sentiment of blame from contemplation of it. Vice
and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds,
colors, heat, and cold, which, according to modern
philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind (1739, p. 423)
Or as it is stated in the Enquiry :
It is the nature, and indeed the definition of
virtue, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable
to or approved by everyone who considers and con
templates it (1751, p. 307).
Such perceptions, then, must not be treated or projected as
objective features of the world.

Doing so, however, will

give us the appearance that our moral pronouncements really
exist apart from our subjective viewpoints.
be a delusion on our part.

Yet this would

What we notice when we observe a

bad act are such characteristics as anger and pain and other
non-moral facts.
fact beyond these.

There is, however, no additional objective
There is no objective property of wrong-

ness that we a.lso observe; there is nothing more to the evaluation than our reacting affectively to those relevant facts
that are present before us.
Earlier it was stated that the sentiments alone were the
source of our motivation.

But this does not entail that rea125

son has no further role in the making of our moral judgments.
On the contrary, since we can make true and false judgments,
reason does play a significant part.

Since we are human, we

can err in our moral judgments as we do in any of our other
judgments.

The main reason why this occurs in our moral

evaluations is due to the possibility of our self-interest
overriding the interests of others, when our inclination to
be sympathetic is replaced by certain vicious tendencies on
our part.

Here reason is needed to get us back on course.

It guides our judgments:
Reason instructs us in the several tendencies of
actions, and hUJ118IJjtyrnakes a distinction in favor
of those which are useful and beneficial (1751, p.
308) •

Our ability to reason, then, informs us of the means by which
we can satisfy our desires and such means will only be under·
stood from an impartial perspective.

Therefore, what consti-

tutes a true moral judgment involves both sentiment and reason.

Each by itself is insufficient as the grounds for es-

tablishing truth in morality.

In order to appropriately ana-

lyze our judgments, the analysis must be in terms of the relations between our affective reactions and their objective
bases.
Although Hume is considered by some philosophers 30 to be a
subjective or relational realist with respect to our moral
judgments and properties, he is not the kind of realist with
which McDowell is sympathetic.

McDowell criticizes Hume on

the grounds that Hume as well as non-cognitivists in general
"Alan Goldman maintains this view throughout his book
Hora1 Know1edge, Routledge, London, 1990.
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describes the reaJ world as only consisting of primary qualities and their objects.

What this entails is a belief in a

strict prescriptive/descriptive distinction.

So, according

to Hume and others, what the world is reaJJylike is to be
described independently of our reactions or of how we view
it.

And, in addition, this view adheres to a claim prominent

in the 18th century philosophy of mind which states that our
cognitive capacities are strictly independent of our sentimental or passionate non-cognitive capacities.

We have, ac-

cording to this view, a sensitivity to the world as it really
is but this sensitivity is separate from our value experience
as such.

Hurne, of course, referred to this as his distinc-

tion between impressions of sensations (ideas) and impressions of reflection (values).
McDowell finds such a position to be untenable.

Can one

really occupy an external impartial perspective as to how
things are?

McDowell voices his concern over,

[w]hether, corresponding to any value concept,
one can always isolate a genuine feature of the
world--by the appropriate standard of genuineness:
that is, a feature that is there anyway, independently of anyone's value experience being as it isto be that to which competent users of the concept
are to be regarded as responding when they use it;
that which is left in the world when one peels off
the reflection of the appropriate attitude (1979,
p. 144).

McDowell believes that the prescriptive and descriptive components cannot be disentangled in the way envisaged by the
non-cognitivists.

According to him, the apprehension and un-

derstanding of concepts cannot take place "without embarking
on an attempt to make sense of (the community's) admiration
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(of actions falling under those concepts} ... an attempt to
comprehend their special perspectiven (1979, p. 144).

Such

understanding involves a regard for rule-following and public
standards.
sition.

Wittgenstein's influence is apparent in this po-

The notion of objectivity in his conception of lan-

guage and its connection to our form of life is derived from
a commun~ ~Y of human response:

Consider, for instance, concepts whose applica
tion gives rise to hard cases ... there are disagreements, which resist resolution by argument, as to
whether or not a concept applies. If one is convinced that one is right on a hard case, one will
find oneself saying, as one's arguments tail off
without securing acceptance, 'You simply aren't
seeing it', or 'But don't you see?'. (1979, p. 151)
Although McDowell doesn't agree with all of Wittgenstein's
views concerning language, he does agree with his analysis of
how the public manifestation of a concept bestows objectivity
on that concept.

McDowell points out that the sense of ob-

jectivity that is depicted by traditional non-cognitivists,
according to which that objectivity which is created by the
rules and standards which we follow and which exists apart
from our beliefs about such rules, is an illusory type of objectivity.

These non-cognitivists maintain that rules are

what f.ix what can and cannot be done or said in a society and
that it is they which keep our practices in line.

There is

some truth to this, yet they also want to maintain that our
reactions or responses to such rules have little to do, if
anything at all, with whether our language and our actions
are objective.

Feelings and reactions are outside the de-

scriptive side of our world.

They describe the role of rules
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and standards using the analogy of train rails:
... What counts as doing the same thing, within the
practice in question, is fixed by its rules. The
rules mark out rails along which correct activity
must run. These rails are there anyway, independently of the responses and reactions a propensity
to which one acquires when one learns the practice
itself; ... Acquiring mastery of the practice is
pictured as something like engaging mental wheels
with these objectively existing rails (1979, pp.
145-146).
But as McDowell points out, one also needs to consider what
is involved in learning rules.

He cites Stanley Cavell's de-

scription of Wittgenstein's view on this:
We learn and teach words in certain contexts,
and then we are expected, and expect others, to be
able to project them into further contexts.
Nothing insures that this projection will take
place (in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as
nothing insures that we will make, and understand,
the same projections. That on the whole we do is a
matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, senses of humor and of significance and of
fulfillrnent .. all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein
calls 'forms of life'. (1979, p. 149).
McDowell defends this view by arguing that it is an illusion
to think there is anything more to objectivity than the language and its rules we have been taught to use and appreciate.

We experience a sort of vertigo if we believe that

there is not something more to ground our objectivity.

Such

is the case for the non-cognitivists who desire this kind of
security.

They believe that if there is not the kind of ob-

jectivity they envisioned apart from their own thoughts and
activities, the world around them just whirls around and past
them.

Once it is realized that what objective grounding

there is depends upon our own thoughts and their rela.tion to
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reality, in part due to the way we are trained to see things,
and not due to an independent impartial perspective, we will
be able to deal with the vertigo.

But this then would re-

quire not positing a strict prescriptive/descriptive distinction.

According to McDowell, it is a fundamental mistake to

think that one could disentangle the two elements.

As he re-

marks, with respect to our system of mathematics:
We tend, confusedly, to suppose that we occupy
the external standpoint envisaged by platonism,
when we say things we need to say in order to reject the reduction of mathematical truth to human
natural history. For instance, we deny that what
it is for the square of 13 to be 169 is for it to
be possible to train human beings so that they find
such and such calculations compelling. Rather, it
is because the square of 13 really ~s 169 that we
can be brought to find the calculations compelling ... But this is an illusion ... we are speaking
not from the midst of our merely human mathematical
competence but from the envisaged independent perspective instead.
(As if, by a special emphasis,
one could somehow manage to speak otherwise than
out of one's own mouth.) We cannot occupy the independent perspective that platonism envisages
(197 9, P. 15 0) .
The objectivity of moral properties, according to
McDowell, is founded on and supported by a community of human
response.

To put it simply, it is our trained reactions and

responses that regulate our particular practices or give us
this sense of objectivity.

The attractiveness of this view

lies in (once again) placing moral properties within our
reach and by emphasizing the impossibility of disentangling
our cognitive from the conative or affective capacities.

How

things really are, then, cannot be characterized according to
primary qualiti~s alone.
In McDowell's Va.lutJJs and StJJcondary "ut!I.Z.it~tJJs (1988), the
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same theme re-emerges.

Here he draws an analogy between

color properties and value properties.

Color ascriptions,

like value ascriptions, are dependent upon our inter-subjective responses and -rationally optimal• or cognitive sensibilities. Both types of judgments are inextricably bound to
the exercise of a perceptual or sensible faculty.

We are

trained to call certain shades of color by certain names;
this is what McDowell means by his reference to a deve1oped
sensibility for such properties.

Colors are present to our

experience, but only as secondary qualities.

Awareness of a

secondary quality is perceptual awareness of a genuinely possessed property of some object in the world.

An object can

be said to be disposed to present a particular perceptual ap·
pearance of itself to its perceiver.

What we see when we

look at a fire truck, for example, is some particular shade
of red (as well as other qualities) but the fundamental scientific explanation of its being red is not its redness.
Rather, as science will tell us, explanations of why we see
the color we do have to do with our physiological make-up and
how light interacts with our eyes, and there is no need to
bring in the colors themselves as reasons for why we see red
as opposed to green.
orless•.

The explanation is fundamentally -col-

Like moral properties, color properties are outside

the natural/causal explanatory order of things; neither are
fundamental to the explanation of our behavior.

In this re-

gard, McDowell refers to such properties as non-natural.
Our propensity to detect these non-natural properties,
then, is heightened by how developed our sensibility is for
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these properties.

And such sensibilities are regulated by

standards; one cannot just say anything is red (or good), for
example.

We could make mistakes about something being red

(or good) and some of us might make finer distinctions among
the different colors (or value properties) present to us.
And so we revise our color evaluations in light of these
findings.

It is important to mention at this point that

McDowell himself only pushes the analogy between colors and
values so far, since he realizes that there does remain a
crucial distinction between the two.

As he remarks, u[a]

virtue is conceived to be not merely such as to elicit the
appropriate 'attitude' (as a color is merely such as to cause
the appropriate experiences), but rather such as to merit itn
(1988, p. 175).

He believes, though, the analogy works well

enough for his purposes, namely for making a case for moral
realism.
As McDowell points out, our affective natures allow us
to detect these types of properties.

However, there are cer-

tain individuals who appear to lack these sensibilities due
to physical handicaps or insufficient training.

Using the

example of comedy, a sensibility theorist would ask why it is
that most of us would find some situation funny whereas some
other individual would not.

His response is that this indi-

vidual does not see or detect the humour in the situation.
Such an individual may grasp the cognitive aspects of the
situation, but for some reason is unable to find the situation funny (i.e., lacks that particular sensibility).
McDowell is unable to come up with an account of the nature
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of these reasons except to say that such a person is not d.ispoaed to (i.e., trained for) finding these things comical.

Anyone who does not share our comical sensibility cannot perceive the situation in the same way that we do.
ical to us just is not comical to them.
case with ethics.

What is com-

And it is the same

Someone who has not been trained to see

certain actions as immoral, for example, and, as such, does
not call them immoral, does not share our specific moral sensibilities.

McDowell points out that such an individual (or

individuals) can be said to have an inability or insensitivity for detecting the moral properties in question.

This in-

dividual can be said to be b1~nd to those aspects noZ111a.11y
found to be moral or immoral.

The moral property, then,

fails to be action-guiding or motivating for this person
since she fails to detect it.
The moral case is likened to a case in which a child
cannot arrive at the right answer in mathematics.

The child,

one says, is unab.lB to perceive or find the correct response.
In this case, we would say that the child has not yet come to
understand the situation in the proper way; she needs to
learn the necessary procedures or rules so that she will arrive at what we wou1d ca11 the correct answer.

If she cannot

correctly apply the rules-, for whatever reason, we are
justified in saying that she does not know the real answer,
but what that means is that her actions are not in accord
with socially inculcated standards.
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4.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Thus far, Wittgensteinian Naturalism appears to offer a
viable alternative to the Quinean Naturalism discussed earlier in this chapter.

Unlike Quinean Naturalism, it avoids

treating the practices of science as the paradigms of ontological commitment.

This it does by rejecting the Cartesian

assumption that metaphysics must be grounded in an adequate
epistemology.

The idea that members of society share a form

of life provides the basis for rejecting that assumption.

In

McDowell's particular account of realism the inter-subjectivism attributed to Platts re-appears in a new light, namely, as a characteristic attributable to all moral agents.
For Platts, moral disagreement signifies error on someone's
part, i.e., that someone is engaging in moral reasoning but
is doing so incorrectly.

For McDowell, moral disagreements

are chalked up to an inability to recognize and engage in
certain kinds of practices.
McDowell's criterion for objectivity, then, has to do
with what is acceptable to agents sharing a form of life.

In

our particular communities, we are trained to see matters
from certain perspectives rather than others.

In the process

of learning what type of behaviors count as good (or bad), we
come to realize that we cannot do anything we want.

We see

that there is a right way to look at things, and anything
that diverges from this way is wrong.

Our training, then,

exercises a certain necessity over our minds and our actions.
So in the case of the individual who fails to see, for exam-

ple, that murder is wrong, then she is considered meaning·
134

blind.

The only way for such an individual to understand the

rule would be for them to see it .in the s8111B "'"Y that their
community does.

There is, then, only one way, i.e., the com-

munity's way, for understanding the meanings of moral terms
and their related practices.

And so, what 'N'Ould seem to

follow from this description is that there is a moral fact of
murder being wrong, in the event that the cozmnunity cannot
conceive of the elimination of the practices of prohibiting
murder, pronouncing it wrong, etc.
Tying objectivity to what is acceptable to all (or at
least the majority of) agents within a society is not, of
course, a novel view.

There has been an historical tendency

to view objectivity in this way, although most traditional
objectivists specify that the agents must be rational.

Kant

(1785), for example, held that a moral law must be something
that all rational people could give their voluntary assent
to.

A moral law was considered to be objective and binding

so long as it was accepted by all rational people.

And, as

Rachels points out,
... [e]ven the emotivists recognized the need to
give so.111B account of the place of reason in ethics
(1986, p. 35).

Rachels himself follows the tradition by referring to moral
truths as truths of reason.

He writes,

A truth of ethics is a conclusion that is backed
by reasons: the •correctw answer to a moral ques-

tion is simply the answer that has the weight of
reason on its side. Such truths are objective in
the sense that they are true inde-pendently of what
we might want or think. We cannot make something
good or bad just by wishing it to be so, because we
cannot merely will that the weight of reason be on
its side or against it. And we can be wrong about
what is good or bad, because we can be wrong about
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what reason commends. Reason says what it says,
regardless of our opinions or desires (1986, p.3536) .
Rachels points out that moral disagreements are disagreements
about facts or an individual's or a group's beliefs about
those facts (1984, pp. 13ff.).
in certain empirical facts.

Rachels grounds his realism

He recognizes that an under-

standing of some particular practice cannot be understood
apart from the conditions surrounding that practice.
the following example to illustrate his view.

He uses

He holds that

the Eskimo practice of killing infants, particularly infant
girls, can be understood only against the backdrop of their
social and economic conditions.

The Eskimos who have occu-

pied great expanses of arctic and sub-arctic terrain from
Alaska to Greenland are forced to live a nomadic lifestyle.
They acquire food by hunting which, in turn, requires them to
be highly mobile so that they can follow herds of caribou and
the like.

Food is often scarce, and often survival is at

best tenuous.

The mortality rate among hunters is quite

high, so the bearing of children, particularly 111t!l1e children
upon whom that office falls, is highly prized.

However, dur-

ing times when food is scarce young .children, as well as the
elderly who are unable to perform duties related to survival,
become a liability.
transported.

Not only must they be fed, they mu.st be

Consequently, if infanticide were not per-

formed, the very survival of the group would be hampered.
Having to transport the very young or the very old would interfere with the ability of the band to track game.

Feeding

the very young and the very old would result in a scarcity of
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food for the hunters which, in turn, would increase their own
risk of being ha:rmed as they engage in the physically demanding process of hunting.

Under such conditions, infants are

reluctantly put to death.

Young girls are more often put to

death than boys because of the high mortality rate among
males due to the danger involved. in hunting:

if males and

females were killed in equal numbers, the number of mouths to
feed would grow disproportionately to the number of hunters
(Rachels, 1984, pp. 20-21).
Some might argue that this example, rather than supporting realism, seems to support relativism instead.

This crit-

icism appears particularly poignant in light of the fact that
the Eskimos only engage in this activity as a last resort;
typically, other alternatives--such as adoption--are sought.
It would seem that what the Eskimos do is contingent upon the
economy forced upon them by the environmental niche they occupy.

Were these sorts of facts other than they are, the

need to practice infanticide would no longer exist. For example, if the Eskimos were employed by U.S. petroleum companies
and were given both housing and a wage with which to purchase
food, then the practice of infanticide would be seen as variable and, therefore, not universal in nature.

Hence, it

would be said that there is not some fact of the matter to
infanticide rs811ybeing wrong, but neither can it be said
that infanticide is rs41.lypermissible.

Whether or not one

practice·s infanticide is a matter of convention.
Rachels, of course, does not agree with this analysis.
He argues that argues that the case involving the Eskimos'
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acceptance of the permissibility of infanticide demonstrates
t!l

common set of va.lues rather than divergent sets of values.

What the Eskimos share in conmon with members of industrialized nations is a concern .for the preservation of their families (or bands).

The different economies and environmental

niches occupied by the tWQ cultures necessitate that the members of the cultures observe different secondary rules in
achieving their goals.

Proceeding in a Kantian manner,

Rachels argues that certain sets of values must be accepted
by societies as necessary conditions for their own survival.
For example, since human infants are extremely helpless and
require care for an extended period of time, if a society did
not care for its young,the young would not survive.

The

older members of the society would not be replaced, and eventually the society would cease to exist.

Rachels concludes

that any society which continues to exist must place acertain amount of value upon caring for the young, and that infanticide must be the exception rather than the rule (1984,
p. 21) .

Again, could a society exist which fails to place value
upon truth-telling?

In a society in which truth-telling was

no more valuable than lying, conununication would be extremely
hampered (e.g., no sense could be attached to asking directions, reporting incidents, etc.), promises and commitments
among individuals would lose their force, and so forth.
Since a society depends for its existence upon a great deal
of cooperation among its members, it is difficult to see how
it could exist under such conditions (1984, p. 21-22).
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It seems that certain values must be invariant or universal across cultures.

As Rachels aptly puts it:

[C]ultures may differ with regard to what they
regard as legitimate exceptions to the rules, but
this disagreement exists against a background of
agreement on the larger issuesw (1984, p. 22).
Does this view, then, show that we must be moral realists?
Are there alternative approaches to the study of morality?
Following Arrington, I hold that this tendency to view
objectivity along these lines has not allowed us to see and
appreciate what we are actually do~ngas moral agents.
Objectivity, according to the cognitivists, is conferred upon
our principles. 31

Rachels, like other rationalists, uses a

top-down strategy in arriving at our moral principles.

He

points out that we rationally deduce our secondary moral
rules from general moral principles.
rule that is justified rationally.

A moral rule just is a
Reason will, as it were,

allow us to srr~ve st the moral truth.

Arrington (as well as

descriptive realists like Platts and McDowell), on the other
hand, speak of our general normative principles as being
groundless; they are just to be viewed as necessary or essential to our way of life, but not transcending our way of
life.

Viewing morality in this way, as Arrington will argue,

will give us a better picture of what our moral practices are

"Throughout the history of ethics there have been philsophers who would be unwilling to base objectivity solely on
rationality, but would be more comfortable, for example, with
basing it on intuitions (as in the case of Moore). Yet suffice it to say that there has been a tendency overall,
whether rationali~t or not, to tie objectivity to what is
agreeable to all beings who are using their mental talents ~n
an opt~ms2 way (whether such talents refer to their reason,
their intuitions, or whatever).
139

like.
However, even though Platts and McDowell are descriptivists in that they do not accept that moral rules are rationally justifiable, Arrington finds that their approaches
do not take account of the different levels of moral claims.
A distinction needs to be made between those claims that we
hold to be more basic and those claims which we find to be
controversial.

Arrington is unwilling, as we will see in the

next chapter, to regard all moral claims as being interpreted
realistically (at least in the way envisioned by these objectivists).

A complete account of morality, according to Arrington,
must pay sufficient attention to the logical and semantical
roles of our different moral claims.

His conceptual rela-

tivism, which I examine in the following chapter, is a more
sophisticated view compared to the accounts offered by descriptive realists such as McDowell.

Unlike McDowell's theo-

ry, Arrington's view does take account of the different lev-

els of moral statements we use within our particular community; some are necessarily true whereas others are contingent.
What status these statements have depends on what role they
play in our form of life.

relative than others.

Some moral claims just are more

In order to be able to do such an

analysis, then, requires that one look at how these sentences
in general behave in our lives.

I now turn to Chapter Three

where I begin with an analysis of Arrington's view and then
proceed to an examination of Blackburn's quasi-realist account of morality.
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CHAPTER THREE
AN ALTERNATIVE TO MORAL REALISM

1.

OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE

This chapter evaluates two alternative accounts concerning the ontological status of the presumed objects of moral
judgments.

These authors are indeed sympathetic to the kind

of criticism offered against Quinean Naturalism by the
Wittgensteinians, yet they are unwilling to draw the same
conclusion as do the realists.
As pointed out at the end of the last chapter, one criticism to which McDowell and other descriptive realists are
susceptible is that they fail in their accounts of moral
practice to distinguish between relevantly different kinds of
claims which make up our moral discourse:

meta-ethical

claims (e.g., •Relativism is false,• •Moral facts exist,•
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etc.), general normative claims (e.g., •Murder is wrong•),
and singular nonnative claims (like •The murder of Johnson by
Smith was wrong.a).

Arrington, in contrast, makes the rele-

vant distinctions and provides a unique version of moral

anti-realism (which he describes as a kind of conceptua1 re1at~v~sn/J.

In the end, though, Arrington's view will be crit-

icized on the grounds that it contains a peculiar inconsistency,

The inconsistency stems from the fact that he asserts

certain meta-ethical claims while professing a theory which
would render such clainis meaningless.
It is Blackburn who finally offers a version of anti-realism (which he calls guas~·rea1~sni> which both recognizes
the relevant distinctions and avoids the inconsistency.

As

we shall see, quasi-realism offers an alternative to the idea
of ontological commitment implicit in Wittgensteinian realism.

In fact, Blackburn is heavily influenced by

Wittgenstein (as well as by Hume) and criticizes these realists for their failure to appreciate the subtlety of

Wittgenstein's view.

In an important respect these realists

have fallen victim to the very temptation they find most repugnant among Platonists and Quinean Naturalists; their attempt to identify realistically interpretable discourse with
sets of practices which are transcendental (to which no alternatives can be seen) juet is part of an attempt to ground
moral judgments in a foundationalist epistemology.

Using

Blackburn's quasi-realism as a basis, I argue for what may be
called the autonomy of mora1 d~scourse.

This is the thesis

that moral discourse does not require epistemological justi-
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fication, and that the cognitivist requirement that such
foundations be forthcoming (in order to guard against the
possibility of moral skepticism) is itself unjustifiable.
The chapter concludes with an account of the way in which
certain meta-ethical claims may be viewed from a quasi-realist perspective.
All of the moral realists mentioned earlier shared a
conmon belief: that at least some of our moral principles are
more intransigent than others, and so such principles must be
true.

And what makes such ~rinciples true is how they relate

to our rationality, intuition, dispositions, etc ..
Arrington, however, points out that this way of viewing our
moral principles does not do justice to the actual way we use
and understand our moral statements.

He points out, that

those which lay claim to being universal (for example,
Rachels' claims concerning the value of caring for the young
and truth-telling) cannot be judged true or false relative to
some standard (transcendental or otherwise).

These kinds of

value statements must be seen as an essential p~rt of our
form of life, as necessary beliefs related to our form of
life.

Given that such values are found within, and not out-

side of, our form of life, Arrington claims that it would
make no sense to talk about these general normative claims
(what he later refers to as grammatical propositions) as
being true or false per se.

Acceptance of those kinds of

claims do, however, make it possible to form true and false
moral judgments of a more particular nature.

We can say Joe

acted wrongly in killing his son (or that the sentence MJoe
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acted wrongly .... w is really true) precisely because Joe's
action goes against the rule that no one should commit infan·
ticide (for which reason the sentence #Joe acted wrongly .... "
goes against our rule for assigning truth).
rule to which the rules answer.

But there is no

So, as paradoxical as this

seems, the generB1 claims which make part~cu1armoral claims
(those containing singular terms) true, cannot themselves be
judged true or false.

It is to this fact that I was refer-

ring earlier in saying that the objectivists mentioned earli·
er do not accommodate different kinds of ethical statements.
The general ethical statements are a sub-class of what
Wittgenstein refers to as granmatical propositions.

A

fuller

consideration of why gramnatical remarks must be regarded as
nonsensical (in a special sense of that term) rather than
true or false shall arise in my examination of Blackburn's
and Arrington's views.

Also, it is from that perspective

that the status of meta-ethical claims, like #Relativism is
false,• can best be understood.

2.

ARRINGTON

Arrington is greatly influenced by Wittgenstein.

He

thinks the Wittgensteinian repudiation of the possibility of
ultimate epistemic justification for moral claims leads, not
to realism, but to anti-realism.

And a further difference

between him and the descriptivist realists is that he distin·
guishes between different levels of moral claims in terms of
their semantic properties.
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Arrington's conceptual relativism takes what he refers
to as soc.ia.1-ru.ls rs.lat.iv.lam as its foil.

Relativists of the

latter kind, e.g, Harman (1977) and Wong (1984), hold that
moral rules emerge from certain social pressures (for survival, companionship and the like) requiring the use of human
cognitive faculties.

For Harman the rules result from a ra-

tional process of bargaining and mutual adjustment in which
agents reckon with one another in full cognizance of their
respective powers (1977, p. 104), whereas for Wong they are
tools employed by members of society to resolve conflicts in
ways rational agents would deem fair (1984, pp. 63ff.).

For

both authors, the process of rule-formation is a rational
one; specific moral rules are subject to standards of rationality shared by all members of the co:nnnunity.

For individu-

als to diverge from the rules that accord with acceptable
standards of rationality is for those individuals to reveal
themselves as either irrational or in error.

Such a view is

considered problematic by Arrington, and rightly so, since
often the beliefs of individuals at odds with the co:nnnon
morality may be more justified than those acknowledged by the
co:nnnunity at large. 32

Besides that somewhat obvious flaw,

Arrington cites a particular dilemma the theories must face.
These theories, described by their proponents as forms of
re.lat.iv.ism because they ground moral rules in soc.ia.1.ly acceptab.le standards of rationality, can escape neither the

charge of being covertly realistic nor that of being extremeIn this respect dynamical models such as that employed by
Boyd which appeal.to processes of reflective equilibrium are
preferable to those which identify the product of rule-fonnation with what is optimally rational.
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ly arbitrary.

Arrington's charge may not be entirely fair,

but it is worth examining since he regards his own conceptual
relativism as a means of passing between the horns of the
dilemma, as avoiding talk of rational justification while at
the same time not committing himself to a purely subjective
view of morality.
According to Arrington, the grounding of moral rules in
human rationality presupposes absolutism, and absolutism presupposes realism (Arrington uses the word '"objectivism"
here).

If moral rules are the products of rat~ona1 process-

es, then preswnably they must hold for a11 rational agents.
But what holds for all rational agents must, according to
Arrington, be nothing subjective.

If moral rules may be said

to be rationally justified, then they must answer to something other than merely subjective states.
be objective or mind-independent.

Hence, they must

The fact that these au-

thors require moral rules to be rationally justifiable makes
their views susceptible to a certain kind of criticism.
the rules rea11yjustified?

Are

Since the standards of rational

justification attending rule-formation are themselves no.I111t!l·
t~ve standards, how are they to be justified?

It seems these

relativists find themselves on a slippery slope:

once the

process of requiring justification begins, where shall it
end?

Clearly the task of providing a justificationist epis-

temology is not one to be embraced by a relativist (or antirealist).
So how is the charge of arbitrariness to be avoided?
Here is the other horn of the dile11111a.
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If one requires jus-

tification, but is unable to provide it, then adherence to
standards of rationality appears arbitrary.

Without an epis·

temological justification to which to appeal, no basis can be
provided for saying that divergent views on morality either
are irrational or in error.

Which view of morality one holds

would in that case hang in the air with the standard of ra·
tionality underlying it.

Because these authors believe

morality is not arbitrary in this sense, such a consequence
is not desirable.
Social-rule relativism relativizes moral rules (or the
application of moral concepts) to standards of rational ac·
ceptability which are problematic insofar as they are said to
confer epistemic warrant upon moral claims. Conceptual rela·
tivism, on the other hand, denies that general nonnative
principles are capable of, or in need of, epistemic warrant.
Our moral concepts fonn a linguistic faJ11~1y (as I will ex·
plain in greater detail below), and whatever justification is
required for specific moral claims must come in appealing to
other members of the family.

In an important respect morali·

ty--making moral claims, applying moral concepts··is an autonomous activity.

It answers to nothing outside itself.

He

puts the matter this way:
[C]onceptual relativism •.. rejects the metaphysi·
cal idea that we can meaningfully speak of there
being something··moral properties of right and
wrong, and moral facts incorporating them··that is
independent of our moral concepts and practices,
something that could be ascertained independently
of those concepts and detennined to be in or out of
accord with them. It also rejects the idea of a
practical or instrumental validation of moral con·
cepts (1989, p. 259).
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In a manner of speaking, the problems posed in the terminology of the family cannot be posed in any other terminology.

Arrington's theory manages to acconunodate moral claims which
perform different semantic roles, and it serves to distinguish those which have.any role to play from those, like
•There are moral facts• which play no role at all.
Like many of the other philosophers considered so far,
Arrington is heavily influenced by Wittgenstein,

Indeed he

cites two arguments from Wittgenstein to support his belief
in the autonOD{Yof morality, his view that the general moral
rules are ground1sss, that is, they are not rationally justifiable.
The first argument, stemming from a consideration of
Wittgenstein (1974a, pp. 53-55; 1974b, p. 186), contends that
the attempt to provide

epistemic justification for all nor-

mative claims would be specious (Arrington, 1989, pp. 259260).

The argument purports to show that the very idea of

justifying a family of moral concepts in terms other than
their own is not possible.
autonomous.

Moral grammar is to be viewed as

Suppose that the the so-called justification

were conducted by appealing to .1110ra1 facts and properties.
In that case the explanation would be specious for the very
reason that the concepts in need of justification would be
employed in the justification.

On the other hand, if the

justification were not conducted in moral terms, if, for example, the moral phenomena were reduced to non-moral phenomena, then as Wittgenstein would say in another context:

it

would be the case that •problem and method pass one another
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by" (1958, p. 232).

If one asks, for example, "What makes

casting a ballot the exercise of a right?• and is told
"Casting a ballot is equivalent to ... which, in turn, is identical to a moral fact (that is, t:hemoral fact which is the
exercising of a right,• one is likely to think one's question
had not been answered.

What a moral fact is, or what a moral

fact is reducible to was not in question.

If moral claims

are to be understood, they must be understood in te:r:ms of the
(moral) context in which they are found.

Blackburn (1988, p.

369) also agrees with this view by noting that, "Ethical notions require ethical sensibilities to comprehend them."
What, then, is called the just.lf~'ct:1t.lon of moral claims is an

activity w~th~n the family of discourse in which the terminology is applied.
The second argument, cited by Arrington, concerns attempts to justify the application of moral concepts by identifying some

got:11

external to their use (Wittgenstein, 1970,

sec. 320; 1974b, p. 184).

Could our moral rules be justified

in terms of some purpose they achieve?

If one thinks so,

then one is conceiving of the rules for the application of a
moral concept as analogous to, say, a cooking recipe which
can indeed be judged according to its end result.

The activ-

ity of judging a recipe just ~s the activity of judging (in
accordance with canons of taste, nutritional value and appearance) what is produced.

The recipe is a means to an end,

and it i·s judged according to its ends.

Can the same be said

for the rules pertaining to the application of moral concepts?

Let us suppose that the rule for applying the concept
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murderer (which I shall here suppose to be the same as the
rule for applying the predicate •xis a murderer•) runs something like this:

if x takes the life of another person with

malintent, then it 11li!IY be said that •xis a murderer.•
what is the goal of this rule?

Now

Is it not just to give the

conditions underlying the application of the concept?

One

could, of course, object that the purpose of rule for applying the concept may be identified with whatever purposes we
have for labeling someone a murderer.

But in that case con-

siderations arising from the first argument become pertinent.
What would the purpose of calling someone a murderer be?
Would it be to effect a form of retribution, or to achieve
some sort of societal goal (such as the maximizing of happiClearly if such ends justify the practice of calling

ness)?

someone a murderer under certain conditions, we have not escaped the circle of moral terms.
This shows that the way we apply our moral concepts, and
our moral rules themselves, are not capable of being given
any sort of epistemic warrant from without (metaphysical or
instrumental).
rant.

Nhat

M9

But neither is there any need for such war-

caJJ •giving justification• just is something

we do in tht11t vocabulary.

The request that something further

be offered. as justification is uttered by someone for whom,
to use Wittgenstein's phrase, language is on a holiday (1958,
sec.38).
What Arrington thus refers to as the autonomy of moral
grammar (1989, pp. 150 and 160) is a special case of the general autonomy of grammar (i.e, of grammatical practices)
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urged by Wittgenstein.

Basically what this means is that all

of our linguistic practices must be understood. in their own
terms:

there is no such thing as stepping outside one's lin-

guistic practices in order to provide them with warrant.
some point explanations come to an end, and one says:

At

•This

is simply what we do.•.
Although Arrington holds the view that the practices
which constitute one's form of life, whatever they may be,
are without traditional epistemological justification, and as
such allows him to be open to the possibility of alternate
moralities, he does believe that that there are certain moral
principles which would be acceptable to all human beings.

As

he puts the matter:
Whereas conceptual relativism can easily accommodate alternative concepts of morality, it is also
compatible with the possibility that all human beings agree in some ultimate or basic way as to what
they would call moral rules and moral ends ... (1989,
p. 262).
[N]o attempt is made to derive the thesis of
relativism from the diversity of moral beliefs.
Indeed, as we have seen, conceptual relativism is
consistent with the possibility that all people
agree on basic moral principles (1989, p. 263).
For the conceptual relativist, the issue of moral realism
hinges on whether one may step outside moral grammar to determine its warrant.

Yet whether or not the application of

(some) moral concepts is invariant, given that no objectivist
moral epistemology is in the offing, one must be committed to
relativism (anti-realism).

The lack of an epistemological

foundation for moral claims is, as should be apparent from
what went earlier, not a flaw according to Arrington.
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We are

not doomed to moral skepticism. Instead it is the claims of
the skeptic which are suspect.
The moral realist, according to Arrington, is engaged
in the old game of looking for epistemic warrant.

The desire

to identify that which is real with what is relative to ~nvar~ant practices--practices whose non-existence is pragmati·
cally incoherent··is the contemporary counterpart of
Descartes' desire to treat as real only that whose existence
is inconceivable.

The moral realist believes that if one

cannot act (talk, think, believe) otherwise in certain situations, then those specific ethical practices ought to be
granted an objective status.
The difference between Arrington and the moral realists
becomes even more striking when we consider their respective
stands on meta-ethical claims.

For the realists, invariance

provides the M!lrrant for saying something is real.

According

to Arrington this sort of ethical pronouncement would have to
be considered nonsensical for precisely the reason that it is
an attempt to go beyond the linguistic resources of the practice itself.

Here it does not matter that descriptive real-

ists want to relativize objectivity to a form of life; the
fact is that sentences like •Moral facts exist• or •Moral
facts do not exist• play no role in the language-games of ascribing blame, value, etc.

If one is told moral facts exist

(or do not exist) upon inquiring whether John is really
blameworthy, one would likely say:
question.•

•but no such thing was in

One issue that will become more important below

is whether Arrington can avoid a similar charge.
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The fact that Arrington's conceptual relativism is compatible with the possibility that some moral practices are
invariable while others may be variable enables it to accommodate a wide range of moral claims which vary according to
degree to which they are susceptible to revision.

Off hand

it seems fairly obvious that some kind of distinction along
these lines must be made by any adequate meta-ethical theory.
For example, one is much more likely to revise one's belief
that John is blameworthy than to revise one's belief that
blameworthiness is something bad.

In fact, we can imagine a

realist attacking Arrington on the grounds that some sort of
onto1og~ca1 difference must account for (or at least be en-

tailed by) the difference in the degree to which they are
susceptible to revision.

To Arrington's credit, he does pro-

vide such an account.
Arrington distinguishes between eight classes of moral
propositions (1989, pp. 302-303):
1. Grammatical propositions which serve as basic
moral principles.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

•It is wrong to tell a lie."
•0ne ought to keep one's promises."
•one ought not to harm other people."
•It is wrong to treat others disrespectfully.•
•one must not take the life of an innocent person."

2. Grammatical propositions concerning the order
of priority among basic principles.
(a) •one ought to tell the truth unless doing so
would cause grave harm to others."
(b) •one ought to keep one's promises unless doing
so would involve taking the life of an innocent person.•
3. Substantive moral principles.
(a) •Premarital sex is wrong.•
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(b) none ought to be patriotic.n
(c) nMercy killing is wrong.•
(d) •one ought to live a simple and frugal life."
(e) •0ne ought to give a quarter of one's income to
charity."
4. Grammatical propositions converted into sub
stantive moral principles.
(a) none ought never to tell a lie."
(b) •0ne ought always to keep one's promises,n
(c) none should never kill another human
being, in war, peace or self-defense.•
5.

Principles of moral permissibility.
(a) •tt is morally permissible to let a deformed fetus die."
(b) Suicide is morally permissible.

6.

Statements of nthe lesser evil."

7.

(a) •You ought to lie to her; otherwise she
will be deeply hurt.n
(b) n1 had to tell the truth, so I could not
keep my promise.•
Exceptions to moral principles.

(a) n0ne ought always tell the truth, unless one is
a prisoner of war.•
(b) none ought to turn the other cheek, unless
one's family honor is at stake."
8.

Particular moral judgments.
(a) •You ought to pay him back."
(b) n1t was wrong of you to cheat on him.•

The items which make up this list vary according to their
epistemological and semantic status.

One immediately notices

upon examining the list that meta-ethical propositions are
nowhere to be found.

That is because they are not to be as-

signed any epistemic or semantic role.
According to Arrington, the most important division
among the categories is that which holds between the first
two and all the rest.

The first two categories are said to
154

express nscsssBry truths, whereas all the rest are contingent
(1989, p. 303).

Perhaps, in order for Arrington to be loyal

to his Wittgensteinian origins, it would be better for him to
say that the distinction runs among those which are bs1d to
be necessary and those bs1d to be contingent.)

The defense

of those comprising (3)-(9) will involve an appeal to those
contained in (1) and (2).
The propositions in (1) and (2) bear an important resemblance to what traditionally are referred to as analytic
propositions, i.e., those which are true in virtue of the
meanings of the words contained within them.

Sentences like

•A bachelor is an unmarried adult human male who is eligible
for marriage• are true because the meaning of •bachelor• just
is that of uunmarried adult human male who is eligible for
marriage.•

Analytic sentences are regarded by many philoso-

phers as necess~rily true, since their denial entails a contradiction:

to deny that a bachelor is an unmarried adult

human male who is eligible for marriage, given what •bachelor• means, is tantamount to saying that a bachelor is not a
bachelor.

The person who utters such statements utters an

absurdity.

Charity, however, would have us assign to the

person an ignorance of the meaning of the relevant term(s).
Reflection upon when we actually do utter such sentences reveals that usually they are uttered in order to instruct
someone concerning the meaning of a particular word.

Because

that is the typical function of these utterances, they may be
referred to as gr4111B18t~ca1 propositions.

The same function

may be fulfilled with the formal mode equivalent in which the
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fact that the utterance is about language itself becomes apparent; one could say, for example, #The word 'bachelor' is
used to refer to unmarried adult human males who are eligible
for marriage."
Arrington points out that calling these grammatical
propositions should not be taken to mean that they are merely
about language and nothing else (1989, p. 292).

Nor should

they be taken, as Katz believes, to express relations among
Platonistically construed senses of expressions.

Their prin-

cipal function is to prescribe action; specifically, they
prescribe what can be said, but one must remember that, for
Wittgenstein, our linguistic practices are not divorced from
the rest of our lives.

Our linguistic practices occur in

concrete social and physical contexts.

Our utterances are

occasioned by events, including others' verbal behavior,
which occur within such contexts; our own verbal behavior
provides the context for others' utterances.

What gramnati-

cal propositions do is provide an account of the context in
which particular utterances may be made.

Suppose we carry

out the further formalizing of •A bachelor is an unmarried
adult human male who is eligible for marriage•:

•The word

'bachelor' is used to refer to the very same thing to which
'unmarried adult human male who is eligible for marriage'
refers."

We might paraphrase, saying:

•The word 'bachelor'

may be used in precisely those contexts in which 'unmarried
adult human male who is eligible for marriage' may be used."
(There may, however, be pragmatic principles like •Avoid
wordiness in this context,, which may predominate.)
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According to Arrington, utterances of the propositions
contained in (1) an (2) fulfill this sort of function.
example,

For

(la) conveys the infonnation that in a context in

which one observes someone lying, or is to1d that someone is
lying, one may say "It is wrong."

The propositions in the

second category provide the link to further actions.
Presumably (2) might include (2c) "One ought to prevent or
rectify wrongdoing unless doing so would cause hann to oneself or others."

Thus in a context in which one may say "It

is wrong," one may do (and say) many other things as well,
and what one does and says will become part of the context
which occasions the actions and words of others.
To fully appreciate Arrington's position it is necessary
to consider the way in which acquiring a moral granmatical
proposition contributes to our understanding of moral concepts.

The proposition (la) ,,It is wrong to tell a lie" is

coJll)arable, Arrington says, to "Red is a color" (1989, p.
283).

One acquires one's concept of color, not first by

being given a general definition (in tenns of genus and differentia, for example) from which one deduces that red,
green, yellow, etc. are colors.

Rather one acquires the con-

cept color by being exposed to particular colors.
Propositions like "Red is
and "color."

a color" serve to define both ,,red"

The former is defined to the extent that its

genus is stated.

(No pretense is made to this being a defi-

nition in terms of genus anddifferentia.)

The word "color"

is defined to the extent that one type of color is specified.
One might wonder what sanctions calling such propositions
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def1n1t1ons.

After all, they appear to be little more than

ordinary predicative propositions.

A useful antidote to this

puzzlement is that one must bear in mind that we do not acquire our concept of co1or by being given an analytical definition.

We acquire our color vocabulary through ostensive

definitions, thus •color is a determinable property and one
that is defined through its determinants--color is red, yellow, green, blue, and so on• (1989, p. 283).
Moral grammatical propositions serve as definitions in
much the same way.

One does not acquire moral concepts, like

those of ob11g8t1on or wrongness, by first being given analytical definitions which are then used to deduce specifically what is obligatory or wrong.

One acquires these moral

concepts in the course of being trained what things are obligatory and what things are wrong.

When one is told that •one

ought to keep one's promises• or •1t is wrong to tell a lie,•
one is learning what keeping one's promises and telling lies
are, but more importantly one is being provided with the determinants of the determinable concepts of ob11gat1on and

wrongdo1ng.

Robert Milo, cited approvingly by Arrington

(1989, pp. 283-284), puts the matter aptly:
I do not see how anyone who claims to know what
it means to say that it is mora11ywrong to do
something can deny that an act's causing pain, injury, or death to someone is at least 4 reason for
judging it to be morally wrong. Indeed, it is
terms of such criteria as these that people are
taught the meaning of •morally wrong.• ... we are not
first taught the meaning of •Morally wrong" and
then taught that such acts are morally wrong;
rather, such criteria define, for the ordinary person, what it means to say that an act is morally
wrong (1984, pp. 195-196).
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We may refer to moral grammatical propositions as definitions
in terms of criteria (a word borrowed. from Wittgenstein).
What moral terms msan, and what our moral concepts are, is
determined. by the sorts of things we count as fa11~ng under
those concepts.

And the sorts of things we count as falling

under those concepts depends upon one's instruction and
training.
We are now in a position to see why Arrington's view is
co111>atible both with the possibility that there are and that
there are not universally held moral beliefs.

Because of the

way in which they are acquired, moral concepts are open-ended
or fuzzy (1989, p. 284).

Because the conditions under which

individuals acquire their moral concepts may vary, so that
their criteria for saying, for example, that something is
obligatory may differ, individuals' moral concepts have the
potential to be quite divergent.

To the extent that persons

acquire their moral concepts under similar conditions, their
concepts will be similar.

So whether moral standards are

universal or variable depends upon the lives people live and
the context in which they live them.

Convergent ways of life

make for co111I10n moral concepts and make basic moral agreement
possible; divergent ways of life do the opposite.

But what

is important here is that one cannot milk from either variability or universality any kind of ontological reading of
moral discourse.
The open-ended nature of moral concepts gives rise to
questions concerning to what extent granmatical propositions
express necessary truths.

They do not seem to enjoy the kind
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of necessity typically attributed to analytical definitions.
One could deny the truth of a gramnatical proposition without
uttering a contradiction.

Here I think Arrington has over-

stated his point, but not in any way detrimental to the view
he espouses.

To be true to his Wittgensteinian origins,

Arrington must view nscsss~tyas a status conferred upon
propositions by virtue of the epistemic and semantic role
they play relative to other kinds of claim which arise within
moral discourse.

Granunatical propositions serve as the ref-

erence points by which more specific moral claims are judged
as true or false.

The truth of a grammatical proposition is

never up for consideration.

It is hs1d necessarily true.

In

a more cautious vein Arrington says, •The following kind of
necessity attaches to these gramnatical propositions:

we

must subscribe to them if we are to participate in the moral
way of life, and within the moral way of life their denial is
incoherent• (1989, p. 275).

One can utter the denial of a

granmatical proposition, but in doing so one would be uttering what would be deemed nonsensical:

the context in which

it is uttered just is one in which such denials have no use.
This is not to say that in a different context the very same
denial might not be meaningful:

•God is good• might be a

granmatical proposition in the context of a monastery, but it
might not be one in the context of a pharmacology laboratory,
where one is taught that only successful experiments are
good.
The first two classes of moral grammatical propositions
must be distinguished from what Arrington refers to as sub160

stantive moral principles.

These are principles arrived at

as a result of argument and decision (1989, p. 292).

These

claims may be defended by appealing to moral grarmnatical
propositions as general premises.

So, for example, the claim

that #Premarital sex is wrong" might be defended by appealing
to the grammatical proposition that Mit is wrong to treat
others disrespectfully."

Typically substantive moral princi-

ples include concepts learned after one has acquired. basic
moral concepts.

One does not typically acquire one's concept

of wrongdo.ingaround the same time as one acquires the concept of premarital sex.

For this reason acceptance of sub-

stantive moral principles constitutes an extens.ion of one's
moral knowledge.
Some substantive moral principles do not include sophisticated concepts such as those of prBlll,!lr.i til.l sex, piltr~·ot.ism,
or mercy k.i.1.1.ing; some simply involve a further qualification
of the existing gramna.tical proposition.

In (4a), for exam-

ple, the moral knowledge of, say, a child to whom (upon

.

telling her first lie (la) was uttered) is extended.

We can

easily imagine (4a) being uttered to a child upon her second
(and subsequent) telling of a lie:

not only is it wrong to

tell a lie (now), but it is a.lM11yswrong; one should never
tell a lie.
Principles of moral permissibility must be distinguished
from the classes of propositions described so far.
general, share the form:
wrong."

These, in

MDoing xis neither obligatory nor

Typically one is not tril~'nsd in what is morally per-

missible, nor is one brought to believe that something is
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permissible on the basis of argument.

More often than not,

what is permissible receives neither praise nor blame.

Thus

permissibility moves in the empty contours of our grammatical
and substantive principles.

It is this dimension of our

moral life which affords us the greatest freedom relative to
the other members of our linguistic and moral conmunity; the
other rules, in contrast, set and prescribe the conditions
under which one is a member of the community.

That princi-

ples of moral permissibility stand in this relation to the
other principles gives Arrington's conceptual relativism a
distinct advantage over forms of realism which would write
principles of moral permissibility into the very nature of
moral reality.

To say that something is necessarily permis-

sible carries all the tension contained in the Sartrian view
of humans as condemned. to be free.

The view espoused by

Arrington casts human freedom in a very different light.

By

effecting social change, by changing social practices, one
may well alter what counts as permissible or otherwise.
The last three sets of principles and judgments are justified by appealing to granmatical and substantive principles
as well as to the nature of the circumstances in which they
are uttered.

For example,

(Sa) might be justified by appeal-

ing to the granmatical proposition (lb) or the substantive
principle (4b) a2ong r~th the facts concerning •you• and
•him.•

At this end of the spectrum the claims being made are

highly contingent; (8a) may be true when spoken of one set of
individuals but false when spoken of another set of individuals.
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What gives Arrington•s conceptual relativism a decided
advantage over other forms of anti-realism is the way in
which it distinguishes between different kinds of moral
claims.

Our moral claims form a family whose members play no

unifo:rm semantic and epistemic role.

Grammatical proposi-

tions determine what RlifiY be (not what .is) true or false.
They define the limits of moral sense for a given linguistic
coI1111Unity insofar as their denial is a piece of nonsense.

It

is in reference to them that substantive moral principles and
the more specific moral claims making up the last three categories may be judged true or false.

Grammatical proposi-

tions, furthermore, define--by setting off in relief--what is
morally permissible.

In this way they dete:rmine what may

sens.ib2ybe spoken of as permissible.

If I have any objection to raise against Arrington it is
that his view suffers from a certain inconsistency.
consistency arises in the following manner.

The in-

Notice that

nowhere among the categories of moral propositions do metaethical propositions occur.

As noted earlier, this sort of

account treats meta-ethical claims as nonsense.

Yet

Arrington declares himself a conceptual relativist.

To de-

clare oneself as an anti-realist of a certain sort just ~s to
proclaim a meta-ethical truth.

How can Arrington consistent-

ly hold such a view when the view itself precludes the possibility of doing so?
I think Arrington is faced with the following dilenma.
He must either relinquish his claim to be providing an account of the ontoiogical status of morality, or he must as163

sign some legitimizing role to utterances of meta-ethical
claims distinct from the role assigned to granmatical propositions (as that role is conceived by him) and from the other
kinds of claims which make up our moral discourse.

Clearly

the second horn of this dileIIIM is the one more favorably
seized upon.

But it is not clear how that can be done within

the confines of the present theory.

If meta-ethical claims

are meta-granmatical propositions, providing us as it were
with a preface or a guide to understanding moral discourse,
then grammatical propositions could not at all have the kind
of status the theory confers upon them.

They would turn out

to be contingent upon propositions even more basic than themselves--propositions about their ontological interpretation.
But the cornerstone of Arrington'& theory just is that grammatical propositions cannot be grounded in this way.
I believe that what is essential to the theory can be
saved, and that some kind of account can be given of metaethical claims.

What is required, in order to do this, is a

modified view concerning the nature of ontological commitment
and a certain de-cognitivizing of grammatical propositions.
Blackburn's quasi-realism provides the solution.

3.

BLACKBURN

This dissertation has wound a dialectical path towards
Blackburn's position.

I maintain that a view like

Blackburn's is the inevitable outcome of any careful consideration of the issues here described.
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The key to Blackburn's

theory is his conception of ontological coJl'lllitment.
we have noted various approaches to this matter.

Thus far

Moore's di-

rect realism makes be.ing the ob,isct of consc.iousness or ,iudgmBnt the only criterion for ontological conunitment.

Katz and

the Quinean Naturalists build a criterion of ontological commitment out of that ""1.ich

II theory guant.if.iss over.

Wittgensteinian realists like McDowell

tie objectivity to

What is the source of onto-

thB can,nun.ity of hUR1t!111 rBsponse.

logical commitment for Arrington?

It is difficult to say,

but it appears that what he is doing is piecing together the
most cohsrsnt theory by making discriminations among moral
propositions; both the theory and the discriminations are
supposed to do justice to our linguistic intuitions.
question Arrington would have us ask ourselves is:
theory true tomy experiences?

The
is the

As members of, rather than

purveyors of, our iooral linguistic community, we cannot have

intuitions concerning meta-ethical claims, but we c11n concerning all the rest.

I hold, then, that Arrington'& crite-

rion of ontological commitment consists in being true to ths
f11cts of one's sxpsr.isncr,.

What all the views share in com-

mon is that ontological commitments issue in sets of be2.isfs
concerning what is real.

Such is not the case, or at least

not necessarily the case, for Blackburn.

For Blackburn one

may have beliefs about what is real, but they are secondary,
almost epiphenomenal, in stature.

What is essential to onto-

logical conmitment is the stance one takes towards something,
regardless of whether or not one is disposed. to say (or consider oneself as believing that) the thing in question is
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real.

Ontological canmitment is to be understood as a set of

dispositions which may or may not include dispositions to
utter a particular proposition.

Characterizing his view, he

says:

[I]t is not what you finish by saying, but how
you manage to say it that matters. How many people
think they can just announce themselves to be realists or antirealists, as if all you have to do is
put your hand on your heart and say, •1 really believe it!• (or, •r really don't•)? The way I treat
the issue of realism denies that this kind of avowal helps the matter at all. The question is one of
the best theory of this state of commitment, and
reiterating it, even with a panoply of dignities-truth, fact, perception, and the rest--is not to
the point (1988, p. 363).
Blackburn, we shall see, rejects the cognitivism inherent in
Arrington's view.

There is much that is cognizable, much

which can be evaluated as true or false, but grannnatical
propositions are not among them.

Blackburn would reject

Arrington's claim that these propositions are in some sense
necessarily true.

Instead the role these propositions play

is secured by the fact that they are rarely uttered.

When

they are uttered they do not function as 8sssrt~ons.

Rather

they show the possibility of a particular stance.
Blackburn is heavily influenced by Hume's projectivism.
On this view, the moral and evaluative properties attributed

to things are in actuality projections of our own sentiments.
Our •emotions, reactions, attitudes [and] commendations•

all

have a bearing upon what properties we assign to a given
thing (1984, p. 180).

For this reason Hume and Blackburn are

to be counted among the anti-realists.

In certain respects

Blackburn's Humean bearings make his approach similar to the
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Wittgensteinians discussed so far; in other respects he differs from them.

The similarity (which he bears even to real-

ists like McDowell) is principally a methodological one.

It

involves a connnitment to descr.ib.lng (to adhering to
Wittgenstein's maxim to 1ook 8nd
tually do arise.

BBB)

how moral judgments ac-

In this Blackburn, like many of the other

philosophers examined, is committed to doing justice to the
phenomenology of our moral life.

This methodological simi-

larity, with Arrington at least, is very short-lived, as
Blackburn develops an explanatory model of how moral judgments are formed.

The phenomenological facts are to be ex-

plained, not merely described..

Consequently, the manner in

which Blackburn arrives at anti-realism is quite unlike the
way a Wittgensteinian like Arrington arrives at it.

The lat-

ter derives anti-realism directly from a dismissal of the
possibility of providing moral claims with foundational epistemic warrant.

Blackburn, on the other hand, derives anti-

realism from a consideration of the theoretical model which
explains how moral judgments are formed.
For Hume, one is never in a position to comport oneself
toward the world (other people, objects, events, etc.) in a
morally neutral way.

Objects and events

str.ikB us

as rele-

vant, irrelevant, valuable or not, commendable or otherwise.
The objects which comprise our world are, to use Hume's
phrase, met by approbation or disapprobation on our parts.
Our atti"tudes, emotions and the like contribute to the formation of our beliefs.

As we investigate, acquire and pursue

the implications of new beliefs about our world we encounter
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additional facts about our environment which meets with our
approval or disapproval.

The process is cyclical, and both

reason and sentiment fonn an essential part of it.

Earlier,

in considering McDowell, we discussed the relative roles of
reason and sentiment in Hume's philosophy.

Because the sen-

timents add a co1or~ng to the world, the moral and evaluative
properties attributable to objects must be considered as less
than intrinsic properties of the things themselves.
Blackburn expands upon the basic tenets of Hume's theory.

Consider the awfulness of a brutal murder.

According to

Blackburn, if one observes a brutal murder, one should count
among the genuinely observable properties of the event, not
only such physical features as one may observe, but its awfulness as well.

One does not, as it were, observe a set of

physical events and then infer that they are awful or bad.
Rather one is struck by the awfulness of the event, one sees

chat something bad is occurring.

To say that all this be-

longs to the observable properties of the event is not to say
all equally enjoy mind-independent existence.

Rather, they

all belong to a description of ,mac one observes, what one is
struck by.

These are the properties one exper~ences the

event as having, and thus they must not be discounted from
the phenomenology of moral experience.
A consideration of the event-as-experienced allows one
to discriminate between explanatory properties and spread
properties (1984, p. 180ff).

Spread properties are those

which subjects are prepar~ to observe in events as a result
of their various emotions, sentiment, and attitudes.
168

Perhaps

the event in question would not even have been observed (perhaps the subject would have observed the nearby greenness of
the lawn) had the subject not possessed the particular emotions, sentiments and attitudes which set the particular
event off as relevant and, indeed, 1110rthyof attention.
These are referred to as sprsadproperties not only because
they are spread or projected onto the event by the observer,
but because their observation gives rise to beliefs as well
as habits, emotions, sentiments and attitudes which rec?dythe
subject for further observations; they partially define what
the subject regards as relevant and worth consideration.

To

say that these properties are spread or projected upon the
world is just to say that the subject comes to view the world
as containing the possibility of relevantly similar and dissimilar events.

The subject acquires or modifies or relin-

quishes certain dispositions.

The event, with all its awful-

ness, becomes a prototype with which to compare future
events.
In contrast to spread properties, there are explanatory
properties which are not projected upon the situation.

The

physical characteristics of the participants are not projected.

Presumably neither is projected the motive which one im-

putes to the murderer to explain his or her behavior.

Rather

these are what elicit one's response, what make one f~nd the
event awful or bad.

One appeals to them in order to exp1a~n

what occurred, as well as what occurred to one in observing
the event.
This theo.zymakes the moral and evaluative properties
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less than objective.

However, as Blackburn acknowledges, an

adequate theory must accommodate the basic phenomena.

In

this case what must be explained is the fact that the spread
properties, e.g., the 8Nfu1nessof an event, grip us so.

Not

only do we observe them, we observe them as the most relevant
properties of the event.

They are those features of the

event which seem most real to us.

That they seB/11 so real but

are not afforded any such status by projectivism stands in
need of explanation.
In order for projectivism to be an adequate theory, the
gulf between what is regarded as real from a theoretical
standpoint and what is regarded as such from a natural, nontheoretical standpoint must be bridged.
rea1~sm is just such an attempt.

Blackburn's guas~-

It strives to show how the

ontological co:nmitments of the natural and theoretical standpoints may be compatible.

It does this, not by reducing the

one to the other (i.e., by providing a theoretical link between the two vocabularies), but by providing an account of
ontological conmitment itself.
One is liable to think that the gulf is (or is nearly)
unbridgeable if one holds to a Quinean view of ontological
conunitment.

That view has it that one is conunitted only to

the existence of that which the best theories quantify over.
If projectivism or any other meta-ethical theory is better
able to explain and predict speakers' moral pronouncements
better that the explanations offered by the speakers themselves (which might, for example, appeal to the property of

awfulness rather than the 8ppear8nce of the property of aw170

fulness), then the conmitments of that meta-ethical theory
are to be preferred over those of the natural standpoint.

We

saw this criterion at work in our earlier consideration of
Quine's views on ethics, which he labels as methodologically
infirm.

If the natural standpoint is to be regarded as theo-

retically sound, then that can only be if it is somehow reduced or translated into the vocabulary of the preferred theory.

Whether such a task could be accomplished is an issue

that lies beyond the scope of this essay.

For Blackburn that

sort of project would be irrelevant, because ontological commitment is not theoretical commitment.
Realists and anti-realists who think ontological co:rrmitment amounts to nothing more than theoretical conmitment, who
think that a survey of their most rationally held beliefs can
reveal what their ontological commitments are, are mistaken.
For Blackburn our ontological commitments are to be understood as stt!lnasswe take towards objects in our environment.
Such stances involve sentiment as well as a cognitive element.

We ready ourselves to be struck by particular objects

and events, and we are readied to respond to them in some way
or other.

For example, one can speak of a sunset receiving

one's approbation.

Given that one has such an experience,

and given that she has a belief that the sun will set (again)
produces a desire in her to see that beauty again.
the same case with our moral commitments.

And it is

Our observation of

a brutal murder gives rise to certain beliefs and emotions.
The 8wfu1nsss of the situation grips us and we form (and retain) certain beliefs and negative emotions about that event.
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(One is reminded of Heidegger's description of Dasein as a
pro,iected-pro,isct~onwhich discloses beings.)

Our ontologi-

cal commitments take shape as •patterns of reaction" to the
natural world (1984, p. 182).

And, as suggested, it would be

a mistake to think that the tenn •pattern of rtJ8ct~on" is
meant to suggest nothing cognitive is at work in responding
to one's environment.

On the contrary, our stances •function

to mediate the move from features of a situation to a reaction, which in the appropriate circumstances will mean
cho~ce' (1988, p. 363, emphasis added).

Choices require be-

liefs concerning the relevant features of the environment,
but they require preferences too; actions resulting from
choice are motivated by emotions, attitudes, and so on.

For

this reason our stances may be described as conat~ve stances
(1988, pp. 363 and 373).

Ontological conmitments are more

like marriage commitments than theoretical comnitments.

They

are entered into with desires which shape one's expectations
concerning how one may affect and be affected by another.

Of

course w~th~n the standpoint of a marriage one does not view
the charm of one's spouse as a projection of one's attitudes
and emotions; rather, one f~nds one's spouse to be cha:aning.
One expects to find this trait.
it.

One expects to respond to

A marriage commitment is not simply a vow that is ut-

tered; it is, to carry the metaphor a bit further, something
one eng8ges ~n, something one does or makes.

Such is the

case with ontological commitments, of which ethical conmitments are a specific form.

In a marriage commitment one

readies oneself for a range of possible events (• .•. in sick172

ness and in health ... "); ethical conmitments do likewise.

We

are readied for possible events which are good or bad, fair
or unfair, pleasant or awful.

And such ethical co:rmnitments

are, in general, commitments to certain (shared) attitudes
and beliefs.

The important point is that all ontological

cormti.tments are to be understood. from w~th~n a particular
standpoint, as relative to the attitudes of the participants
themselves.
Why should we prefer this construal of the nature of on·
tological commitment over that which identifies such conmit·
ments with theoretical commitments?
this question is deflationary.

Blackburn's response to

The question is motivated by

a false conception of science and the theories that there
ensue.

The pract~ce of science includes methodologies (and

techniques for evaluating methodologies), various research
goals, and various forms of theories.
tive as well as cognitive elements.

Science includes cona·
One's research goa1s,

one's preferred methodology, what one regards as an adequate
theory are all conative elements within science.

The view

that science's theoretical cormti.tments are molded by nothing
but cognitive factors is itself a myth.

Basically we are to

view the scientist as a participant within a context which
primes for particular attitudes (for example, towards ade·
quate empirical investigation of hypotheses, sufficient con·
sistency within the theory, etc.).

The scientist's ontologi·

cal conmitments are formed by a process identical to that
which produces the conmitments of persons within the natural
standpoint.
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The apparent inconsistency between the ontological commitments of a projectivist meta-ethics disappears if one
bears in mind that such commitments are relative to contexts
which prime for one or another set of attitudes.

One's cona-

tive stance when working out a meta-ethical theory that will
be found adequate to one's mentors or peers is quite different than one's conative stance when observing a brutal murder
or listening.to one's cha:aning spouse.

If ontological com-

mitment is relative to a context, then there is no contradiction in saying (from a theoretical standpoint) that the awfulness of an event is projected, and from a natural or ethical standpoint) that an event 1s awful.

We can understand

why Blackburn refers to his view as quas1-rsa1~sm.

It per-

mits talk of what is real, indeed it 1eg~t~m~zes such talk
even in those cases in which one disagrees with it; but it
insists that talk of what is real must be qualified in te:ans
of the context in which it occurs, contexts which prime for
one or another set of attitudes.
Blackburn warns us that this conception of ontological
commitment should not be taken to be an espousal of ethical
relativism.

Not only do we have preferences, we have beliefs

about our preferences.

We arB free to judge the practices

which others engage in, which in the end form their sensibilities and promulgate the practices themselves.

The practices

(verbal and nonverbal) which produce the sensibilities of a
Nazi need not be regarded as immune to our criticism.

As

Blackburn points out (1984, p. 192), •not all sensibilities
are admirable.•

What makes certain sensibilities better than
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others has to do with what we have come to expect from other
people and this comes from our desire for the world to be of
a certain sort.

It is interesting how Nazis elicit such fer-

vent negative reactions in us.

Audiences watching Nazi sym-

pathizers (on GeraJdo, for example) are moved to the verge of
violence.

This is no mere balking at a set of false beliefs.

It is, rather, a reaction to a way of J~fs that is so incompatible with our own that it meets with thorough disapprobation on our parts.

As part.ic.ipants in a particular form of

life, we have no choice; we just view the world in a certain
way.

We may provide justification for our digust, but justi-

fication would not be sought unless the disgust were felt.
And as Blackburn points out, seeing the world in one way
rather than another does not commit one necessarily to relativism:
[O]ne last charge of the would-be realist is
that a projectivist may inhabit a particular ethical boat, but he must know of the actual or potential existence of others; where,then, is the absolute truth? The answer is that it is not anywhere
than can be visible from this sideways, theoretical
perspective. It is not that this perspective is
illegitimate, but that it is not one adapted for
finding ethical truth. It would be if such truth
were natural truth, or consisted of the existence
of states of affairs in the real world. That is
the world seen from the viewpoint that sees different and conflicting moral systems--but inevitably
sees no truth in just one of them. To usee• the
truth than wanton cruelty is wrong demands moralizing, stepping back into the boat, or putting back
the lens of a sensibility.· But once that is done,
there is nothing relativistic to say (1988, pp.
371-372).

Far from being relativistic, then, to the extent of sanctioning forms of life-and specific moral principles diametrically
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opposed to our own, our moral sentiments and ethical commitments are precisely what make our condemnation of the various
practices in which Nazis engage possible.

4.

AN BXPRESSIVIST ACCOUNT OF MORAL

GRAMMATICAL PROPOSITIONS

Blackburn's analysis of ontological conmitment sheds
considerable light upon the status of what Arrington describes as mora1 gr8J1111111t~ca1 propos~t~ons.

Earlier we cred-

ited Arrington with introducing relevant semantic and epistemic distinctions among moral propositions.

Doing so en-

ables him to articulate his brand of anti-realism while doing
justice to important aspects of moral phenomenology (e.g.,
that some claims seem more intransigent than others, that
what is held finn by some persons may vary from what is held
fi:an by others, and so on).

Arrington finds himself in trou-

ble inasmuch as his theory takes away the very possibility of
mst!!U1.ingfu11y iflssert~ng that anti-realism is true.

A quasi-

realist conception of ontological commitment can resolve this
problem.

And, so, in the end, I advocate a certain combina-

tion of Blackburn's and Arrington's positions.

The solution

requires that we (i) assimilate grammatical propositions to
express~ons, or, more exactly, we assimilate tokens or particular utterances of these propositions to tokens which have
an expressive rather than assertoric function, and (ii) exhibit the relation between meta-ethical propositions and
granmatical ones.

The latter step legitimizes (in certain
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contexts) utterances of meta-ethical propositions, while making their assert~on or den~a1 nonsensical; this will sound
paradoxical only to someone who thinks that all utterances
must functions as assertions.
One of Blackburn's most valuable insights is that very
basic moral propositions, such as those we call moral grammatical propositions, are expressive of one's conative
stance.

I think, in fact, that Blackburn may well be ex-

pressing a view which, if not explicit, is at least implicit
in the latter Wittgenstein's writings.

What Arrington has

neglected to realize is that tokens of grammatical propositions do not function as assertions.

Rather than *looking

and seeing• how grammatical propositions function, Arrington
adheres to the Davidsonian idea that the meaning of a declarative sentence is to be equated with its truth-conditions.
Like Davidson, he believes that a declarative sentence is
meaningful only if it is either true or false, which is to
say that he accepts the principle of bivalence for all such
sentences.

He thinks that gramnatical propositions must have

a truth-value, and since they are the most fundamental of
moral propositions, they are to be afforded the status of
necessary truths.

A1though he does qua1ify his use of that

term (1989, p. 275), he cannot resist its use, especially
when contrasting the status of grammatical propositions with
those of more specific moral claims which he regards as cont~ngent1ytrue.

Arrington quite explicitly refers to gram-

matical propositions as having cognitive (or assertoric) content.

Our acceptance of any moral grarranatical propositions
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is not,
... a blind, existential leap of faith. We who
adopt it have our guideposts; we have our feet
planted firmly on moral ground. This support is
provided by the rules of moral granunar. They stand
firm for us; they provide direction and guidance
and ensure that we are occupying 100ral space. What
they do not do is provide us with simple rules or
principles that tell us what we always ought to do.
They establish presumptions about what we should do
in particular circumstances; they tell us what di
mansions we must take into account if we are to ar
moral ac
rive at a moral judgment or take
tion .... The rules of 100ral grammar tell us what to
look for, but they do not tell us what we will find
( 19 8 9, p • 27 9) •

A grammatical proposition like uLying is wrong," on this account, .ident.if.ies a kind of action as morally relevant (namely, lying).

That is what Arrington means in saying that they

define the d~mens.ions of 100rality for us.

They do not pro-

vide us with specific guidance (unlike "I ought not lie"),
but they do provide us with general information from which
substantive and 100re specific 100ral principles may be derived.

Because grammatical propositions function as premises

in the derivation of substantive and more specific 100ral
principles, the truth of the latter is said to be contingent
upon the truth of the former.
The expressivist account of grammatical propositions
calls into question the idea that utterances of such have
cognitive content, at least that they have cognitive content
in the sense that they have or assert truth conditions.

The

term grammatical propos.it.ion is itself rather misleading.

It

sounds as if specific utterances of sentences which share the
syntactic form of uLying is wrong" are tokens of a certain
type of linguistic expression, and that these types of lin178

guistic expression are in4ividuated in terms of their propositional or cognitive content.

Thus a token of •Lying is

wrong" appears to express a content, which may be judged true
or false.
This is very misleading, as what are called gr8DlllatJca1
propos.it.ions are really linguistic tokens used in concrete

situations, not contents expressed by linguistic tokens.
Arrington does acknowledge that the countenancing of graimnatical propositions by Wittgenstein counts as a shift away from
cognitivism's thesis that ultimate moral principles cannot be
given epistemic warrant.

But Arrington retains a cognitivist

view of grammatical propositions to the extent that he believes they are endowed with cognitive content and provide
epistemic warrant for more specific claims:

they do not rest

on an epistemic foundation, because they are themselves foundational.

This is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's view.

Wittgenstein's was not a cognitivist even to this extent.
What Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations purport to show is that there is something which we call "following a rulew which is not cognitive in nature.

His exami-

nation of the phenomena of following and obeying rules is intended to show "that there is a way of grasping a rule which
is not an JntsrprstatJon, but which is exhibited in what we
call "obeying the rulew and •going against it" in actual
cases (1958, sec. 201).

If rule-following were always a cog-

nitive affair, then before one could follow a rule, that rule
would have to be interpreted, which would presumably require
that one say ,.,hat Js meant by the rule.
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One would be expect -

ed to provide something of a translation.
rule-following is wrong on two counts.
would generate an infinite regress.

Such a view of

First, if true, it

The translation would

stand in need of an interpretation as well.

That is why

Wittgenstein says, that •any interpretation still hangs in
the air along with what it supports, and cannot give it any
support.

Interpretations by themselves do not determine

meaning• (1958, sec. 198).

Second, the mere ability to in-

terpret a rule is not any kind of guarantee that someone understands the rule in question.

Our criterion for whether

someone understands and is capable of following a rule is
their subsequent behavior.

Whether or not someone can give

an adequate translation of a rule is irrelevant unless their
words link up somehow with their deeds.

If Joe lies to a

friend, that is a criterion for saying •Joe has done some·
thing wrong,• as well as for saying •Joe is not following the
rule (the substantive moral principle) that one ought never
lie.•

Subsequent lying on Joe's part and a failure on our

parts to get Joe to stop lying would then be a criterion for
saying •Joe does not understand lying is wrong.•

It cannot

be sufficient for Joe to be said to understand the moral
grammatical proposition •Lying is wrong• that he be able to
interpret or paraphrase it for us.

He must behave a certain

way, engage in some practices and not others.

Consequently,

maintaining that understanding grammatical propositions
amounts to grasping a cognitive content is not compatible
with Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following.
Arrington points out that moral granmatical propositions
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do not give us spsc2f2cdirections in how to act but reveal
the dimensions of moral life.

This is, in a way, correct.

As Levvis (1992, p. 72) points out, the utterance of a grammatical remark •is intended to elicit a response of a most
general nature; their purpose is not to elicit any specific
move within the language-game, but to get the person to take
up the language-game in question.•

But they do not do this

by virtue of having some sort of cognitive content to grasp.

This does not mean that grammatical propositions lack s60/t!ll1·
t2cproperties entirely (indeed it is not even to deny that
they may have--or may have attributed to them--some sort of
cognitive content), but what it does mean is that what semantic properties are essential are not those typically associated with having a truth-value.

What is essential to a gram-

matical proposition is, not what it S8ys, but what it sho111S.
The expressivist account to be articulated here comports
with Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and
Blackburn's quasi-realism, and it enables us to handle a
range of sentences left unaccounted for (or accounted for incorrectly) by Arrington. Consider:
1.

•rt is wrong to tell a lie.

2.

•It is true that it is wrong to tell a lie.•
•rt is a fact that it is wrong to tell a lie.•

3.

•rt is necessarily true that it is wrong to
tell a lie."
•rt is necessarily a fact that it is wrong to
tell a lie."

4.

•There are moral facts.•
•There are no moral facts.•

5.

•Moral realism is true.•
•Moral anti-realism is true.•
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The sentences contained within (1) - (5) are typical of a range
of sentences along a continuum ranging from (1) grarmnatical
propositions to (5) meta-ethical propositions.

Foremost is

the account to be given of grammatical propositions.
The claim that grammatical propositions express or show,
rather than say something, should not be interpreted to mean
It would be

that they simply reveal what is subjective.

wrong to interpret (1) along emotivist lines as nothing other
That view leaves

than the expression of one's own emotion.

utterly mysterious how persons are able to conununicate any·
thing whatsoever to an unsympathetic listener.

The form of

expressivism found in Wittgenstein makes the uttering of a
granmatical proposition a kind of show.

It shows or d~sp1ays

the role an expression may (or may not) play within a language-game.

That is to say, it presents the listener with

what might be regarded as a ft/Ork~ngprototyps of meaningful
discourse which employs the expression.
portion thereof) is displayed.

A

practice (or a

And depending on the disposi·

tions of the listener, the rule may or may not be understood;
which is just to say that depending on the dispositions of
the listener, the language-game or practice will or will not
be taken up.
Practices, unlike emotions, are public.
pressed or shown is how to act, how to go on.

Nhat is ex-

This point is

easy enough to see in Wittgenstein, but it is easy to miss in
Blackburn, since projectivism has it that what are projected
are emotions, sentiments, attitudes, etc., which are all so
subjective.

It must be remembered, though, that for
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Blackburn the projection of spread properties arises from and
results in either the promulgation or modification of pt!it·
terns of react~on to the natural world.
are public events.

Patterns of reaction

They are identical to what we have called

pract~ces, and Blackburn himself refers to them as "'4ys of
.l~fB.

It may be helpful to compare the sort of analysis which
granmatical propositions will here receive with the disquota·
tional analyses sometimes .offered of sentences of proposi·
tional attitude (for example by Quine (1960), Davidson (1968)
and Stich (1983).

According to these theories, when one ut·

ters a sentence of propositional attitude--•s believes that
p"··one is showing what S 11/0u.ld St!lyunder certain circum·
stances.

Stich, for example, claims that when one says •s

believes that p,• one is engaged in a little bit of play-act·
ing (what Davidson, 1968, p. 104 refers to as st!lmB·say~ng).
For Stich the •that" functions demonstratively, and every·
thing prior to it constitutes a bit of stage-setting.

The

actual utterance of •p• in the course of the ascription is a
kind of demonstration of what we might expect to hear corning
out of S's mouth given the kind of state Sis in.

It is as

if the ascriber of the attitude were to stand before her au·
dience and say:

•sis in a state of mind which disposes him

to do th~s: 'p' ."

Stich's view is more complex than this,

and its added complexity bears a relevance to our own meta·
ethical considerations.

The utterance of a propositional at·

titude ascription does more than show what sort of thing is
to expected of

s.

It also reveals what is to be expected of
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the ascriber if she were situated or poised in the world in
the same manner as S.
cription is:

The full analysis of the belief as-

Sis in a state such that, were I in that

state, I would utter 'p'.•

The point is that the play-acting

at the end of the belief ascription expresses as much about
the actor as it does about the person to whom the belief is
ascribed.

What it expresses about the actor is not something

subjective, but how she would go on, what her pattern of reaction would be, in a similar context.

I suggest that gram-

matical propositions perform their function in a similar way.
What an utterance of (1) does is show what would occur
in the context of someone lying or in the context of someone
saying that lying is occurring.

someone who utters a gram-

matical proposition like (1) is saying, in effect •rn a context in which lying occurs or someone says that lying is occurring we act th~sway 'It is wrong•.•

The sentence demon-

strates what sort of reaction to expect from the speaker in
that kind of context.

Preswnably the speaker intends to con-

vey not only that she engages in that specific kind of behavior but in concordant behavior as well.

On the reasonable

assumption that the listener (a child perhaps) knows that no
bit of behavior occurs in isolation, this shou1d be understood.

The grammatical remark indeed presents only a frag-

ment of what is to be expected, and subsequent instruction
might require different or more detailed exhibitions (parents
prone to spanking their children sometimes administer as a
final warning a very light swat preceded by the sentence:

•Th~s is what lying will get you•--again this is a demonstra184

tion).
This sort of analysis can be extended to many, if not
all, of the sentences which Arrington includes among his substantive moral principles.

It is hard to believe that these

are all or always ~nfsrrsd from moral granmatical propositions.

We can well imagine a parent encountering a child's

sscond lie saying, -one ought never lie,• and this not being
~nfsrrsd from anything; it would seem, on the contrary, that

its utterance is necessitated by the child's failure to act
in accord with the grammatical proposition.

We can see this

point more clearly if we bear in mind that -0ne ought never
lie• or •Lying is always wrong• may well be rendered by contemporary canons of logic as •For any x, if xis an act of
lying, then xis wrong.•

For Wittgenstein, sentences con-

taining variables, like mathematical and logical formulae, do
not perform an assertoric function; they show the form of
what can be said.

This is a

a view which extends at least

as far back as that philosopher's Tr8c-t8tus (1922).

The

point is that the antecedent can be taken to specify a type
of context, and the consequent can be regarded as a d~sp28y
of the sort of thing to be expected in that type of context.
To paraphrase:

•In a context in which xis an act of lying

(or in which I am willing to say or accept as true 'xis an
act of lying'), I am disposed to say 'xis wrong•.• It may be
that Arrington is perfectly amenable to this analysis, since,
for him, the earmark of a substantive moral principle is its
semantic and epistemic role, rather than its syntactic form.
But what I think is questionable concerning his distinction
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between grammatical propositions and grammatical propositions
converted into substantive moral principles is the process of
conversion.

He seems to think that if one starts with a

granmatical proposition (perhaps in the instruction of a
child) and converts the grammatical proposition into a sub·
stantive one, then that is a cognitive process in which the
granmatical proposition functions as a general premise.

The

analysis offered here construes such remarks as further instruction (training), since their utterance tends to follow
upon a failure to grasp the rule.
What shall we make of the sentences which comprise (2)?
One objection to the analysis just offered might be that "It
is true that it is wrong to tell a lie" is synonymous with
(1).

In that case utterances of (1) shou1dbe regarded as

having a cognitive content with a determinable truth-value.
From the opposite, emotivist camp, might be heard the objec·
tion that prefixing "It is true that ... " to "it is wrong to
tell a lie" merely adds emphasis, makes more emphatic, one's
dislike of lying.
Neither analysis need be accepted.

The utterances in

(2) can serve as grammatical remarks which, like (1), show
one's propensity to act in a certain kind of way.

The prin·

ciple difference between Mit is wrong to tell a lie" and "It
~s true that it is wrong to tell a lie" is that the latter
expresses a different stance on one's part.

If the former

shows that one is ready to engage in certain behaviors, the
latter shows that one is ready to engage in even more specific behaviors.

Specifically, it shows that the speaker is
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disposed. to trt!Nlt the grammatical remark as the kind of thing
which is true, the kind of thing from which certain conclusions can be drawn.

It announces oneself as one who engages

in the behavior typically associated with what is c1111ed
•drawing inferences from propositions of this form."

It an-

nounces one's readiness, in the presence of Joe's lying, to
say •Joe is doing something wrong,• and one's readiness to

act accordingly.
It is not clear how the second sentence contained under
(2), namely, "It is a fact that it is wrong to tell a lie"
differs from the first.

Perhaps in some contexts it is func-

tionally equivalent to the first in the pair.

Perhaps an-

nouncing that •it is a fact ..• • shows both one's willingness
to extend condenmation to the specific case and one's unwillingness to tolerate dissension concerning the moral grmnmati-

cal proposition.

From a purely cognitivist position this un-

willingness might look like an unwillingness to debate a
basic assumption, and indeed parents do say to their children
•took, I'm not going to debate the issue with you.•

In con-

trast to a cognitivist interpretation, I would suggest that a
child who asks, upon being reprimanded for repeatedly lying,
•well, why shouldn't I?" has actually run up against the
bounds of sense.

The parent's reply of "It is just a fact

that it is wrong to tell a lie" or "Look, I'm not going to
debate the issue with you" sets a linguistic boundary; there
is no language-game or practice within this context) which
might be called qusst:ion:ing ,a,hstbsr ts11:ing
s:ib1s.

11

1:is :is ps.nn:is-

What the parents shoa, is that the child can always
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expect them to react in a similar negative way in like contexts.

Essentially the child's question would go unanswered;

this would be unsatisfying to the child, but, as Wittgenstein
would say, the question that cannot be answered cannot (or,
at least, should not} be asktK/ (1922, sec. 6.5).
Utterances of sentences like (1) and (2) as well as of
certain sentences that Arrington might include within his
list of substantive moral principles play a role within a
natural moral standpoint.
of the speaker.

They express a stance on the part

They thus convey the ontological comnitments

of those who adopt the stance and engage in certain practices; in the case of (1) the conmitment is to the wrongfulness of lying.
The sentences contained under (3) are not, however, uttered from within the natural ethical standpoint.

They are

pieces of philosophical parlance which, while expressive, express a confusion.

The description of a grammatical proposi-

tion as a necessary truth results from the cognitivist impulse to provide epistemological foundations for specific
moral claims.

As we have noted, Wittgenstein's rule-follow-

ing considerations run contrary to this impulse.

Grammatical

proposition have their status, not because they reflect a
necessary truth, but because their acceptance (their remaining unquestioned for the most part} makes our practices possible.

In an CSrta~ntyWittgenstein expresses the point well

by suggesting that granmatical propositions are Mlike the

axis around which a body rotates.

This axis is not fixed in

the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement
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around it determines its immobility (1969, sec. 152) . 33

The

cognitivist will undoubtedly interpret this as a flaw in our
moral discourse:

that it cannot be grounded in the required

way means our moral beliefs could all turn out to be false;
the rational person is entitled to be skeptical about all
moral claims.
But this is mistaken.

What the cognitivist requires in

terms of justification just cannot exist.

This suggests not

so much a flaw in our moral discourse and practices generally, but an incorrect picture of the nature of moral discourse
on the part of the cognitivist.

Moral grammatical proposi-

tions provide a point of reference with respect to which specific moral judgments may be determined to be true or false.
But what shall serve as a reference point for determining
whether a grammatical proposition is true?
'

Is this not, as

Wittgenstein says (1958, sec. 217), the point at which we
reach bedrock and our spade is turned?

The question of the

cognitivist in search of rational justification is like that
of the child who asks uwell, why shouldn't I lie?"

It is a

piece of nonssnss, in that it is a question that has run up

against the bounds of sense.

To say that the question that

cannot be answered cannot be asked is just to say that there
is no context in which utterances of that sort have any role.
The practice of 11sk.ing for .Just.if.ic11t.ion does not occur hsrs.
Far from sanctioning skepticism with regard to ethics,
these considerations establish the autonomy of ethics, or, as
Arrington would say, the autonomy of our moral language
(1989, p. 260).
11

Moral grmmaatical propositions cannot be

This passage is cited in Levvis (1992), p. 75.
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given rational justification, but neither do they require it.
It is the desire to provide it with a foundation that is nonsensical; it is the expression of that desire which is nonsensical.

What this means is that we may s11fs.lyengage in

such tasks as forming moral judgments, criticizing one another, expressing our approval or dissaproval
without rational foundation.

11s M!!J

do, that is

Morality answers to us, a point

even Kant, the rationalist, acknowledges.

But whereas Kant

thought that moral rules must answer to our rationality, the
viewpoint defended here insists that it must answer to our
entire nature--to our emotions, attitudes, sentiments and
sensibilities.

As I said above, this does not mean that

morality is subjective or that the disagreeable actions of
others are i11111une from criticism.

Those would be conclusions

one might draw only if one regarded the lack of a foundation
as a flaw.

light.

Rather, disagreements are cast in a different

Their resolution cannot be viewed as merely the

achieving of rational agreement.

Instead, their resolution

is an attunement of sensibilities, a sharing of a certain
sort of stance.
Let me conclude with an account of the kinds of sentences contained in (4) and (5).
meta-ethical claims.

These qualify as full-blown

It is here that Blackburn's quasi-real-

ism is of the greatest help.

From within the natural ethical

standpoint (4) and (5) are patent nonsense.

From the stand-

point of one who engages in such 'linguistic' practices as
ascribing value, registering dissapproval and offering condemnation, (4) and (5) have no use.
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Their utterance could

play no role w~th~n those language-games.

Nevertheless the

natural standpoint, the various stances we take up when not
engaged in a theoretical examination of ordinary moral judgments, has no monopoly on ontological coillllitment.

In this

respect Blackburn's view seems to diverge from
Wittgenstein's.

There OHybe some context in which utter-

ances of (4) and (5) do play a role; that context will not be
the one in which someone must arrive at an ordinary normative
judgment.

(4) and (5) belong to the pronouncements of meta·

ethics n8tura1~st~ca11yconstrued.

As I point out below,

they belong to the psychology, sociology, sociolinguistics of
moral discourse.

And if that is the case, then the autonomy

of our moral discouse-·of m:,r42~ty--entails a continuity be·
tween meta-ethics and the social sciences.

That is of no

small consequence, since it suggests there is no purely
philosophical approach to meta-ethics.

5.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

What this dissertation emphasizes is that moral language
must be understood in its variety, in terms of its function
within its general context.

That means that certain ap-

proaches to the study of meta-ethics are more appropriate
than others.

Within meta-ethics, there has been a tradition-

al split between normative and descriptive approaches.

The

normative approach is concerned with telling us how we ought
to think about moral issues.

Kant's moral theory (1785) is

one such example of that kind of approach.
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His Categorical

Imperative tells us how we should form moral judgments, that
we should will our actions to be universalizable.

The de·

scriptive approach, though, lays out how we actually think
about moral issues.
approach,

Wittgensteinians in general follow this

It is not that I want to discount the normative

approach, but the descriptive approach, in general

does

offer more insight into what we actually do as moral agents.
In this. dissertation we moved from the least naturalistic approaches, Moore's and Katz's theories, for example, to
the more descriptive views, those of Platts, McDowell,
Arrington and Blackburn.

One of the chief criticisms of

Moore's intuitionist view was that it could not adequately
explain how we actually form false moral beliefs.

Katz's

theory was able to accomodate false moral beliefs yet his
theory is nevertheless deficient in that he holds that platonic senses are the determinants of reference.

As my dis-

sertation has shown, concrete linguistic tokens are better
candidates for determinants of reference and the
Wittgensteinian view defended in this dissertation does give
prominence to the semantic role which linguistic tokens play.
Platts and McDowell were both referred to as descriptive
realists in that their accounts of morality demonstrated

Wittgenstein's Mlook and see• approach.

McDowell, in partic-

ular, emphasized that in order to understand the moral judgments of a group one had to be able to understand their form
of life or shared practices.

Arrington, also a

Wittgensteinian, though he appreciates the fact that such realists do not view moral sentences in isolation and, as such,
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have bridged the gap between moral discourse and practice,
criticizes such realists on the grounds that their accounts
of morality suffer from not making the necessary distinctions
between different types of moral claims.

Arrington points

out that we must understand the logical and semantical
relations found with our moral language if we are to have an
adequate account of morality.

His view is a description of

these different relations, and as such, his view offers us
deeper insight into what we are actually doing as moral
agents.

His theory, which he refers to as conceptual rela-

tivism, is an anti-realist view.
his theory

t!IS

But it is his reference to

t!I.Dt.i-rst!l1.ist which causes a problem.

And the

problem is this: to proclaim oneself to be an anti-realist
just is to proclaim a meta-ethical truth.

But Arrington's

theory tells us that meta-ethical claims are nonsense in that
they have no meaningful role to play within our moral language games.
As I suggested earlier, though, an account can be given
of meta-ethical claims which can be added to the fundamental
features of Arrington's theory.

Such an account is found in

Blackburn's expressivist view of morality.

Blackburn's theo-

ry is to a great extent a Humean view of morality in that he
emphasizes that our moral judgments involve a blend of cognition and sentiment.

I believe that his view is the most de-

fensible in that his description of our moral behavior discloses (alternate) ways of valuing by pointing out the existence of spread properties, that it is we who project our
values onto the world.

All in all, his quasi-realist view of
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the nature of morality best legitimizes the descriptive approach.
This is not the end of the story, though.

The descrip-

tive approach has offered us greater insight into how it is
that we make the moral judgments we do and, as a result, has
shown that meta-ethics should now be viewed as an aspect of
social science, but there is certainly more work to be done.
This approach, then, points to further research that is not
within the scope of this dissertation.

The type of research

I have in mind includes investigations of roles within legal
contexts, analyses of interactions between children (as found
in Gilligan's A D~fferent Vo~ce), as well as other socio-linguistic projects.

The purpose behind such research, then, is

to give us more knowledge about ourselves so that we will be
able to ask ourselves whether the moral values we hold
presently are ones that we should continue to hold.

The de-

scriptive approach, then, allows us to better formulate our
moral viewpoints.

It makes us consider whether the values we

presently have are ones we should want to inculcate among our
people.
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